Evolution of China's Policy on the Western Sahara

 The ChinaMed Project published on 7 May 2026 an analysis titled "From Neutrality to Strategic Ambiguity: China and the Western Sahara Conflict" by Imane Ezzehouany, Bianca Pasquier, and Amanda Chen.  

This analysis examines the evolution of China's position on the Western Sahara and the growing tension between diplomatic neutrality, geoeconomics, and geopolitical competition in the Maghreb.  The rapid expansion of Sino-Moroccan relations in recent years raise questions whether Beijing may be adopting a calibrated ambiguity compatible with Morocco's autonomy plan, allowing China to safeguard its strategic interests without incurring meaningful political costs.  

UN Peacekeepers Defy South Sudan Government Order to Abandon Town

 The Associated Press published on 10 March 2026 an article titled "UN Peacekeepers Defy South Sudan Military's Order to Leave Opposition-held Town" by Florence Miettaux and Deng Machol.  

The UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan refused to comply with an order from the South Sudan government to shut down its base in Akobo, an opposition stronghold near the Ethiopian border where thousands of refugees have fled.  South Sudan government forces intend to attack the town.

Can Chinese Peacekeepers Make a Difference along Sudan/South Sudan Border?

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 9 February 2026 a commentary titled "Can Chinese Peacekeepers Actually Change Anything in Abyei?" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

Abyei is an oil rich region along the Sudan-South Sudan border where the China National Petroleum Corporation has been the major operator.  A UN peacekeeping force (UNISFA) with Chinese participation is stationed there.  The author questions whether the newest Chinese peacekeeping unit assigned to UNISFA will make any difference in the outcome.  

China's Security Engagement in Africa

 Australia's Lowy Institute published on 2 February 2026 a commentary titled "China's Security Offerings Gain Traction in Africa" by Piers Pigou.

The author argues that China adapts to Africa's emerging security priorities: countering violent extremism and organized crime and supporting maritime security and infrastructure.  It tailors its training programs, equipment transfers, and technical assistance.  The critical question is whether China's inputs align with African defined needs and priorities.  

Sudan Conflict Only Worsens in December

 Aljazeera published on 31 December 2025 an article titled "War in Sudan: Humanitarian Collapse, Fighting, Deadlock, December 2025" by Mohammad Mansour.

The humanitarian situation in Sudan deteriorated to a new low following a collapse of international funding, although the European Union launched an air bridge to deliver supplies to Darfur.  Kordofan province became the new epicenter for fighting as both the Sudan Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces relied increasingly on the use of drones.  All attempts to end the conflict through negotiation appeared to be stalled.  

Drones and Foreign Arms Transfers Fuel Sudan's War

 The UN Political and Peacebuilding Office posted on 22 December 2025 remarks titled "ASG Khiari Warns Indiscriminate Drone Strikes and Arms Flows Are Driving Sudan's War."

UN Assistant Secretary General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, Khaled Khiari, condemned the use of drones and foreign supply of increasingly sophisticated and deadly weapons to the belligerents in Sudan's civil war.  Calls to end these flows have gone unheeded and there has been no accountability.  

China's Peacekeeping in South Sudan

 China-Africa Security Radar posted on 1 November 2025 a commentary titled "When Peace Serves Two Masters: China in South Sudan" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.  

The author summarizes China's peacekeeping activities in South Sudan, noting that Beijing combines humanitarianism with strategic interests, i.e. the China National Petroleum Corporation's 40 stake in key South Sudanese oil fields.  

China's Approach to Counterterrorism in Africa

 The CTC Sentinel published in its August 2025 issue an article titled "Understanding China's New Counterterrorism Ambitions in Africa" by Jason Warner.

The author argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing's primary motivations for entering the African counterterrorism space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical economics first approach.

Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of counterterrorism assistance--less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships--that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa.  

The China-Africa Security Relationship

 The China Global South Project posted on 23 July 2025 a Q & A titled "China's 'Feeling the Stones' Approach to African Security Takes Shape" with Lungani Hlongwa, China-Africa Security Radar, and Paul Nantulya, Africa Center for Security Studies in Washington.

China sees Africa as central to the future of the international order.  Because of increasing threats to Chinese nationals and interests in Africa, the security element of China's engagement has become more important.  But China is not following a single strategy for dealing with the security challenges that it faces.  Chinese policy is usually aligned at the strategic level but often encounters fragmentation at the level of execution.  

South Sudan Taxing the Hand that Feeds It

 The Wall Street Journal published on 8 October 2024 an article titled "South Sudan's Economic Crisis Is So Bad It's Taxing Its Only Lifeline" by Nicholas Bariyo.  

South Sudan's economy is collapsing as a result of disruption to its oil exports, flooding, and mismanagement.  The government has resorted to taxing international aid deliveries and supplies belonging to the UN peacekeeping operation that helps protect it.  

Chinese Counterterrorism in Africa

 The Stimson Center published on 31 July 2024 an analysis titled "Chinese Counterterrorism in Africa" by Cobus van Staden.

China's approach to counterterrorism in Africa blurs the lines between crime and terrorism on both sides of the relationship.  This analysis emphasizes the role of non-state actors in the context of low state capacity and explains some of the factors that inform the limitations of Chinese counterterrorism approaches in Africa.

