Recommended reading on the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal

For those of you interested in the binding arbitration concerning Abyei in Sudan, I call your attention to a useful document titled "Frequently Asked Questions and Answers about the Decision of the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal." Dated 28 July 2009, it was prepared by the Public International Law and Policy Group, a global pro bono law firm. You can access the document (in PDF format) here.

Testimony today before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

I testified today before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (chaired by Senator Kerry) on the topic of "Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Sudan." I was on a panel with Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Eisa, a physician and 2007 Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award Laureate, Sudan Organization for Rights and Peace-Building, Washington, D.C, and Susan Page, regional director, Southern and East Africa Programs, National Democratic Institute. A video recording of the committee can be found here. You can read my full testimony (in PDF format) here. UPDATE: My testimony also appears on AllAfrica.com.

Interview with World Have Your Say (BBC radio)

I participated in a BBC radio panel discussion "World Have Your Say" on July 28, 2009, on the subject of Islamic extremism in Africa. Much of the program focused on northern Nigeria, which was the location recently of extremist Islamic attacks against police stations and government buildings. I focused primarily on East Africa and the Horn, noting that the situation is especially worrisome in Somalia. There was much discussion about the relationship between poverty and Islamic extremism. I emphasized that poverty, social and economic inequality, political marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities, and corruption are not direct causes of extremism. The establishment of extremist Islamic groups requires persons with an extremist ideology and a commitment, often from outside Africa, to mobilize local people with grievances to join the cause. This is where poverty and the other factors play a role. They create a negative, local environment which extremists can manipulate for their own reasons. And we are not just talking about Islamic extremists. The Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda is a non-Muslim group, for example, that is as extreme as any Islamic group in East Africa and the Horn. Salafi and Wahhabi influence from Egypt, the Gulf States, and South Asia have reached East Africa and the Horn and, in the case of al-Shabaab in Somalia, become radicalized and politicized. Only a tiny percentage of Muslims in the region, however, agree with these extremist ideologies. To listen to the interview, click below (though the BBC producer has said that the clip will only be up for a few days).

Two recommended articles on Somalia

For those of you interested in Somalia, I call to your attention two useful articles in the July issue of the CTC Sentinel.

1. "A Diagnosis of Somalia's Failing Transitional Government" by Anonymous
2. "The Status of Conflict in the Southern and Central Regions of Somalia" by Michael A. Weinstein

Both articles can be accessed in PDF format here.

Report on Chad's domestic crisis

For those of you following developments in Chad and suggestions for dealing with the situation, I call to your attention an excellent report titled "Chad's Domestic Crisis: The Achilles Heel for Peacemaking in Darfur" by the Project Enough team and dated July 2009. You can access the file in PDF format here. Image: "Chadian troops deployed in town after fighting with rebels." VOA.

9 questions from Life Week (Beijing) on Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, UN, AU, etc.

