Chinese Investment and Construction in Sub-Saharan Africa

 The American Enterprise Institute published in November 2026 a study titled "China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Facts About Investing and Building" by Ian Jones and Derek Scissors.

This is an important study that concludes China's engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa has pivoted from building infrastructure in populous countries to buying assets in mineral-rich ones, with state-owned enterprises undertaking most of the activity in both cases.

Metals account for 75 percent of investment in 2023-2025 compared to 49 percent in 2005-2025.  State investors predominate, and in 2023-2025, Chinese investment was focused in the DRC, Zambia, Guinea, and Botswana.  Copper attracts the most money.  

Solomonic Decision by Angola and Tanzania Skirts Great Power Competition

 West Africa Weekly published on 30 October 2026 an article titled "Tanzania and Angola Agree to Link Atlantic and Indian Ocean Rail Corridors."

Tanzania and Angola have agreed to link Angola's Benguela railway that connects to the Atlantic Ocean with the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) that connects to the Indian Ocean.  China originally built and continues to support TAZARA while the United States and European Union support the Lobito Corridor project in Angola, the DRC, and Zambia.

This decision by Angola and Tanzania effectively links the competing Western and Chinese railway projects into a single network that does not force the African countries to choose between the West and China.

Zambia to Settle Some Copper Sales in Chinese Yuan

 Business Insider Africa published on 15 October 2025 an article titled "Zambia to Settle Some Copper Sales in Chinese Yuan as Africa's Biggest Trading Partner Steps Up Challenge to Dollar Dominance" by Adekunle Agbetiloye.

Starting early next year, Zambia will accept the Chinese yuan for some copper exports, marking a move away from US dollar dependency.  China's push to internationalize the yuan is gaining momentum as growing numbers of yuan settlements strengthen China-Africa commercial relations.

Chinese Buddhism in Africa

 Global China Pulse published on 22 September 2026 an essay titled "Buddhism Reconfigured through Language: Reflections from a Chinese Temple in Tanzania" by Mingyi Xiao.  

This is an account of the Chinese Buddhist Tanhua Temple in Dar es Salaam established at the request of the Chinese community in Tanzania.  The essay examines the role of language in the localization and adaptation of Chinese Buddhism through everyday experiences at the temple.  The focus of the temple is the teaching of Buddhism and Mandarin.

Chinese Buddhist institutions are an emerging presence in Africa.  There are similar temples in Zambia and Botswana.  The author concludes that Chinese Buddhism in Africa remains a work in progress.  

African Copper and China

 Thierry Pairault posted on 7 September 2026 an analysis titled "African Copper and China."

China has become a major player in the copper industry.  China accounts for 48 percent of the world's copper refining capacity, while its mine production is estimated at only 8 percent of world production and it holds only 4 percent of world reserves.

Africa's two major copper exporters, the DRC and Zambia, already had duty free access to China for copper in all its forms.  China's recent removal of all tariffs on all African exports, except from Eswatini will not impact their export of copper to China.  The main obstacle facing the DRC and Zambia is their ability to meet demand, whether through extracting more copper or withstanding competition from other suppliers such as Chile and Peru.     

US Africa Assistant Secretary's Visit to Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya

 Firstpost posted on 1 September 2026 a 15-minute podcast titled "Trump Targets Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya" with Alyson Le Grange.

The podcast reviews US ties with Zambia, Ethiopia, and Kenya as US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Frank Garcia, makes his inaugural visit to those countries.  Le Grange discusses critical minerals in Zambia, Red Sea security with Ethiopia, and Kenya's status as the only US non-NATO ally in sub-Saharan Africa.  She asks about Washington's "trade not aid" policy and wonders what Africa wants out of its relationship with the United States.

US Critical Minerals Policy in Africa

 The Global South Policy Hub, a Washington-based nonpartisan think tank, published on 17 August 2026 a paper titled "Aligning U.S. Critical Minerals Policy with Africa's Development Agenda" by Alaka Lugonzo.  

