Saudi Arabia's Red Sea Maritime Alliance

 Firstpost posted on 15 August 2026 an article titled "What Is Saudi Arabia's New Red Sea Maritime Alliance?"

Saudi Arabia hosted 43 nations in Riyadh in late July and launched the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition that, so far, unites 14 regional countries to protect the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden.  It aims to counter Houthi threats coming from Yemen, secure global trade routes, and reduce reliance on Western maritime security operations.

Countries that have signed on are Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and the internationally recognized government in Yemen.  Notable omissions are Eritrea, India, UAE, and Oman.  

Iran War Intensifies US-China Competition in Africa

 The Middle East Council on Global Affairs, a policy research institution based in Doha, Qatar, published on 16 July 2026 a commentary titled "Iran War Intensifies U.S.-China Rivalry in Africa" by Mustapha Boudoumi.

Disruptions to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the strategic importance of African choke points such as the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb.  The situation in Iran has put increasing focus on China-US competition for critical minerals in Africa.  

Namibia Signs 8 Cooperation Agreements with China

 Discovery Alert posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's Oil, Uranium & Lithium Strategic Partnership with China 2026" by Muflih Hidayat.  

The China-Namibia strategic partnership entered a new chapter in July 2026 when Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a state visit to China.  She signed 8 cooperation agreements that focus on green minerals, uranium, lithium, oil and gas, ports, technology transfer, and clean energy.

US-China Competition in the Middle East and North Africa

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.

Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity.  The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries.  As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.  

The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region.  For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key.  Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas.  These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.  

How African Countries Can Get Better Value from Chinese-Supported Power Projects

 Energy for Growth Hub published on 18 May 2026 an article titled "Four Ways African Countries Can Secure Better Outcomes from Chinese-supported Power Projects" by Naa Adjekai Adjei.

Ghana's experience with Chinese-supported power projects demonstrates that it is possible to achieve better results with cost benchmarking, competitive procurement, stronger finance negotiation, and project oversight expertise.

Mozambique Considers Converting Dollar Debt for Chinese Yuan

 Bloomberg published on 5 May 2026 an article titled "Mozambique Weighs Swapping Dollar Debt for Yuan in China Talks" by Tavares Cebola.

Mozambique is considering converting the $1.4 billion it owes China into yuan loans as part of a debt restructuring with its biggest bilateral creditor.  

Evolution of China's Policy on the Western Sahara

 The ChinaMed Project published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "From Neutrality to Strategic Ambiguity: China and the Western Sahara Conflict" by Imane Ezzehouany, Bianca Pasquier, and Amanda Chen.  

This analysis examines the evolution of China's position on the Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb.  The rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years raise questions whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco's autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.  

World Bank Assessment of Sub-Saharan Africa's Growth Prospects

 The World Bank Group published in April 2026 "Africa Economic Update: Making Industrial Policy Work in Africa."

The World Bank projects that growth in Sub-Saharan Africa for 2026 will average 4.1 percent, the same as in 2025.  Downside risks, however, are emerging due in large part to disruptions caused by the war in Iran.  They include rising fuel, food, and fertilizer prices together with tighter financial conditions that are likely to push inflation higher, disrupt economic activity, and disproportionately affect the most vulnerable households which spend a larger share of their income on food and energy.

China Projected to Dominate Africa's Solar Panel Imports

 The Wire, a digital news magazine, posted on 5 April 2026 an article titled "China's Solar Industry Follows the Sun to Africa" by Noah Berman.  

Based on the current trend of Chinese solar panel sales to Africa, China will become the critical supplier of energy infrastructure to Africa by the end of the decade.  There is concern, however, that this may result in dependency on China with Africa becoming a dumping ground for Chinese solar products.

Will War with Iran Impact the Horn of Africa?

 The Emirates Policy Center published on 27 March 2026 an analysis titled "Exacerbating the Risk of Fragility: Consequences of Iran War on the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa Region."

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea may become an arena for escalating regional and international conflict as Iran seeks to expand its confrontation with the US and Israel.  It could escalate existing local conflicts, intensify competition by regional powers such as Türkiye and Egypt, and cause a recalibration of foreign policy alignments.  

The Plusses and Minuses of China's Investment and Trade in Africa

 The Conversation published on 10 March 2026 a commentary titled "China in Africa: Investment and Trade Work Well When There's Strong Oversight, and Badly When There Isn't" by Vincent Tawiah, Dublin City University.

The author concludes that Chinese investment, loans, and trade in Africa offer substantial economic opportunity, but they can also lead to the rapid depletion of vital energy and forestry resources, undermining long-term development goals if institutional guardrails are weak.

China Dominates Investment Proposals in Angola

 Business Insider Africa published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Oil Producer Says China Dominated $21.88 Investment Proposals Over Five Years" by Solomon Ekanem.

Angola has received 596 investment proposals worth an estimated $21.8 billion over the past five years. with Chinese investors accounting for 80 percent of the total.  

