Discovery Alert posted on 11 July 2026 an article titled "Namibia's Oil, Uranium & Lithium Strategic Partnership with China 2026" by Muflih Hidayat.
The China-Namibia strategic partnership entered a new chapter in July 2026 when Namibian President Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah made a state visit to China. She signed 8 cooperation agreements that focus on green minerals, uranium, lithium, oil and gas, ports, technology transfer, and clean energy.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 1 July 2026 an analysis titled "In the Middle East and North Africa, America and China Converge More Than They Diverge" by Amr Hamzawy and Kathryn Selfe.
Competition between the United States and China in the Middle East and North Africa is less a threat and more an opportunity. The region has important geostrategic significance for both countries. As great power competition develops globally, Washington and Beijing's positions in the region are increasingly converging.
The United States and China are united by their primary interest in maintaining free trade in the region. For both countries, a stable, peace-driven order is key. Washington is also driven by interest in Israel's security; Beijing is similarly driven by China's need for oil and liquid natural gas. These two interests are compatible and underscore the need for peace and stability in the region.
Energy for Growth Hub published on 18 May 2026 an article titled "Four Ways African Countries Can Secure Better Outcomes from Chinese-supported Power Projects" by Naa Adjekai Adjei.
Ghana's experience with Chinese-supported power projects demonstrates that it is possible to achieve better results with cost benchmarking, competitive procurement, stronger finance negotiation, and project oversight expertise.
The International Crisis Group posted on 2 April 2026 a 36-minute podcast titled "How the Iran War Is Reshaping the Region" with Alan Boswell and Hafsa Halawa, independent political analyst.
The war in Iran is already resulting in shortages of fuel, energy, and electricity in the Red Sea region. Over the longer term, it will likely cause higher inflation and food shortages due to diminished access to imported food and fertilizer, 40 percent of which passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The fertilizer issue is exacerbated because it does not have a long shelf life.
Large diasporas in the Gulf states from countries like Ethiopia may start returning home as jobs shut down. Gulf state investment in the Horn of Africa, which had been growing rapidly, is likely to fall significantly.
The war may force Gulf states to refocus their national security strategies as they assess freedom of navigation and support for factions or governments in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Saudi support for the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) may decline because of Iran's ties with the SAF. The UAE is likely to continue its support for Ethiopia.
The war is likely to exacerbate existing tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Egypt and Turkey will need to reassess their strategies in the region. The war comes on top of Israel's recognition of Somaliland, which already exacerbated Gulf state security relationships.
Saudi Arabia has shifted oil exports to the port of Yanbu in the Red Sea. If the Houthis decide to attack international shipping in the Red Sea, this could end the shipment of oil to Asia by closing the Bab el-Mandeb choke point. It would still be possible to ship oil from Yanbu north through the Suez Canal to Europe.
The Iran war makes clear that the regional security situation is now completely interconnected.
Semafor published on 9 February 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Pitches Minterals, Strategic Location to Trump" by Mohammed Sergie.
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, is encouraging the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland because of its strategic location at the south end of the Red Sea and oil and gas reserves.
Australia's Griffith University and the Green Finance & Development Center in Shanghai published on 18 January 2026 "China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report 2025" by Christoph Nedopil Wang.
Since the beginning of BRI in 2013, the report says Chinese construction projects (profit making opportunities by Chinese construction companies) totaled $837 billion globally while investment projects totaled $561 billion globally. The figures are based on having an active memorandum of understanding with China at the time of the report. Energy, mining, and transportation projects top the list.
In 2025, Africa accounted for a significant increase ($61.2 billion) in BRI engagement (construction projects and investment), but most of it was in construction projects (47 percent of global total) and not investment (22 percent of global total). Nigeria alone accounted for $24.6 billion in construction projects and the Republic of the Congo for another $23.1 billion.
The China-Global South Project published in July 2025 a major report titled "Powering Africa: China's Expanding Role in the Continent's Energy Future" by Frangton Chiyemura.
From 2020 to 2024, Chinese financing delivered over 32 gigawatts of power generation capacity to 30 African countries. At the same time, several projects face delays or dormancy due to technical, financial, or political challenges.
The South China Morning Post published on 15 March 2025 an article titled "As Chinese Gas Investments in Africa Take Off, Oil Imports Sink" by Jevans Nyabiage.
China is importing less and less oil from Africa, now about 10 percent of its global oil imports, but is ramping up its investment in African LNG.
The Associated Press published on 13 November 2024 an article titled "Nigeria Signs $1.2 Billion Deal with Chinese State-owned Company to Revamp Key Gas Plant" by Dyepkazah Shibayan.
Nigeria signed a $1.2 billion deal with Chinese state-owned CNCEC and BFI Group to revitalize a gas processing facility. The deal is intended to revive the 135 million standard cubic feet gas processing facility at the Aluminum Smelter Company of Nigeria.
The American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats published on 8 August 2024 an analysis titled "Turkey Prepares to Ship Out to Somalia" by Liam Karr and Lilya Yatim.
Turkey has agreed to deploy an unspecified number of naval forces to Somalia to build the Somali navy's capacity. This will improve Somalia's ability to compete with Ethiopia's goal to develop a naval base in Somaliland. The Somali-Turkish naval agreement could also complicate Ankara's relations with Addis Ababa and give added incentive for the UAE to strengthen relations with Ethiopia.