Africa holds about 30 percent of the world's critical minerals that power renewable energy technology.  Africa's critical mineral wealth is rapidly reshaping its relationship with the United States.  The author argues that current US mineral partnerships remain heavily tilted toward securing supply chains rather than delivering shared economic benefits.  

The United States has an opportunity to rethink its approach by moving away from extractive relationships toward transparent industrial partnerships along the lines of the African Union's African Green Mineral Strategy (AGMS).  A more sustainable approach would align US strategic interests with Africa's development agenda.

Comment:  While this is sound advice, China is a much larger importer of Africa's critical minerals than the United States.  It would be useful if some organization, particularly one in Africa, could offer similar advice for Beijing.

China and US Following Zambian Election: Critical Minerals Are the Prize

 The Associated Press published on 14 August 2026 an article titled "Zambia Awaits Presidential Election Results. Here's Why China and the US May Be Interested" by Jacob Zimba.

Zambia awaits the results of an election that will decide whether President Hakainde Hichilema wins a second five-year term.  Both China and the US are interested in Zambian copper and cobalt and hence the outcome of the election and its impact on each country.

African Solar Manufacturing May Not Compete with Chinese Imports

 The Associated Press published on 8 August 2026 an article titled "Africa Wants More Homegrown Solar to Boost Self-Reliance, but China's Shadow Remains" by Allan Olingo and Chan Ho-Him.

Several African countries are building more domestic solar manufacturing capacity, but they face competition from China's dominant global role in making solar cells and other components.  Africa is a perfect market for China's overcapacity in this sector.

Somali Diaspora in Africa and Giving Back to Somalia

 The August 2026 issue of Africa Spectrum includes an "Introduction to the Special Issue: Giving in Somali Diaspora Humanitarianism in Africa" by Nauja Kleist and Mark Bardbury.

The articles in this special issue of Africa Spectrum demonstrate that Somali diaspora humanitarian engagement is continuously evolving and comes in many forms.  It is influenced by gender, generation, educational background, and socio-economic circumstances.  

The issue is unique in that it focuses on the Somali diaspora in a number of African countries and not the diaspora in North America or Europe.  

How China and the US Pursue African Critical Minerals

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals.  China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals.  The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.  

Zambia Ends Raw Copper Exports to China and Elsewhere

 Business Insider Africa published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Copper Producer Curbs Raw Copper Exports and Makes Demands of Chinese Firms" by Awogbemila Temitope.

The Zambian government has restricted unrefined copper exports to force foreign mining and industrial companies to build local processing plants.  Chinese companies invest heavily in Zambia's mining sector and will be the most impacted by this policy change.

China-Africa Trade First Half 2026

 Thierry Pairault just posted a paper titled "The Tariff Exemption Saga and the Results for the First Half of 2026."

China's zero tariff policy for all countries in Africa except Eswatini took effect on 1 May.  During the first half of 2026 Africa's trade deficit with China widened from $44.7 billion to $57.9 billion as of the end of the first half of 2026 compared with the first half of 2025.  Chinese exports to Africa rose by 21.8 percent and imports from Africa by 16.3 percent compared with the same period in 2025.

Eight African countries (South Africa, DRC, Zambia, South Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Algeria, and Zimbabwe) accounted for about 94 percent of the increase in Chinese imports from Africa during this period.  Almost the entire increase in the value of African exports to China was due to the shock in world commodity prices, largely independent of the zero-tariff policy.  

China's New Gold Strategy Runs Through Africa

 TrendsNAfrica published on 1 July 2026 an article titled "China's New Gold Strategy Runs Through Africa:  How Beijing Is Rewriting the Global Bullion Market."

Beijing is quietly reshaping the mechanics of the international gold trade.  Its strategy involves dismantling speculative domestic paper-gold trading while building an international ecosystem centered on physical bullion, yuan-based settlements, and African mineral wealth.

About 40 percent of the world's remaining underground gold reserves are located in Africa.  China is reducing its holdings of US Treasury securities and replacing them with gold purchases, especially in Africa.  