Chinese Cobalt Mine in DRC Causes Health Problems

 The Environmental Investigation Agency and PremiCongo published in March 2026 a report titled "Toxic Transition: How the World's Largest Cobalt Producer Has Allegedly Poisoned Communities for Years."

A Chinese company, CMOC Group Ltd., controls two of the world's largest copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Thousands of people live within a few kilometers of the operations and its massive processing plant.  Local communities and civil society groups have sounded the alarm about severe health issues.  Since 2023, doctors and nurses near the mines have treated a growing list of patients.

China Replaces South Africa as Primary Chrome Processor

 Discovery Alert posted on 1 March 2026 an analysis titled "China Becomes World's Leading Chrome Processor Overtaking South Africa" by Muflih Hidayat.  

Ferrochrome production, which is essential for stainless steel, requires consistent, energy-intensive processing.  Although South Africa is the source of much of the world's chrome ore, China's coal-based power generation is more reliable and cheaper than South Africa's electricity.  Consequently, processing of the ore has shifted from South Africa to China.

Indian Ocean: Economic and Strategic Corridors

 The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.  

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.

The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security.  Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital.  A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.

In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.

Chinese Mining-Energy Investments in Zimbabwe

 The South African Institute of International Affairs published in January 2026 a paper titled "Examining Integrated Chinese Mining-Energy Investments in Zimbabwe" by Yaseen Tayob and Adrian Joseph.

The paper assesses Chinese investments in Zimbabwe's mining and energy sectors and shows that they provide identifiable economic value to the Zimbabwean economy, particularly in the country's lithium mining sector.

The Complexities of the China-Libya Relationship

 The ChinaMed Project published on 30 January 2026 an analysis titled "China and the Libyan Crisis: Maintaining a Foot in the Door in a Changing Region" by Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni.  

This paper revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing's evolving relations with the country's factions and situating them within a regional context.  It concludes that China is unlikely to engage deeply in Libya's power struggles.  Beijing will likely keep its options open, be present but uncommitted.  

Revival of the Belt and Road Initiative in Africa

 Australia's Griffith University and the Green Finance & Development Center in Shanghai published on 18 January 2026 "China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2025" by Christoph Nedopil Wang.

Since the beginning of BRI in 2013, the report says Chinese construction projects (profit making opportunities by Chinese construction companies) totaled $837 billion globally while investment projects totaled $561 billion globally.  The figures are based on having an active memorandum of understanding with China at the time of the report.  Energy, mining, and transportation projects top the list.

In 2025, Africa accounted for a significant increase ($61.2 billion) in BRI engagement (construction projects and investment), but most of it was in construction projects (47 percent of global total) and not investment (22 percent of global total).  Nigeria alone accounted for $24.6 billion in construction projects and the Republic of the Congo for another $23.1 billion.  

An Analysis of Russia-Africa Ties and Role of US

 Riddle published on 18 December 2025 an analysis titled "Russia-Africa Ties Catch Global Tailwinds in 2025" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, research fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security, a think tank in the Nordic and Baltic space.  

Russia and Egypt are cohosting this week the 2nd Russia-Africa ministerial conference, which is setting the agenda for the 2026 Russia-Africa summit.  The focus is on expanding trade with Africa, which is currently smaller than Ukraine's trade with the continent.  Russian investment barely registers, and Moscow has fallen from the number one arms supplier to number two.

On the other hand, Russia's covert and security ties with Africa remain robust.  Moscow now has 22 "Russia House" branches in Africa, opened two new embassies in 2025, and has plans for five more.  The author adds that "with the US abandoning its leadership role, Moscow--working in tandem with Beijing--gains more space to offer governments worldwide an alternative to the US-led, post-Cold War order."  In addition, President Trump "has expressed open contempt (if not hatred) toward the continent."

Africa Mostly an Afterthought in US National Security Strategy

 The White House released this week the Trump administration's "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" dated November 2025.  

Africa receives relatively brief attention at the end of the 29-page report, although the introduction does include the Egypt/Ethiopia conflict as one of the eight conflicts President Trump has settled in his first eight months in office.

Rather than spread liberal ideology, according to the strategy paper, the US should instead look to partner with select countries to ameliorate conflict, foster mutually beneficial trade relationships, and transition from a foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm. It should favor partnerships with capable and reliable states committed to opening their markets to US goods and services.  The US should seek good returns on investment in the energy and critical minerals sectors.  The US should avoid any long-term American presence or commitments. 

Comment:  The short section on Africa clearly reflects the Trump administration's "America First" strategy.  A policy towards Africa based on trade and investment is a noble goal, but largely dependent on the willingness and ability of the American private sector to implement it.  Past history demonstrates that without significant US government incentives, this policy is likely to disappoint.  

The inclusion of the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia as one of the eight resolved by President Trump in his first eight months may come as a surprise to Ethiopia and Egypt.