The Economist published on 20 August 2026 an article titled "Somaliland Wants to Help Secure the Red Sea."
Somaliland's president says his country can help secure the Red Sea by offering military bases to global powers along its coastline. Somaliland is prepared to offer both the United States and Israel bases at the port of Berbera.
Saxafi Media posted on 23 August 2026 an interview with me titled "Inside Washington's Somaliland Dilemma: David Shinn Reveals What U.S. Policy Really Means."
Although much of the interview deals with Somaliland, it covers issues throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, including US support for Somalia sovereignty, Israel's recognition of Somaliland, importance of Ethiopia, the conflict in Sudan. Egypt's role in the region, security in the Red Sea, competition with China, the role of African diasporas, and the contribution of UN agencies and IGAD.
Somalia Today published an article dated 1 August 2026 titled "AFRICOM Chief Rules Out US Military Base in Somaliland" by Mohamed Bashir.
General Dagvin Anderson, head of the US Africa Command, said in an interview published by the US embassy in Mogadishu on 31 July that "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland." He added that "US policy is and remains the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia. That has not changed."
The United States has maintained contact with Somaliland officials and supported development and security programs in the region without recognizing it as a separate state.
The Emirates Policy Center published on 1 July 2026 a paper titled "Between Maritime Access and Recognition: Geopolitical Implications of Rapprochement Between Ethiopia and Somaliland."
The prospect of landlocked Ethiopia securing maritime access through Somaliland highlights the intersection of Addis Ababa's structural need for a maritime outlet and Hargeisa's ambition to strengthen its legitimacy and bargaining power--without pressing for immediate formal recognition.
The most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is the gradual expansion of economic and logistical cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland, without sovereign arrangements or formal recognition. While the option of recognition or sovereign maritime privileges remains possible, it is less likely and would require deeper regional and international transformations.
Higher Education Today posted about a month ago a 29-minute podcast titled "Culture and History of Somaliland" hosted by Steven Roy Goodman with Jama Musa Jama, Hargeisa Cultural Centre, and Lee Cassanelli, professor emeritus at the University of Pennsylvania.
This is a positive account filmed in Hargeisa of Somaliland's history and culture, interspersed with video clips of the country.
The Africa Report published on 26 February 2026 an article titled "Somalia: Hobyo Port Advances Amid Security Risks and Ethiopia Trade Scramble" by Mohamad Sheikh Nor.
Hobyo Investment Company has a 70 percent stake and a Turkish-owned construction company a 30 percent share in a new port at Hobyo, which is intended to support central Somalia and possible trade to and from Ethiopia. The new port faces challenges because it will strengthen certain local and foreign actors while sidelining those with interests in competing ports.
Reuters published on 13 January 2026 an article titled "DP World Says Somaliland Port Operations Continue Amid Regional Tensions."
Dubai-owned ports and logistics DP World said its operations were continuing at Berbera port in breakaway Somaliland following an escalation of tension between the UAE and Saudi Arabia in nearby Yemen. In addition, Somalia's government in Mogadishu said it was annulling all agreements with the UAE, including port deals, although it does not control Hargeisa's deal with DP World.
Egypt's Al Dostor published on 29 December 2025 an article titled "A Dangerous Gamble. Two International Experts: Israeli Recognition of 'Somaliland' Turns It into a Military Base."
The Arabic-language article draws on analysis by me and an analyst at the Atlantic Council in Washington on the implications of Israel's formal recognition of Somaliland, the first such recognition by another country. It raises the question of possible recognition by other countries and identifies some of the challenges and new strategic considerations in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.
Nanyang Technological University posted on 26 November 2025 an article titled "DP World Launches Shipping Corridor between Dubai and Somaliland."
The UAE's DP World has launched a shipping route connecting Dubai's Jebel Ali Port with Berbera Port in Somaliland on the Gulf of Aden. Most of the trade on this new route will come from and go to landlocked Ethiopia's 130 million people.
Semafor published on 28 March 2025 an article titled "Somalia Offers US 'Control' over Strategic Ports" by Amanda Sperber.
Somalia's government has offered the United States "exclusive operational control" over strategic ports on the Gulf of Aden in an effort to preclude a decision by Washington to recognize the independence of Somaliland. The offer includes the port of Berbera under the control of Somaliland and Bosaso under the control of Puntland.
