China's Heavy Fighters Make First Flight to Africa

 MiGFLUG posted on 23 August 2026 an article titled "China Flies Its Heavy Fighters to Africa" by Joseph Duncan.

A formation of Shenyang J-16 strike jets made its first flight to Africa and landed at an Egyptian air base on 21 August, opening the second edition of the "Eagles of Civilization" joint exercises between the Chinese and Egyptian air forces.  

The J-16s covered more than 6,000 kilometers across two continents and four countries in roughly nine hours, topped up in the air by a Xian YY-20A refueling tanker.  

This is another indication of Egypt's steadily deepening military cooperation with Beijing.

China Courts African Media Leaders

 China Daily published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Deeper China-Africa Media Relations Urged" by Zhao Jia.

The 7th Forum on China-Africa Media Cooperation brought together in Beijing about 400 government, media, diplomatic, business, and academic representatives from China and 45 African countries.  Representatives reportedly urged China-Africa media cooperation to move beyond equipment support and program exchanges toward coproduction and two-way storytelling in order to help the African media better narrate their own stories and bring a wider African perspective to Chinese audiences.  

China-Africa Ties and US Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a paper titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.

China presents its engagement in Africa as promoting mutually beneficial economic development without imposing political conditions.  In practice, China seeks to use integrated multidimensional engagement to advance its broader global strategic goals of expanding its international influence, strengthening its access to natural resources, and challenging US global leadership.

Economic activity is a central pillar of China's activity in Africa.  Beijing's policy banks and state-backed lenders have extended numerous loans to African governments and other actors, making China a key bilateral creditor on the continent.  China engages in education and media cooperation, and provides development aid via grants and concessional loans, technical assistance, and humanitarian programs. Security cooperation between China and African countries has grown, especially over the last decade. 

China Is Largest Drone Supplier in Africa

 Military Africa recently posted the "Africa Drone Procurement Report 2026."  The dataset comprises 234 procurement records across 34 African nations from at least 21 supplier countries spanning 1980 to 2026.  During this period, it identified 1,959 drone units obtained by African countries.  From 2020 to 2026, African countries procured 1,054 drone units or 53 percent of the total since 1980.

China was the leading supplier at 587 drones or just under 30 percent of the total procured in Africa. Its Wing Loong armed drones and Rainbow CH series drones went primarily to Egypt (126 units), Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (80), Nigeria (72), Ethiopia (57), and Algeria (49).  Chinese drones appeared extensively in active combat zones (Libya, Ethiopia, and Sudan).  They are particularly favored for their low cost, availability, and lack of human rights conditionality. 

The next most important suppliers after China are Israel (325 drones), Türkiye (291), US (247), and locally manufactured (216).  Iran and Russia supply drones to active conflict-zone actors through more opaque channels.  Israeli drones have gone primarily to Morocco, with smaller numbers to Ethiopia, Uganda, Zambia, and Libya's Government of National Unity.   

US-China Differences on Global Warming Pose Dilemma for Africa

 The Institute for Security Studies published on 14 August 2026 a paper titled "US-China Rivalry Puts Africa's Climate Diplomacy to the Test" by Dhesigen Naidoo.

China has been a consistent signatory of the Paris Agreement while the Trump administration withdrew from it during both its first and second iterations.  

The author argues that Africa must maintain a positive climate-action approach while navigating the American anti-climate stance.  US support for fossil fuel-based development has gained momentum, slowing Africa's pathway to low carbon development.

Chinese Fishing Fleet Charged with Illegal Activity in West African Waters

Modern Ghana published on 14 August 2026 an article titled "Illegal Chinese Fishing: Africa Must Stop Taking the Bait" by Mustapha Bature Sallama. 

China's refusal to sign the Mombasa Declaration is an admission that its deep-sea fishing fleet is engaged in illegal practices.  China is gradually expanding its footprint in African waters, at the risk of permanently endangering the economic sovereignty of coastal states.  

China Increases African Agency vis-a-vis the West

 African Arguments posted on 13 August 2026 a commentary titled "The Beijing of It All: Africa's Development Terms Are No Longer Written in Washington or Brussels" by Wanjiku Wanjohi.

Political conditionality associated with Western aid is giving way to a new framework established by China.  China describes its interaction as a partnership based on non-interference and rapid delivery of development projects.  As a result, Africa now has meaningful alternatives and greater negotiating power.

Comment:  While Chinese loans and assistance do not come with the baggage of political conditionality, they do have economic conditionality.  For example, Chinese loans and projects must be implemented by Chinese companies, usually state-owned ones.  

Decline of the US State Department

 Small Wars Journal published on 11 August 2026 a commentary titled "The War of the Pen: What America's State Department Is Ignoring" by Julian McBride.

The author laments the absence of ambassadors at numerous US embassies, the State Department's waning soft power, the rise of middle and regional powers at the expense of the United States, and the increasing influence of China in the Global South.

He believes US diplomatic setbacks are self-inflicted but can be reversed through concerted action and the US position restored in the Global South.  