Zimbabwe Shuts Down Chinese Lithium Company for Fraud

 Discovery Alert published on 16 July 2026 an article titled "San Ding Lithium Shutdown: Zimbabwe's $3.65M Mining Fraud Exposed" by Muflih Hidayat.  

Zimbabwe holds Africa's largest lithium reserves and Chinese companies have invested more than $2 billion in the lithium sector.  China's San Ding Lithium operated through the fabrication of receipts and invoices to disguise fund diversions.  Zimbabwe charged two San Ding Lithium officials with two charges of fraud and shut down the company.

Zambia's Reasons for Cancelling Major Human Rights Summit

 Just Security published on 2 June 2026 a commentary titled "In Addition to Chinese Pressure, a Backsliding Democracy May Explain Zambia's Decision to Cancel a Major Human Rights Summit" by Jane Munga and Steve Feldstein.

Days before 2,600 human rights defenders, technologists, and policymakers were expected in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 30, the Zambian government called off RightsCon, the world's largest conference on digital rights.  

According to the summit organizers, the cancellation was due to foreign interference from China "because Taiwanese civil society participants were planning to join us in person."  But a closer look reveals a more complicated picture linked to Zambia's democratic decline and more repressive policies.  

Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa

 Boston University's Global Development Policy Center published in June 2026 a paper titled "Development Quid Pro Quo: Chinese Finance and Critical Mineral Access in Africa" by Congyi Dai.

The paper explores whether China's development finance agenda is motivated by its global quest for natural resources, facilitating mine acquisitions in Africa.  It uses four data sources to examine whether Chinese development finance is tied to the pursuit of critical minerals.

The paper concludes that minerals needed for clean energy technologies such as copper, cobalt, nickel, and platinum group metals are associated with Chinese loan commitments to recipient countries.  Specifically, uranium is the mineral most strongly linked to Chinese development projects, particularly those including a substantial grant component and highly concessional repayment terms.

China, US, EU Competition for Critical Minerals in Africa and Latin America

Modern Diplomacy published on 21 May 2026 an article titled "Geology Meets Geopolitics: The Global Race for Critical Minerals in the Climate Transition" by Marta Rehnman, Trinity College Dublin.

China dominates the processing of critical minerals in Africa and Latin America.  Beijing has mining partnerships with 44 African countries.  But the United States and European Union are stepping up competition for unexploited mineral reserves in both Africa and Latin America.  

How African Countries Can Get Better Value from Chinese-Supported Power Projects

 Energy for Growth Hub published on 18 May 2026 an article titled "Four Ways African Countries Can Secure Better Outcomes from Chinese-supported Power Projects" by Naa Adjekai Adjei.

Ghana's experience with Chinese-supported power projects demonstrates that it is possible to achieve better results with cost benchmarking, competitive procurement, stronger finance negotiation, and project oversight expertise.

Likely Impact of China's Zero Tariff Policy on African Imports (in French)

 GeopoWeb posted on 18 May 2026 an analysis titled "Africa, China, and Zero Tariffs: A Diplomatic Gesture Put to the Test by the Data" by Thierry Pairault.  

Effective on May 1, China began a policy of zero tariffs on imports from all African countries except Eswatini, which recognizes Taiwan.  Six African countries (South Africa, DRC, Angola, Guinea, Zambia, and Congo Brazzaville) now supply three quarters of China's imports from Africa.  Most of these imports consist of minerals, metals, and crude oil, which already enter China duty free.

A modest quantity of African agricultural products will benefit from the zero-tariff policy.  Landlocked African countries, which tend to be among the poorest, will receive little or no benefit from the zero-tariff policy because of transportation constraints.  In addition, non-tariff barriers such as sanitary standards remain in effect.  Thierry identifies several other barriers to increased African exports to China that will limit the impact of the zero-tariff policy.  He also compares the impact of EU and Chinese imports from Africa.

Thierry concludes the zero-tariff policy has less to do with rebalancing trade between China and Africa than it is an effective diplomatic tool at little cost to China but also limited in its economic impact.