Aljazeera published on 4 October 2026 an article titled "Ethiopian Government Forces Seize Tigray Capital Mekelle as TPLF Withdraw."
Ethiopian National Defense Forces and an allied Tigrayan militia took control of Mekelle, capital of Tigray Region, as Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) forces abandoned the city. Although Ethiopia charged that Egypt supported TPLF forces in Tigray, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called for dialogue not confrontation in Ethiopia.
China's President Xi Jinping made a state visit to Egypt 1-2 September 2026. Both countries issued joint statements at the end of the visit. Curiously, the English translations of the two statements are different.
Egypt's version published by ahramonline and dated 2 September 2026 is titled "Egypt and China Joint Statement on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership."
China's version posted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and dated 2 September is titled "Joint Statement between the People's Republic of China and the Arab Republic of Egypt on Further Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership."
Following are the different translations of three sections relating to African issues important to Egypt. While the meaning is essentially the same, there are some important differences in word choice.
China's translation of the section on Nile water:
"Both sides reaffirmed their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests and major concerns. China emphasized its understanding of the Nile's vital importance as Egypt's main lifeline and its legitimate rights to safeguard its water security, food security, and development interests. Both sides called on all Nile River basin countries to abide by international law, including avoiding harm."
Egypt's translation of the section on Nile water:
"The two sides reaffirmed their firm mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests and major concerns. The Chinese side affirmed its recognition of the vital importance of the Nile River to Egypt as its principal lifeline and of Egypt's legitimate right to safeguard its water and food security and development interests. Both sides called on all Nile Basin countries to comply with international law, including the obligation not to cause harm."
China's translation of the section on Red Sea security:
"The governance and security of the Red Sea are primarily the responsibility of the Red Sea littoral states. The wishes of these countries should be fully respected. The Red Sea littoral states should strengthen regional cooperation, jointly address challenges, and ensure freedom of navigation and unimpeded international trade."
Egypt's translation of the section on Red Sea security:
"The primary responsibility for the governance and security of the Red Sea rests with its littoral states. The will of those states must be fully respected. Regional cooperation among the littoral states must be strengthened to address common challenges and safeguard freedom of navigation and international trade."
China's translation of the section on Sudan:
"Both sides emphasized that Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity should be respected, Sudanese state institutions should be upheld, and interference in its internal affairs should be avoided. Both sides stressed their willingness to work together to achieve a ceasefire in Sudan and initiate a Sudanese-led inclusive political process."
Egypt's translation of the section on Sudan:
"The two sides stressed the need to: Respect Sudan's unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Preserve Sudan's national institutions. Refrain from interfering in Sudan's internal affairs. Work jointly to end the war in Sudan and launch a comprehensive, Sudanese-owned political process."
Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.
The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years. Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months. Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.
The Washington Post published on 21 January 2026 an article titled "How Egypt Is Reviving the Suez Canal after Maritime Attacks Sank Traffic" by Claire Parker and Heba Farouk Mahfouz.
Attacks beginning in 2023 by the Houthis in Yemen on international shipping in the Red Sea interrupted maritime traffic through the Suez Canal, forcing most ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal provided Egypt in 2023 with $10.2 billion in revenue and accounted for 12 to 15 percent of global maritime trade.
The Houthis have ended most attacks, maritime traffic is increasing, and Suez Canal revenue for Egypt is picking up. If the Gaza ceasefire holds, international shipping through the Red Sea and Suez Canal is expected to increase further, adding to Egyptian revenue.
NBC News posted on 17 January 2026 an article titled "Egypt Welcomes Trump's Offer to Mediate Nile Water Dispute with Ethiopia" by Freddie Clayton.
In a letter to Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President Trump said he is "ready to restart U.S. mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia to responsibly resolve the question of "The Nile Water Sharing' once and for all."
Comment: When the Trump administration tried during its first term to mediate among Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan the Nile water issue, it did not end well. The Egypt-Ethiopia "war" is also one of the eight that President Trump has said he has already resolved.
World Politics Review published on 28 July 2025 an analysis titled "Egypt's Regional Strategy Is Coming Undone in Libya and Sudan" by Elfadil Ibrahim.
In late June, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi hosted General Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army, and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudan Armed Forces, in an attempt to mediate the growing tension between the two leaders.
