"Russian Houses" in Africa Lure Recruits for Ukraine War

 Euro News posted on 18 June 2026 an article titled "Moscow Uses 'Russian Houses' in Africa to Lure Recruits into War in Ukraine, Investigation Shows" by Sasha Vakulina and Aleksandar Brezar.

Moscow is operating or opening "Russian Houses" in at least 22 African countries as part of its strategy to consolidate its influence on the continent.  The centers screen Soviet and Russian films, often on patriotic themes, and distribute ideologically vetted literature.  They also teach the Russian language and coach young people on how to move to Russia as students or workers.  

Ukraine's military intelligence has done an investigation that identifies Russian Houses as key hubs for recruiting Africans to go to Russia where they eventually end up on the front lines of the war against Ukraine.  Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that at least 2,965 citizens from 36 African countries have taken part in combat on Russia's side.  

Jihadist Attacks Threaten Russian Influence in Mali

 Reuters published on 29 April 2026 an article titled "Mali Turmoil Threatens Russian Push for Influence and Mineral Wealth in Africa" by Andrew Osborn and Anna Peverieri.

A series of reversals suffered by Mali's Moscow-backed military government has dented Russia's image and threatens its strategic and economic interests in Africa.  Mali's military junta's future is now in jeopardy and Russia's military presence in Mali is also on the line.  

Russia Doubles Down in Africa's Sahel

 The Sentry published in April 2026 a study titled "Doubling Down: Russia's Military Network in West Africa."

Russia's Wagner Group withdrew from Mali in June 2025, largely handing over operations to the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, which has about the same number of troops as Wagner and many of them are former Wagner fighters.  Some core leadership also remains the same.

The Africa Corps has been moving a large quantity of weapons into Mali, which suggests that Russia is doubling down on Mali, despite the concurrent withdrawal and multiple failures of the Wagner Group.  

US Competes More Directly with Russia in Africa

 AEIs Critical Threats Africa File published on 21 April 2026 an article titled "US Competes with Russia and Others as It Engages African Autocrats" by Liam Karr, Yale Ford, and Zoe Sommer.  

The Trump administration has put the United States in more direct competition with Russia in Africa, especially in states that have come under military control.  The US is primarily pursuing security-related interests and exploring opportunities for cooperation on critical minerals.  

Russia's Recruitment Campaign in Africa for Mercenaries

 Global Issues posted on 20 April 2026 an article titled "Russia's African Cannon Fodder" by Andrew Firmin.  

The article reviews Russia's program to recruit Africans, often based on disinformation, to fight for Moscow in its war with Ukraine.  The top African countries for providing mercenaries to fight in Ukraine are Egypt, Cameroon, and Ghana.  

Short Video Analysis of Sudan's Civil War

 The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies posted on 17 April 2026 an eight-minute video analysis titled "The Sudanese Civil War, Three Years On" by Michael Jones.

After three years of conflict the Sudan civil war has reached a political and military dynamic stalemate.  Diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire have achieved little progress.  The war is sustained by foreign powers, especially the Arab Gulf states.  The conflict threatens to become a regional war.

Russia's Security Program in Africa after the Wagner Group

 The South African Institute of International Affairs published in February 2026 a study titled "Back to the Shadows: Russia's African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin" by Ivan U. Klyszcz, Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn, Estonia.  

Russia continues to deploy military personnel and conduct information operations to shape regional politics in Africa.  Since 2023, Moscow has taken tighter control, with Kremlin-linked figures, state agencies, and federal funding driving these efforts.  Russian activities reflect the Kremlin's top foreign policy priorities but are constrained by competing demands, especially the war in Ukraine.

Why Russia is Losing Africa's Sahel

 Foreign Affairs published on 25 March 2026 an article titled "Why Russia Is Losing the Sahel" by Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss, both at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

As Russia confronts shortcomings in its own capacity and the complexities of an environment it never fully understood, its expansion into the Sahel is on the verge of stalling, if not unraveling entirely.  Moscow's initiatives should serve as a cautionary tale for other African states contemplating whether to accept Russian security assistance.  This is also an opportunity for the United States to return.  

Sudan: UAE Establishes New Routes to Supply Rapid Support Forces

 The Clash Report posted on 23 March 2026 an article titled "UAE Tries to Rewire Supply Routes to Sudan's RSF via Ethiopia & Central African Republic."

The United Arab Emirates is restructuring its logistical network to sustain supply lines to Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, shifting routes through Ethiopia and the Central African Republic as existing corridors in Chad and Libya face pressure.  

Russia in Africa: Influence and Its Limits

 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 26 February 2026 a study titled "Russia in Africa: Examining Moscow's Influence and Its Limits" edited by Nate Reynolds, Frances Z. Brown, Frederic Wehrey, and Andrew S. Weiss.

The study explores Russia's role, its appeal, and its limitations across Africa since the 2010s, drawing on contributions from a range of scholars.  It also looks at the agency and interests of African governments and citizens.

Opportunism continues to define Russia's approach to Africa, as Moscow hones a set of tools designed to take advantage of instability and state fragility.  African actors can--and do--instrumentalize Russian engagement on the continent and advance their own agency in the relationship.  Geopolitical competition in Africa is widening and intensifying as middle powers emerge as important external partners, in addition to traditional powers.  The West must evolve its approach accordingly.

