PLA Upgrades Communications and Intel Capability at Djibouti Military Base

 The Center for Strategic and International Studies published on 17 September 2026 an article titled "Extended Range: China Upgrades Its Military Base in Djibouti" by Matthew Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Douglas Comstock.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has installed new equipment at its military base in Djibouti that will strengthen its internal communications capabilities and enable signals intelligence collection.

This new equipment allows the PLA to maintain redundant over-the-horizon communications with Chinese ships and aircraft operating in the region and provides secure communications channels with command headquarters in China.  It probably enables the PLA to monitor the activities of other military bases in Djibouti.

Strategic Calculus of Xi Jinping's Visit to Egypt

 The Diplomat published on 8 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Strategic Calculus of Xi Jinping's Egypt Visit" by Ayesha Sikandar, National Defense University.

Xi Jinping's 1-2 September state visit to Egypt symbolized a broader shift among Middle Eastern states toward diversifying their foreign policy partnerships.

For Egypt, the visit signals not a pivot away from the United States, but rather a realignment to achieve more strategic autonomy amidst volatility in the Middle East.

Key Takeaways from President Xi Jinping's Trip to Egypt

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 3 September 2026 a commentary titled "The Two Key Takeaways from Xi's Egypt Visit" by Amr Hamzawy.

The author concluded that "China's influence in the Middle East is on the rise, and Egypt's international partnerships amid regional turmoil in the Middle East are growing.  Those are the two key takeaways of Xi's visit to Egypt."

Chinese and American Approach to Egypt

 Armstrong Economics posted on 24 August 2026 a commentary titled "China and Egypt Unite" by Martin Armstrong.

The author argues that Washington never seems to understand that trade and geopolitical influence go hand in hand, citing the case of China's influence in Egypt.  The United States sees Egypt in a military context while China looks at Egypt as a commercial gateway connecting three continents.

Eritrea After Isaias Afwerki

 Twin Cities, Minnesota radio station Voices of Ethiopia posted on 21 August 2026 a commentary titled "After Isaias: Could Eritrea's Succession Crisis Destabilize the Red Sea?"

Since independence in 1995, Isaias Afwerki has been the center of power in Eritrea.  This commentary raises the question whether Eritrea can undergo a transfer of power without triggering a struggle among the military, security establishment, political elite, and competing regional interests--and whether a potential struggle could spill beyond Eritrea's borders.  Internal fragmentation, a proxy struggle along the Red Sea, and even normalization of relations with Ethiopia are all possible.

 

Securing the Red Sea

 The Hollings Center for International Dialogue published in July 2026 a brief titled "Securing Strategic Waters Across the MENA Region: The Red Sea."

The current threat in the Red Sea is not confined to the closure of the geographical Bab el-Mandeb choke point.  It is shaped by persistent uncertainty caused by the security crises in the wider region.

The threat cannot be addressed through conventional naval tools alone, nor reduced to a piracy or law enforcement problem.  The brief recommends incremental cooperation, capacity building, and risk mitigation measures.

US-China Competition in the Middle East and North Africa

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.

Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity.  The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries.  As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.  

The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region.  For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key.  Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas.  These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.  

Indian Ocean: Economic and Strategic Corridors

 The Emirates Policy Center posted on 27 February 2026 an analysis titled "The Economics of Deterrence: How Corridors and Alliances Are Reshaping Geopolitics" by Ebtesam AlKetbi.  

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are frameworks for redistributing centers of gravity and influence, diversifying states' strategic options, and embedding long-term investment commitments.

The world is shifting from rigid alignments to flexible alliances that integrate economy and technology with digital and maritime security.  Power is no longer defined solely by territorial control but by the management of flows--trade, energy, data, and capital.  A state that positions itself as a central node within these networks gains strategic weight.

In the Indian Ocean region, both the Indian-led IMEC and the better known and more expansive Chinese BRI are efforts to achieve these objectives.

China Counters Western Alliances in Global South

 Modern Diplomacy published on 31 January 2026 a commentary titled "How China Courts the Global South to Counter U.S. Alliances" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University in Egypt. 

China is countering Western alliances by drawing on its soft power and economic engagement through the Belt and Road Initiative, rapid military modernization, the formation of counter alliances such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and "gray zone" tactics.  China's goal is to shape a multipolar world order.  

China Offers Security Alternative to US in Africa and Arab World

 Modern Diplomacy published on 21 January 2026 a commentary titled "China Recalibrates Military Outreach, Strengthening Officer Training for Africa and the Arab States" by Nadia Helmy, Beni Suef University in Egypt.

The People's Liberation Army is working to shape the loyalties of future military elites in Africa and the Middle East by emphasizing military training to counter the role of the United States.  Its military base in Djibouti is an important part of this effort.

Ukraine's Efforts to Counter Russia in Africa

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 20 November 2025 an analysis titled "A Shadow War in the Global South: Are Kyiv's Operations in Africa Paying Off?" by Sam Bowden.  

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kyiv has conducted intelligence operations against the Kremlin across Africa and the Middle East.  Kyiv opened 8 new embassies in Africa after the Russian invasion in 2022, raising its total to 19.  But Ukraine's efforts continue to lag well behind Russia's engagement in Africa, and its outreach to the continent has been limited at best.  