The meeting reportedly was a disaster. Burhan accused Haftar of arming his enemy in Sudan's civil war, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Haftar denied the allegations and Burhan then presented proof of his complicity. Egypt's attempt at brokering peace between two of Cairo's major clients only laid bare the growing precariousness of Sisi's regional policy.
The National published on 21 January 2024 an article titled "El Sisi Warns Ethiopia over Somaliland Red Sea Deal" by Hamza Hendawi.
Following a visit to Cairo by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said Egypt will not allow any country "to breach or threaten Somalia's security." This was in reference to the Memorandum of Understanding announced earlier by Ethiopia and Somaliland.
Aljazeera published on 25 September 2023 an article titled "Second Round of Negotiations on Ethiopia's Mega-dam Wrap Up."
Two days of talks in Addis Ababa involving representatives from Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan ended without making significant progress according to Egypt and with Ethiopia pledging to continue talks "in good faith."
Comment: After four seasonal annual fillings, Ethiopia completed filling the reservoir behind the dam this year. During this period, there was no apparent harm done to downstream Sudan and Egypt as a result of withholding Blue Nile water in the reservoir. The river is now flowing normally again through and over the hydropower dam, which is not diverting water for irrigation purposes.
The Middle East Institute published on 5 September 2023 an analysis titled "No News on the GERD Negotiations Is Bad News" by Mirette F. Mabrouk.
Following a hiatus of two years, recent talks in Cairo involving Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan on differences concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile ended with no tangible progress. The UAE attempted to broker the most recent agreement by promising $20 billion of investment in all three countries.
Radio France Internationale posted on 14 July 2023 an article titled "Egypt and Sudan's International Partners Try to Stop the Civil War" by Melissa Chernam.
There are three ongoing peace processes that are trying to bring a ceasefire in Sudan: the Saudi/US effort in Jeddah, the IGAD/African Union attempt led by Kenyan President William Ruto, and the Egyptian regional summit headed by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Comment: If there is any coordination of these different peace processes, it is not apparent.
The Atlantic Council published on 1 June 2023 a commentary titled "Is Egypt Planning a Full-scale Invasion of Sudan?" by Shahira Amin, independent journalist based in Cairo.
President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi has ruled out any military intervention in Sudan but regional analysts point out that Egypt supports the Sudan Armed Forces and the stakes are too high for Cairo to sit idly by.
The Institute of Developing Economies at Japan's JETRO published on 16 August 2022 a policy brief titled "Egypt and the Politics of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: An Update" by Housam Darwisheh.
The brief explains how Egypt's signing of the 2015 Declaration of Principles and the neutral position of its allies led to a stalling of negotiations and gave Ethiopia a free hand to continue unilaterally filling the GERD.
Bloomberg published on 12 August 2022 an article titled "Why Ethiopia's $5 Billion Dam Has Riled Its Neighbors: Quick Take" by Samuel Gebre and Fasika Tadesse.
The article provides a short status report on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam now that the third annual filling of the reservoir behind the dam has been completed. The reservoir is now about one-third full. Once it is full, the Blue Nile will continue flowing normally again throughout the year, including during the rainy season when the filling takes place. Downstream Egypt continues to protest construction of the dam while Sudan's position seems to ebb and flow.
The Associated Press published on 7 February 2022 an article titled "Egypt, Djibouti Leaders Meet to Discuss Ties, Ethiopian Dam" by Samy Magdy.
In the first visit to Djibouti by an Egyptian leader since Djibouti's independence, President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi focused on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
The Middle East Institute published on 27 January 2021 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Domestic Problems Risk Becoming International" by Mirette F. Mabrouk.
The author argues that while Ethiopia's internal situation is troubling enough, the potential for the conflict to spill over borders is even more disturbing.
Foreign Affairs published on 10 August 2020 a commentary titled "Toxic Water Politics Threaten Democracy and Regional Stability" by Michael Woldemariam.
Ethiopia has begun filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. Egypt continues to regard the dam as a threat to its national interests. Sudan is caught in the middle of the dispute. Negotiations have failed to resolve critical outstanding issues. Toxic Nile politics are complicating the fragile democratic transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan. International relations in the Horn of Africa remain unstable and Ethiopia's and Egypt's efforts to outflank each other diplomatically add to an already explosive mix.