War on the Rocks published on 23 April 2024 an analysis titled "Solving the Houthi Threat to Freedom of Navigation" by Allison Minor, Brookings Institution.
Although Houthi attacks from Yemen on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have faded from the news cycle, the threat is unlikely to go away soon and continues to interrupt commerce in the region. The international response has not reassured commercial actors to resume major shipping activity in the Red Sea.
An end to the war in Gaza, the Houthis stated reason for initiating the attacks, will not likely end them. The Houthis demand access to additional Yemeni oil and gas resources in order to strengthen their control over northern Yemen. An UN-backed political process for dealing with the conflict in Yemen may be the best way out of this conundrum.
The Rift Valley Institute and Peace Research Facility published in 2023 a study titled "Squeezing the Ogaden Basin: Power and Protracted Oil and Gas Exploration in the Somali Region" by Juweria Ali, University of Westminster.
Ethiopia's Somali Region is rich in oil and gas reserves in the Ogaden Basin. Attempts by the federal government in Addis Ababa to access these resources are bound up in long histories of violence and dispossession. There is no federal government road map to resume oil and gas exploration and future extraction in the Ogaden Basin following the 2022 expulsion of China's Poly-GCL company.
There is evidence that the federal government is pursuing a policy of co-opting community figures in order to gain greater legitimacy for its top-down decision-making on oil and gas management, at the expense of public participation.
The Washington Post published on 10 January 2024 an article titled "Chinese PLA-linked Vessels Map the Indian Ocean for Submarine Warfare" by Cate Cadell.
The Indian Ocean is critical to China's strategic and economic interests, as well as its geopolitical rivalry with India. Consequently, the Indian Ocean is fast becoming one of the biggest domains for Chinese oceanic surveys, which are ostensibly civilian in nature but tied to the People's Liberation Army and Beijing's military-civil fusion program -- a national strategic plan to advance China's military by acquiring technology and research from civilian groups.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published in November 2023 a paper titled "Who Finances Energy Projects in Africa?" by Oyintarelado Moses.
The largest energy finance providers in Africa between 2012 and 2021 were China, World Bank, Italy, France, and the United States. The top African recipients of energy during these years were Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, and Angola.
The Global Development Policy Center at Boston University published in November 2023 a policy brief titled "Green Horizons? China's Global Energy Finance in 2022" by Cecilia Springer, Ishana Ratan, Yudong Nathan Liu, and Jia Gu.
From 2000-2022, the China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank provided 331 loans totaling $225 billion for 65 public borrowers for energy projects around the world. 2022 marked the second year in a row that China's development finance institutions did not issue new loan commitments for the overseas energy sector.
Despite the decline since 2016 in loan commitments and size, the amount of energy finance China provided surpassed the energy sector lending offered to public entities by any other global lender. The largest share of existing loan commitments by China has been to exploration and extraction projects in the energy sector.
Power generation received the second largest amount of lending commitments across energy subsectors. In terms of energy source, fossil fuels received the most support with coal, oil, and gas representing 73 percent of the lending. Oil was the largest energy source by amount of finance, followed by gas and liquefied natural gas.
China's commitments to stepping up support for green and low-carbon energy have yet to emerge in the form of development finance.
S&P Global Commodity Insights posted on 12 October 2023 a commentary titled "China Replaces African Loans with Energy Investments Amid Faltering Economy."
As China's huge loans for African governments come to an end, its foreign direct investment in oil, gas, and minerals is on the increase.
The U.S. Naval War College posted early in 2023 a 48 minute podcast titled "Maritime Competition in African Waters" with Captain Kamal-Deen Ali (Ghana Navy retired) and questions by Isaac Kardon, U.S. Naval War College, and Naunihal Singh, National War College.
Captain Ali responded to a wide range of questions related to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including illegal fishing, piracy, food security, mining, and great power competition. He demonstrated a thorough understanding of all these issues.
The Diplomat published on 31 July 2023 a commentary titled "China's Oil Gambit in Africa's Conflict Zones" by Robert Bociaga.
China continues to invest in energy projects across Africa, including those in conflict zones.
Boston University's Global Development Policy Center posted on 17 November 2022 a study titled "Towards a Solutions-Oriented Approach: China, Africa and Energy Transition Narrative Building" by Maureen Heydt.
China's policy bank loans in Africa have generally supported fossil energy, although hydropower makes up a significant portion of China's lending to African energy projects.
The Council on Foreign Relations blog posted on 22 April 2022 an analysis titled "How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Will Impact Africa's Energy Transition" by Katie Auth and Todd Moss, both at the Energy for Growth Hub.
The authors reached 7 conclusions:
(1) African leaders will increasingly frame energy poverty as an energy security issue deserving the same urgency.
(2) The rush to boost LNG supply to Europe will stoke further African frustration with climate hypocrisy--unless development finance follows through.
(3) Rising oil and gas prices will hurt African electricity markets.
(4) But rising interest rates will also create headwinds for renewable projects.
(5) The need to diversify away from Russia will reinvigorate interest in African oil and gas production for export.
(6) As the urgency behind decarbonization intensifies, demand for critical minerals will spur investment in African mining.
(7) Russian actions (and Western financial sanctions) could give countries pause about betting on Russian nuclear technology.