Radio France Internationale posted on 17 August 2024 an article titled "Ethiopia and Somalia Move Closer to Resolving Somaliland Dispute."
Turkey will host a third round of talks between Ethiopia and Somalia on 17 September in an effort to mediate the differences over the Ethiopian-Somaliland memorandum of understanding for a naval base near Berbera in the Gulf of Aden. The parties did not reach an agreement in the first two rounds of talks.
The Nanyang Technological University in Singapore published on 27 June 2024 an analysis titled "Ethiopia's Red Sea Gambit: A Landlocked Nation in Search of an Alternative Port" by Johan Burger.
The author reviews Ethiopia's current standing in the Horn of Africa and the impact of its memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Somaliland to establish a port and naval base there. He concludes implementation of the MOU could destabilize the region.
The Conversation published on 3 April 2024 a commentary titled "Turkey and Ethiopia Have Had Close Ties for Many Years: Somalia Maritime Deals May Shift the Dynamics" by Michael B. Bishku, Augusta University.
Long standing Ethiopia-Turkey ties are being put to the test as a result of Ethiopia's deal with Somaliland for a military base and reportedly diplomatic recognition. Turkey has a military base in Somalia, which opposes the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal, and is training Somali soldiers and equipping its naval force. This situation poses a dilemma for Turkey's relations with Ethiopia.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 6 March 2024 a Q & A titled "The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal."
The Q and A with ICG experts covers a wide range of issues. The one new significant fact to come out of the discussion is that the proposed Ethiopian naval base on Somaliland's Gulf of Aden coast is expected to constitute 20 square kilometers of land and sea at an undetermined location rather than the earlier stated 20 kilometers of coastline. This makes more sense as the 20 kilometers of coastline never specified how deep it would go into Somaliland or how much water area it would occupy.
The Italian Institute for International Political Studies published on 30 January 2024 an analysis titled "On the Edge: The Ethiopia-Somaliland MOU" by Aleksi Ylonen.
This is an analysis from the perspective of an Italian think tank of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The MOU says Ethiopia will consider recognition of Somaliland in exchange for port access and a 50-year lease of land for a military base on Somaliland's Gulf of Aden coast.
World Politics Review published on 2 February 2024 an analysis titled "The Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal Could Sink Djibouti's Economy" by Francisco Serrano.
The port of Djibouti accounts for 95 percent of Ethiopia's trade and 75 percent of Djibouti's GDP is dependent on transport services with Ethiopia. The deal between Ethiopia and Somaliland, if it materializes, could have a huge negative impact on Djibouti.
The Council on Foreign Relations published on 25 January 2024 a backgrounder titled "Somaliland: The Horn of Africa's Breakaway State" by Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista.
This is a useful update and background piece on the situation in Somaliland since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991.
The International Crisis Group posted on 25 January 2024 a 39-minute podcast titled "Ethiopia's Push for Sea Access" with Christopher Clapham, University of Cambridge, and Alan Boswell.
Clapham discusses the history of Ethiopia's effort to obtain an outlet to the Red Sea and the recent Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Current conflict over access to the Red Sea could extend throughout the Horn of Africa, which is a region always subject to a catastrophic war. The situation in Ethiopia is very worrying.
Addis Ababa today looks like a relatively stable bubble surrounded by instability in the regions. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is not immediately threatened but is running an idiosyncratic administration with no obvious basis of support. He is making a series of tactical alliances but losing trust in the process. The concept of manifest destiny runs strong in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Clapton concluded that the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal will eventually fall apart.
The Soufan Center, an independent and non-profit research organization based in New York, published on 11 January 2024 an intel brief titled "Tensions Growing Between Ethiopia and Somalia over Somaliland Port Deal."
The analysis notes that the proposed deal is backed by the United Arab Emirates. On the other hand, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Arab League, Egypt, and Turkiye have sided with Somalia against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.
The Guardian published on 13 January 2024 an article titled "'We Are Ready for War': Somalia Threatens Conflict with Ethiopia over Breakaway Region" by Fred Harter.
Ethiopia's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland allegedly involves diplomatic recognition of Somaliland in return for Ethiopian use of the port of Berbera and a military base on Somaliland's Gulf of Aden coastline. The MOU has not, however, been published and its terms remain murky. Nevertheless, Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its territory, says it is prepared to defend the homeland to prevent its recognition by Ethiopia.
