African Arguments published on 18 August 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan: Burhan's Dialogue Is Not a Path to Stability" by Ezzat Khairi, Sudanese political analyst.
While not making an argument for the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, the author argues that any credible transition in Sudan must start with the departure from sovereign political authority of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. He has broken too many promises. Sudan's stability begins where al-Burhan's rule ends.
The Middle East Eye published on 19 August 2026 an article titled "UAE-backed Chinese Company Acquires Stake in Ethiopian Gold Mine Near Sudan War Zone" by Zecharias Zelalem and Oscar Rickett.
Last week, Canadian mining company Allied Gold sold a 9.2 percent stake to China's Zijin Gold International. This gives Zijin partial ownership of mines in Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and near Kurmuk in Ethiopia. The Kurmuk mine is in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region, which hosts at least one base used by Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE supports the RSF and is the main buyer of gold coming from both Sudan and Ethiopia.
The UAE's sovereign wealth fund has a major share in the parent company of Zijin Gold International and in Canada's Allied Gold. The Ethiopian gold mine puts Chinese, Canadian, and UAE interests close to the civil war between the RSF and the Sudan Armed Forces in Sudan's Blue Nile State and raises further questions about the UAE's role in the conflict.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured two district capitals in Blue Nile State on the Ethiopian border. The SPLM-N supported the RSF in one of the operations. The RSF likely launched its operations from Ethiopian territory. The RSF's advance in Blue Nile State distracts the Sudan Armed Forces from consolidating recent gains in central Sudan.
The Economist published on 6 August 2026 an article titled "The Ruin of Sudan."
Based on a visit to Khartoum and Omdurman, the article shows the devastation caused by more than three years of war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. The SAF is now in control of the capital region.
AEIs Critical Threats Africa File posted on 6 August 2026 an article titled "Tigray on the Precipice" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.
The Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces engaged in western Tigray on 1 August, each accusing the other of initiating the conflict. The battle ended quickly but tension remains high in the region.
The UK government published on 16 July 2026 a press release titled "UK Sanctions Illicit Gold Networks Fueling Sudan's War Amid Crisis around El Obeid."
The UK government announced sanctions targeting the conflict gold trade in Sudan, procurement networks, and financial facilitators that are fueling the civil war in Sudan. The sanctions focus primarily on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and UAE-based companies, but they include the Sudan Armed Forces and one Hong Kong-based company.
Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years. Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months. Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.
Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."
Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region. They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.
The Associated Press published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Child Soldiers Recount Horrors of Sudan's War and Presence of Colombian Mercenaries" by Sam Mednick, Isabel Debre, and Astrid Suarez.
Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conscripted child soldiers, some of whom have been trained by Colombian mercenaries. The UAE allegedly recruited the Colombians to fight alongside the RSF.
African Arguments posted on 21 July 2026 a commentary titled "Sudan's Peace Process Is Negotiating a War That No Longer Exists" by Ezzat Khairi, a Sudan political analyst.
Diplomatic assumptions for ending the war in Sudan remain where they were in April 2023. Peace initiatives approach Sudan as a two-sided conflict between a national army and a paramilitary rebellion. That model no longer fits the war. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) now contain armed movements, tribal formations, ideological brigades, local defense groups, and commanders with their own constituencies and expectations of the postwar order. The leaders of the SAF and RSF do not fully control the coalitions supporting them.
World Politics Review published on 13 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Could Be Headed for De Facto Partition" by Mohamed Wad Al-Sak.
If the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces take control of El Obeid in central Sudan from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), it could result in a de facto partition of the country. El Obed is the SAF's last command center in central Sudan and the linchpin of its western supply corridor.
The International Crisis Group published on 17 July 2026 a commentary titled "As the Horn of Africa Nears Boiling Point, Time for Urgent Diplomacy" by Alan Boswell.
Given the uncertainty about Washington's level of commitment to bring peace to the Horn of Africa, additional Gulf States, the European Union, the United Nations, Norway, and the United Kingdom should step up their engagement.
Foreign Affairs published on 26 June 2026 an article titled "Who Is Winning Africa's Drone Wars?" by Nate Allen and Rida Lyammouri.
Inexpensive drones are fast becoming the weapon of choice in African conflicts. They are being deployed by both governments and insurgent groups. China is now Africa's largest supplier of drones, accounting for a quarter of those procured.
Foreign drones have turned African conflicts such as the civil war in Sudan into destabilizing proxy wars. At least eleven African countries now produce drones including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco.
The UN Human Rights Council published on 8 July 2026 a 26-page report titled "Information Supplementing the Report 'Sudan: Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher'."
This report provides detailed references not included in the initial 19 February 2026 report and additional information that the UN Human Rights Council gathered following continued investigations since the publication of the original report.
It also helps develop the legal basis for the conclusions that were drawn in the original report, that the mass killings and related atrocities committed by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in and around El Fasher were indicators of a genocidal path.
Foreign Policy posted on 15 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts" by Nosmot Gbadamosi.
The EU and the US have expanded sanctions on individuals and companies that have aided the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and/or the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). In the meantime, global efforts to end the war have largely stalled.
Comment: Numerous sanctions in recent years on the RSF and the SAF have had no impact on bringing this civil war to an end.
Reuters published on 15 July 2026 an in-depth article titled "The US Army Veteran and the Mystery Boeings Flying Sudan's War Routes" by Alexander Dziadosz, Reade Levinson, and David Lewis.
Companies registered in Singapore and the UAE owned by a US government, and military contractor and US Army Special Forces veteran have been operating several Boeing aircraft linking regional supply routes of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan. The United Nations has accused the RSF of genocide. The United States has not sanctioned the companies.
The New York Times published on 13 July 2026 an editorial titled "The World Must Wake Up to the Horror in Sudan."
Repeating the concerns of so many others, the editorial argues that the world needs to do more to halt the killing and mass displacement in Sudan.
The Diplomat published on 8 July 2026 an article titled "Three Decades in, China Is Cashing in on Sudan's Collapse" by Paul Mwirigi.
In the midst of a three-year-long civil war, most Western countries have abandoned Sudan. China, on the other hand, is investing in projects such as copper mining.
AEI's Critical Threats Africa File posted on 9 July 2026 an article titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Angus Muldoon.
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) has recaptured from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces several towns in Sudan's Blue Nile State that borders Ethiopia. This relieves some of the pressure on SAF forces elsewhere in the country. The SAF has also had some military gains near Sudan's border with Chad.
The BBC posted on 7 July 2026 an article titled "Fears of a Massacre in This City on the Frontline of Sudan's War" by Akisa Wandera.
El Obeid, capital of North Kordofan has been under siege by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for 18 months. Most recently, the RSF has stepped up the use of drones.
The United Nations believes another human rights catastrophe like the one in El Fasher is unfolding in El Obeid. The Sudan Armed Forces continues to control the city, but its hold is weakening as it faces increasing RSF drone attacks.