Africa's Geopolitical Realignment

 Global Views World published on 10 August 2026 a commentary titled "Africa's 2026 Geopolitics: China's $282B Pull" by Alonso Reyes.  

The author argues Africa's geopolitical alignment is undergoing significant transformation by moving away from traditional Western allies and towards emerging powers such as China, India, Russia, and the Gulf States.

But this is not a zero-sum game.  African leaders are not choosing sides.  They are diversifying their partnerships to maximize their own national interests.

Africa's Most Popular Chinese Phones Pose Tracking Problem

 Tech Central published on 24 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Most Popular Phones Have a Tracking Problem" by Fanie van Rooyen.  

Of the 84 million smartphones shipped to Africa in 2025, more than 40 million were made by China's Transsion, a Shenzhen-based manufacturer that owns the Tecno, Infinix, and Itel brands.  New research has decrypted the phones and found a built-in tracking system that reports a user's precise location, which apps they use, how much data each app consumes, and the moment an app switches on the camera.  These data are tied to roughly 14 permanent device identifiers that a user cannot reset.  This creates a common thread linking every captured event back to the exact same handset over its entire lifespan.

While other smartphones also collect data, Transsion has not been transparent in what its handsets are doing.

Somali Diaspora in Africa and Giving Back to Somalia

 The August 2026 issue of Africa Spectrum includes an "Introduction to the Special Issue: Giving in Somali Diaspora Humanitarianism in Africa" by Nauja Kleist and Mark Bardbury.

The articles in this special issue of Africa Spectrum demonstrate that Somali diaspora humanitarian engagement is continuously evolving and comes in many forms.  It is influenced by gender, generation, educational background, and socio-economic circumstances.  

The issue is unique in that it focuses on the Somali diaspora in a number of African countries and not the diaspora in North America or Europe.  

China and the US Compete in Africa for Satellite Development

 Semafor published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Africa's Space Race Is Becoming Washington's Next China Challenge" by Yinka Adegoke.

Chinese companies have provided bundled satellite packages--combining hardware, launch services, financing, infrastructure and training--to more than 20 African countries.  The US, by contrast, has focused on satellite data, technical training, and regulatory cooperation rather than hardware.  This may leave Washington at a structural disadvantage.

Somalia/Somaliland: Text of US AFRICOM Commander's Interview

 This is the full text of the interview by Omar Faruk Osman, Secretary-General of the National Union of Somali Journalists, with General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, the Commander of U.S. Africa Command in Mogadishu and posted on 31 July 2026.

Most of the interview focuses on US-Somali cooperation in combatting al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia.  This is the interview where General Anderson also said, "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland" and "U.S. policy is, and remains, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia.  That has not changed."   

Review of Our China-Africa Book

 The Czech Journal of Political Science published in its second issue of 2026 a review by Ondrej Voznak of our book titled "China's Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement." 

China Increases HIV/AIDS Funding in Africa, But Still Well Behind US

 The South China Morning Post published on 7 August 2026 an article titled "What China's Expanded Funding for HIV/Aids in Africa Means as US Cuts Health Aid" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

As the United States reduces its funding in Africa for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, China is modestly increasing assistance.  US funding remains, however, much higher than that coming from China.  

China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 6 August 2026 a report titled "China-Sub-Saharan Africa Ties and U.S. Policy" by Nicolas Cook, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, and Michael D. Sutherland.

This is a comprehensive overview of China's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and guidance for US policymakers.  

China's AI Systems Making Rapid Gains in Africa

 The New York Times published on 5 August 2026 an article titled "China's A.I. Is Surging Across Africa.  That Should Worry Silicon Valley" by Paul Mozur, Adam Satariano, and Aaron Krolik.

China's AI is surging in Africa where buyers look for the best possible system at the lowest possible cost.  The Chinese systems are publicly available to download and modify without payment or approval.  Xi Jinping is using AI as a form of Chinese soft power.

 

US-China Competition for Ethiopia's New International Airport

 Business Insider Africa published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's $12.5 Billion Airport Has Become the Latest Investment Battleground between the U.S. and China in Africa" by Solomon Ekanem.

The United States is seeking a role for its private sector companies in the development of Ethiopia's new $12.5 billion Bishoftu Airport as it challenges China's commanding position of building infrastructure projects in Africa by its state-owned companies.

The United States sees this as an opening for its construction and engineering companies and an opportunity to sell more Boeing aircraft to Ethiopian Airlines.  In addition, the Bishoftu Airport is a gateway to influence Africa's fast-growing aviation, logistics, and technology sectors.

How China and the US Pursue African Critical Minerals

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals.  China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals.  The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.  

Why Is the State Department Slashing Visa Processing Across Africa?

 The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."

Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia). 

Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).

The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."  

Comment:  The national security explanation is not convincing.  For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg.  In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country.  Nor is the realignment likely to save much money.  US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens.  The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.  

What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business.  The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates.  This raises the question.  Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States?  Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.