These essays point to a complicated and mixed record for Russia in Africa that defies simple characterizations.  Russia's influence in Africa has undoubtedly grown, but there are outstanding questions about whether it can translate its gains into stable, lasting relationships; whether its tools and symbolic gestures will gain further traction; and whether it can outcompete a crowded field of external powers that can deliver more than Russia, should they choose to.

Will Russian Mercenaries Protect Madagascar's Interim President?

 El Pais published on 24 January 2026 an article titled "Russian Africa Corps Mercenaries Incorporate Madagascar into Their Expansion Across the Continent" by Jose Naranjo.

A 40-member Russian delegation led by the head of the Africa Corps militia met in late December with Madagascar's interim president and offered personal protection to the Malagasy leader as the Africa Corps has done in the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Libya, and Equatorial Guinea.  

Rapid Support Forces Attack on Chadians Complicates Relations

 AEI's Critical Threats Africa File published on 22 January 2026 an analysis titled "Sudan" by Michael DeAngelo and Liam Karr.  

Sudan's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) conducted an attack on Chadian forces in Chad, raising tensions with a key partner amid disruptions to RSF supply lines.  The RSF claimed the attack was a mistake, but it has strained already complicated relations between Chad and the RSF.  Supply routes to the RSF through Chad are also under pressure.  

Chinese Gold Miners Warned in Central African Republic

 The China-Africa Security Radar posted on 22 November 2025 an article titled "'Mining Slave' Warning in CAR Sparks Fierce Debate among Chinese Netizens."

The Chinese embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic, issued a strong warning about the dangers facing Chinese nationals involved in gold mining.  This led to a vigorous internet debate among Chinese netizens as to how to respond to the warning.  

The Prospects and Limitations of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in September 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte.

The study chronicles the emergence of the Africa Corps and assesses its activities since the summer of 2023 in relevant African states.  It shows how the Africa Corps consolidated its position in Libya and Mali, where the Wagner Group had a legacy presence on the ground; how it embraced new opportunities in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea; in which countries there are indications that the Africa Corps might attempt to make inroads in the future; and where the Wagner Group continues to operate as Wagner--in the Central African Republic.  

An Analysis of Russia's Africa Corps

 The Robert Lansing Institute, an American nonprofit public policy research group, published on 30 September 2025 a detailed report titled "Russia's Africa Corps: Wagner's Successor in Africa (2022-2025)." 

This in-depth account concludes that the Africa Corps has effectively taken over the Wagner Group's Africa program since late 2023.  The Africa Corps maintains a presence in the CAR, Mali, Libya, Sudan, Niger, and Burkina Faso.  It has a small engagement in Equatorial Guinea and prospective deals in Togo, Benin, and Cameroon.  

The shift from the Wagner Group to the Africa Corps marked an effort to align African operations with Russia's state strategy.  The goals of securing allies, resources, and strategic positioning remain, but the execution is now more systematic and overtly tied to the Kremlin.  The Africa Corps is the beginning of a more ambitious Russian expeditionary posture.  

Africa's Critical Minerals and Russia, China, and the US

The Africa Policy Research Institute published on 29 September 2025 an analysis titled "From Minerals to Influence: Resource-for-Security Deals Reshaping Power Dynamics in Africa" by Amandine Gnanguenon and Marius Kretzschmar.   

Critical raw materials, especially minerals, have become Africa's major attraction for Russia, China, and the United States.  Each country has a different approach for linking critical minerals to its security interests.  

Russia's Growing Influence in Africa

 The International Crisis Group posted on 2 October 2025 a 7-minute video titled "Russia's Growing Influence in Africa."

This is a brief survey of African countries where the Wagner Group was engaged, and its activities increasingly are being taken over by the Africa Corps. The video ties Russia's interests to the extraction of natural resources such as gold and strategic access in eastern Libya. 

Russia Losing Influence in Africa

 The Wall Street Journal published on 29 September 2025 an article titled "Russia's Ambitious Plans in Africa Are Unraveling" by Benoit Faucon and Nicholas Bariyo.

Russian influence is receding in Sudan, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso following the collapse of the mercenary Wagner Group and its replacement with the Africa Corps under Moscow's Ministry of Defense.  

A Comprehensive Report on Russia's Africa Corps

 The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey published in August 2025 a study titled "Putin's New Frontier: The Prospects and Limitations of Africa Corps" by Hanna Notte. 

This timely and well researched study concludes that Russia's Africa Corps is a bureaucratic restructuring and rebranding of the Wagner Goup, which only continues to function in the Central African Republic.  It employs many former Wagner mercenary fighters and has taken control of its recruitment infrastructure. 

The Africa Corps is tethered closer to the Russian military's chain of command. It prioritizes training and routine security assistance rather than the high-risk missions of the Wagner Group.  It apparently relies on funding from Russia's state budget.  The Africa Corps might face future competition from countries such as Turkey, Iran, and China.  

Russia's Africa Corps Taking Over from Wagner Group

 Foreign Policy published on 3 September 2025 an article titled "Prigozhin's Ghost Haunts Africa Corps" by Christopher Faulkner, US Naval War College.

The Central Africa Republic (CAR) stands as the sole remaining foothold of the Wagner Group.  Its successor, the Africa Corps, is replacing it, but so far it has served as little more than a praetorian guard for autocrats seeking regime survival and deeper relations with Russia. Moscow has even asked the CAR to cut ties with the Wagner Group and sign a contract with the Africa Corps, which will pose serious challenges for Russia's policy on the continent.