Commercial Ship Apparently Responsible for Red Sea Cable Cutting

 The Associated Press published on 8 September 2025 an article titled "Commercial Shipping Likely Cut Red Sea Cables that Disrupted Internet Access, Experts Say" by Jon Gambrell.

A commercial ship dragging an anchor likely cut the four undersea cables in the Red Sea that disrupted internet access in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

China: Falling Crude Oil Imports from Africa

 Visual Capitalist published on 2 September 2025 a chart titled "Visualizing China's Crude Oil Imports by Country" by Dorothy Neufeld and Joyce Ma.

The chart shows China's crude oil imports by major source in 2024.  African countries accounted for less than 9 percent of China's total imports.  This percentage has been steadily declining over the last 15 years but has stabilized in the last couple of years at this low level.

By comparison, in 2024 China received 57 percent of its crude from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, and Iran.  Another 20 percent came from Russia.    

China and Egypt Hold First Joint Air Force Exercise

 Newsweek published on 22 April 2025 an article titled "China Shows Off New Warplanes in Challenge to U.S." by Amira El-Fekki.

China's first joint air force exercise with Egypt highlighted Beijing's push to project power into the Middle East and North Africa.  The PLA Air Force sent J-10c and J-10s fighters while Egypt fielded its MiG-29 aircraft for the exercise.

USAID's Door Closing Quickly

 The Washington Post published on 7 April 2025 an article titled "Marco Rubio Said He'd Protect Lifesaving Aid Overseas.  DOGE Disagreed" by Annie Gowen.

USAID's new 28-year-old deputy administrator from the DOGE team has ordered the termination of key medical and emergency assistance work across Africa and the Middle East.  His order seems to contradict Secretary of State Marco Rubio's promise to continue lifesaving USAID programs.  

US Suspends Funding for Counterterrorism in Africa and Middle East

 The Washington Post published on 16 February 2025 an article titled "Trump's Global Funding Freeze Leaves Anti-terror Programs in Limbo" by Katharine Houreld, Rachel Carson, Susannah George, and Mustafa Salim.  

The Trump administration's suspension of funding for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program is leaving ongoing training programs in countries like Somalia in limbo.  This provides an opportunity for terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab to step up their efforts to topple legitimate governments.  

Russia in the Middle East and North Africa

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 2 December 2024 a study titled "Russia in the Middle East and North Africa: Arms, Power Projection, and Nuclear Diplomacy" edited by Amr Hamzawy.

The study contains the following chapters:

Introduction - Russia in the Middle East and North Africa--Disrupting Washington's Influence and Redefining Moscow's Global Role by Amr Hamzawy.

1. The Soviet Roots of Putin's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East by Mark N. Katz.

2.  Russia's Balancing Act in the Levant by Maha Yahya and Mohanad Hage Ali.

3.  Soviet and Russian Policies Toward Egypt: Two Snapshots by Amr Hamzawy and Rain Ji.

4.  A Mixed Balance Sheet: Russia's Uneven Influence in the Maghreb by Frederic Wehrey.

5.  Autocrats United: How Russia and Iran Defy the U.S.-led Global Order by Nicole Grajewski and Karim Sadjadpour.

6. China and Russia in the Gulf: A Cacophony of Influence and Interest by Robert Mogielnicki.

7,  Turkiye and Russia: An Unequal Partnership by Sinan Ulgen.

8.  Russia's Enduring Presence in the Middle East by Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss.

9.  Russia's Great Energy Game in the Middle East by Sergey Vakulenko.  

An Analysis of China's Approach to the Red Sea Crisis

 The 2024 fall edition of Middle East Policy contains an article titled "Security in Neutrality: Chinese Engagement in the Middle East and the Red Sea Crisis" by Christopher K. Colley and Joshua R. Goodman, both at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base.

The authors conclude that the primary goal of China in the Red Sea crisis is to use diplomacy to avoid escalation and entanglement in military conflict.  Its second preference is to free ride on the efforts of others.  If there are clear dangers to Chinese nationals or economic interests, it is prepared to respond militarily.  

A Decade of Egypt-Russia Relations

 The South African Institute of International Affairs published in September 2024 a paper titled "Strategic Partners or Tactical Allies? A Decade of Egypt-Russia Relations" by Heba Taha, Lund University of Sweden.

The paper assesses the drivers of the Egyptian-Russian relationship and its evolution over the past decade.  The author concludes that the relationship reflects a tactical convergence and is mostly structured around mutual interests.  Egypt forms a key part of Russia's turn to the Middle East and Africa.  At the same time, Egypt perceives closer cooperation with Russia as a way to balance its relationship with the United States.  

The Middle East's View of the China Model

 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) published in September 2024 a report titled "The Middle East's View of the 'China Model'" by Jon B. Alterman.  

The CSIS Middle East Program researched Arab populations' desire for an alternative development model to the one proffered by Western states.  The project focused on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.

The study concluded that China's Middle East strategy is focused on the United States, but China is not engaged in straightforward competition.  China's strategy does not seek to replace the United States in the Middle East, push it out, or outcompete it.  Instead, China is working to untie the Middle East from the United States and to make the region and world more receptive to China.

China will continue to seek to increase its role in the Middle East.  The United States should not fear China's presence.  Rather, Washington needs to sharpen regional understandings of the value of U.S. partnerships, lower the costs of maintaining them, and clarify the consequences of undermining them.