UPDATE 7/28/09: The Life Week article appears here in Chinese. You can view Google's rough translation of the page here (note that "Dashen" is "Shinn"). I was interviewed on July 18 by Life Week (Beijing). Below is the transcript: Question 1: It seems the situation in Somalia is even more serious than last month. Is that right? Could you please give me some information about the current situation in Somalia? We really do not know much in China. Amb. Shinn: I really do not think the situation has worsened over the past month. The situation in Mogadishu has been difficult for many months. While it has not improved, the relative position of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and those groups (al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam) opposing it are about the same. Image caption: "Government soldiers have been battling al-Shabab for control of the capital, Mogadishu [AFP]." Source: Al-Jazeera. Question 2: Seven people accused of renouncing Islam and spying for the TFG were beheaded in Somalia on July 10. It seems the authority of the Islamist insurgents is growing. What did this terrible event mean? Was it an effort to send a message to the TFG? Amb. Shinn: There is a great deal that we do not yet know about this incident. One al-Shabaab spokesperson has denied responsibility. I am not aware that any group has taken responsibility. According to one report (e.g. here), those who were beheaded were Christians. There are probably not more than a couple thousand Christians in Somalia; they are such a small group that they pose a threat to no one. Somalis have traditionally been highly tolerant of this tiny minority. Whatever group carried out this heinous crime only demonstrated irresponsible cowardice. Question 3: Two French security consultants were kidnapped at gunpoint from a hotel in Mogadishu on July 14, 2009. Who did this? Why? What will the French government do? Amb. Shinn: The two French officials were assigned by the French government to help the TFG establish an intelligence and security service. They were apparently kidnapped by a criminal group that may have turned them over to al-Shabaab and/or Hizbul Islam. The original purpose of the kidnapping seems to have been an effort to obtain ransom money. Now that they may be in the hands of al-Shabaab and/or Hizbul Islam, the incident has become politicized, and one or both of these organizations may try to obtain some political favor from France or the international community. Although France will do everything possible to protect the safety of its nationals, I suspect it is leaving no options off the table in responding to this act. Question 4: I know that the African Union has 4,300 Ugandan and Burundi troops in Mogadishu. Their mandate only allows them to protect the TFG state house, port and airport. They were not permitted to seek out and confront the groups that are trying to overthrow the TFG. But on July 12 there was a direct fight between the AU troops and the insurgents. Why? Facing the increasingly serious situation, will the AU take additional action? Amb. Shinn: The AU troops moved into North Mogadishu to help the TFG remove insurgents who oppose them. For the most part, North Mogadishu is not friendly territory for the insurgents. Although some observers argue that the AU troops exceeded their current mandate to shoot only in self-defense, the AU troops argued that this was self-defense. The AU is urging that the force be given a stronger mandate. In any event, I think from this point forward you will see the AU troops becoming more aggressive vis-à-vis the insurgents. Question 5: What about the Ethiopian troops? We know Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia last month, but it seems they have not acted yet. Amb. Shinn: Ethiopia removed its troops from Mogadishu in January 2009, and they have not returned. I don’t believe they have any intention to return to Mogadishu. On the other hand, Ethiopia has for years sent small numbers of its troops across its lengthy border with Somalia to support friendly Somalis or to chase insurgents that it believed crossed into Ethiopia. You can expect this activity to continue. Question 6: It seems the international community is still keeping aloof from the situation in Somalia and does not intend to take further action. What do you think about it? Why? Amb. Shinn: The international community (United Nations, African Union and Arab League) strongly backs the position of the TFG and opposes al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Although I do not believe the international community is prepared to send troops to Somalia, it is doing more to improve the TFG security forces. The United Nations Development Program is providing training for the police. Djibouti and Kenya have offered training for TFG security forces. France and Italy are helping to train TFG security forces. The U.S. provided about $5 million worth of ammunition and small arms to the AU forces that, in turn, helped to arm TFG forces. The international community should avoid direct involvement in Somalia as this will only alienate more Somalis just as the growing foreign jihadi presence in al-Shabaab is alienating Somalis. Question 7: The UN Security Council warned Eritrea on July 8 that it would consider taking action against anyone who undermined peace in Somalia. The AU said Eritrea had been aiding Islamist insurgents who are fighting Somali government forces, but Eritrea denied it. What did Eritrea do as you know? What will happen next? Will it influence the current situation? Amb. Shinn: I do not have information on Eritrea’s role beyond that which has been provided by the AU and UN, but I have no reason to dispute the UN and AU accounts. If Eritrea continues to support al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, it will come under increasing criticism from the international community, possible including sanctions. Should that happen in the UN Security Council, the position of China and Russia will be critical as both countries have in the past been reluctant to approve sanctions against another country. Question 8: The TFG is supported by the UN and AU, but it seems the insurgents are always stronger. Why? Amb. Shinn: It is difficult to judge the strength of the insurgents. Certainly, the military capacity of the TFG is weak. The insurgents are well financed from overseas and apparently well organized. They are not, however, unified except on one point — to overthrow the TFG. Should they succeed in that effort, I think there will be considerable disagreement among the insurgents as various insurgent factions seek power. It is not that the insurgents are so strong; it is rather that the TFG is so weak. On-going training of the TFG security forces may make a difference in the months ahead. Image: From NYT article mentioned below. Caption: "More than 20 young Somali-Americans, many of them raised in Minneapolis, left the United States to join a militant Islamist group in Somalia." Credit: Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times. Link. Question 9: I heard that some Somali-Americans went back to Somalia and participated with the insurgents. Could you please give me some details? It seems it has evoked a major reaction in U.S. society, right? Why did this happen? Amb. Shinn: The New York Times did an excellent analysis of this issue on July 12, 2009. It identified more than a dozen Somali-Americans from various parts of the United States, but especially from the large group that lives in Minneapolis-St. Paul, who went to Somalia beginning in late 2007 to join al-Shabaab. Some were young Somali-Americans who had engaged in gang activities in the United States while others were upstanding Somalis with a bright future. A few left for Somalia because they were attracted by religious zealotry. Some objected to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Some sought adventure and some probably had no idea what they were doing. Several died in Somalia, a few returned to the United States and most are probably still in Somalia. There has been considerable attention to the story in the American press. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has spent considerable effort trying to get to the bottom of the case and to prevent any threat to the United States. The vast majority of the Somali-American community are law-abiding citizens or residents. They are very upset at what has happened to a small minority of their children.

Journal article on China now online

My article, which appears in the spring/summer 2009 issue of Columbia Journal of International Affairs, titled "Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent" was not initially available online. It can now be found here.

CENSA publishes book on U.S.-China-Africa

The Council for Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA) is announcing that it has just published "Crossroads Africa: Perspectives on U.S.-China-Africa Security Affairs," for which I wrote the preface, titled "Africa at the Crossroads." The book is edited by Robert R. Tomes, Angela Sapp Mancini, and James T. Kirkhope (New York: Council for Emerging National Security Affairs, 2009). As far as I can tell, it is not available online, but you can check at www.censa.net. To see more information about a panel related to the book last April, click here.