Chinese Peacekeepers at UN Operations in Africa Fall to New Low

 China Military Online published on 6 May 2024 an article titled "27th Chinese Peacekeeping Troops to MONUSCO Return Home."

The 218 members of China's peacekeeping contingent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have returned home following UN closure of the mission.  

Comment:  After the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali closed last year, Chinese troops also returned home.  There are currently only five UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.  China has just over 1,200 personnel assigned to four of them, although nearly all of the personnel are in South Sudan and in Abyei along the Sudan/South Sudan border.  This is the lowest number of Chinese troops assigned to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in more than fifteen years.  

Charting China's Relations with Countries in North Africa and the Horn of Africa

 The China-Med Index for North Africa and the Horn of Africa consists of a series of interactive charts for most of the 21st century on China's general imports from countries in the region, general exports to countries in the region, mutual energy dependence, contracts awarded to Chinese companies, Chinese workers in countries in the region, China's foreign direct investment in each country, and China's contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping operations.  In the most recent years, all of the charts demonstrate lower numbers than their peak years.  

The index includes the following countries: Algeria, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tunisia.  The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation supported publication of the data.  

China-Africa Peace and Security Forum: A Positive Analysis

 Al Mayadeen, an independent Arab satellite channel, published on 14 September 2023 a commentary titled "Third China-Africa Peace and Security Forum Benefits the Continent's Long-Term Stability" by Hamzah Rifaat.  

Commenting on the recently completed third China-Africa Peace and Security Forum in China, the author concluded that greater understandings have been reached which bodes well for world peace.  

Mali Army and Wagner Group Accused of Atrocities

 Human Rights Watch published on 24 July 2023 a statement titled "Mali: New Atrocities by Malian Army, Apparent Wagner Fighters."

Human Rights Watch stated that Malian armed forces and foreign fighters apparently from the Russia-linked Wagner Group have summarily executed and forcibly disappeared several dozen civilians in Mali's central region since December 2022.  

More Analysis that Wagner Group Will Continue Operations in Africa

 Critical Threats published on 5 July 2023 a commentary titled "Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update Special Edition: Wagner Will Remain in Africa" by Karolina Hird and Liam Karr.

The authors conclude that Russia has every intention of continuing Wagner Group operations in Africa, although it is not clear if the organization will engage independently or be placed under the Ministry of Defense.  In Mali, jihadi activity increased after the arrival of the Wagner Group and is likely to expand again following the imminent departure of the UN peacekeeping force.  

Wagner Group Staying the Course in Africa, So Far

 The Guardian published on 6 July 2023 an article titled "'It Is Like a Virus that Spreads': Business as Usual for Wagner Group's Extensive Africa Network" by Jason Burke.

So far, the network of businesses and security protection offered by the Wagner Group in Libya, CAR, Mali, and Sudan is continuing uninterrupted.  The group's economic and political activities in Africa are important to Moscow but will likely be rebranded while Wagner's assets and systems continue.  

More on Future of Wagner Group in Africa

 Aljazeera published on 1 July 2023 an article titled "After Mutiny, Clouds Hover over Wagner Operations in Africa" by Ope Adetayo.  

African governments such as the Central African Republic and Mali that rely on Russia's Wagner Group for security face an uncertain future.  The Wagner mutiny has become a cautionary tale for African leaders.

Future of Russia's Wagner Group in Mali

 The International Crisis Group posted on 28 June 2023 a 50 minute podcast titled "Is This the End? Wagner in Russia, Ukraine and Africa" with Olga Oliker, Jean-Herve Jezequel, and Richard Gowan.  The first 19 minutes of the podcast dealt with the Wagner Group in Russia and the Ukraine and the remainder of the podcast covered the Wagner Group's future in Mali and other African countries.

There are about 1,500 Wagner Group mercenaries in Mali.  The government of Mali called for the departure of MINUSMA, the UN peacekeeping force, by the end of June with a six month period for the UN to remove its troops and equipment from the country.  MINUSMA has been located primarily in urban centers in Mali.  What happens after the UN force departs Mali?  One possibility is that the Russian mercenary force will take over the bases evacuated by MINUSMA.  Additional Wagner Group forces in Russia might redeploy to operations in Africa such as Mali, resulting in greater influence in African internal affairs by Moscow.  This development could also have a major impact on the future of UN peacekeeping in Africa. 

An Analysis of China's Global Security Initiative

 The Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) blog posted on 2 March 2023 a commentary titled "China's New Global Security Initiative: A Rising Power Spreads Its Wings" by Pascal Abb, senior researcher at PRIF.

China announced its Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the 2022 Boao Forum for Asia, a Chinese-sponsored multilateral security conference.  In February 2023, China issued a concept paper that added some detail concerning the initiative.  Four ideas highlight the GSI.

First, the GSI's agenda is global in scope.

Second, the GSI is based on a very wide-ranging understanding of security characterized as comprehensive national security.

Third, the GSI establishes a strong connection between peace and development.

Fourth, the GSI makes a clear divide between US and Western normative approaches to security and China's approach, which opposes hegemonism, unilateralism, protectionism, and a Cold War mentality.