Event on East African Piracy @ GW Homeland Security Policy Institute

I was part of a panel yesterday on "East African Piracy: Sources, Challenges & Potential Policy Responses" at GW's Homeland Security Policy Institute. The other panelists were:

1. Charles Dragonette (LinkedIn), senior maritime operations analyst, Office of Naval Intelligence
2. Mark Kimmitt, retired Brigadier General and former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs
3. and Martin Murphy, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

The discussion was moderated by Frank Cilluffo, director of HSPI, and Stephen Carmel, HSPI senior fellow and senior vice president, Maersk Line, Limited. To learn more about the event, see this post on the HSPI website and the Issue Brief (in PDF format), and full audio of the event appears below. American intelligence specialists who follow Somalia appear almost unanimously, at least in their public comments, to believe that there is no link between Somali pirates and terrorism or extremist groups like al-Shabaab. All of the other members of the panel also expressed this view. I was the lone dissenting voice. I suggested that although evidence to the contrary is sparse, they should first debunk the October 31, 2008, report titled "Unholy High Seas Alliance, Africa" in Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor. Although this report may be faulty, it provided evidence of a connection between pirates operating out of Kismayu in southern Somalia and the al-Shabaab extremist organization located in that port town. It suggested the link is fragile and based on mutual financial and logistical interests, not ideology. The two groups shared training, and the pirates sometimes smuggled weapons for al-Shabaab. The Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) first deputy prime minister recently charged that pirates were transporting for a profit foreign jihadi extremists to Somalia to fight for al-Shabaab. The TFG has, of course, a vested interest in making this claim in order to attract more western support. My point is that one should not dismiss out of hand a connection between some of the pirates and extremist groups like al-Shabaab even it the pirate motive is simply making money.

Reuters: What an al-Shabaab win would mean for Somalia

I was quoted in an article today by William Maclean, a security correspondent at Reuters, titled "What would al Shabaab win mean for Somalia?" Here is the first quote:

Horn of Africa specialist David Shinn said foreign concern about al Shabaab and its recruitment of foreign fighters would translate into outside support for the domestic opposition, especially the moderate Islamist Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca group. The United Nations and the AU say hundreds of foreigners have flocked to join al Shabaab. Some analysts say these accounts appear exaggerated. But Western powers fear that if the government is overthrown, the militants will try to destabilise parts of Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Yemen as well as central and northern Somali regions. "I don't see large troop movements into Somalia," said Shinn. "Opposition would be something not as visible to the naked eye, and it would begin rather slowly. But it would build over time if Shabaab seemed to have staying power."

And then later on in the article:

Would al Shabaab help or hinder such efforts? Back in 2006, the ICU was seen by aid experts as a relatively accountable partner in handling the practicalities of aid flows, at least in contrast to a chaotic and corrupt situation under the warlords who held sway before them. Analysts say it is possible the militia may want to emulate the Union in its handling of humanitarian shipments. But whatever approach it takes to aid, al Shabaab's harsh justice may make some donors think twice before funding aid purchases. "It would be a real dilemma for the donors," said Shinn.

The entire article is accessible here. Image: People walk outside the Sahafi hotel where two foreigners were kidnapped in Somalia's capital Mogadishu July 14, 2009. Somali gunmen stormed into a Mogadishu hotel on Tuesday and kidnapped two French security consultants working for the government, witnesses and officials said. REUTERS/Omar Faruk

Quotes in two more Christian Science Monitor articles on Pres. Obama in Africa

I am quoted today in two new pieces in the Christian Science Monitor by Drew Hinshaw. There relevant quote from the piece "Obama in Africa: Big on inspiration, short on specifics" is:

"It was an important speech and it's by far the most comprehensive statement he's made on Africa, but it still leaves a lot to the imagination," David Shinn, former ambassador to Ethiopia, said. "He didn't really give a very good picture as to what the US is going to do in the Congo, or Somalia, or Sudan."

In "Africans reflect on Obama's 'tough love' message" I am quoted as saying the following:

"I think the main thing he wanted to do was to put the Africans on notice that its time to stop complaining about their problems as emanating from outside, and to realize that for the most part, their problems are of their own making now," says David Shinn, former US Ambassador to Ethiopia. "I think it came across loud and clear."

Image: President Barack Obama and first lady Michelle Obama (2nd l.) and their daughter Sasha (l.) take part in a departure ceremony at the airport in Accra Saturday. Jim Young/Reuters. Source: CSM.

Pres. Obama lays out general Africa themes, but we still need the details.

I participated in the BBC radio "Focus on Africa" program today concerning the visit to Ghana by President Obama. Most of the participants focused on the president's call to Africans to take control of their own future and the need for good governance. I noted that he also emphasized a willingness by the United States to support development that offers real benefits to more people, especially the improvement of agriculture and food security. Although he did not use the term in his speech in Ghana, he has called elsewhere for a green revolution in Africa. He also stated that the United States would continue the effort of President Bush to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB in Africa. He added to this list the eradication of polio and neglected tropical disease. Finally, he stated that the United States would step up its efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict in Africa, noting in particular the on-going problems in Darfur, Somalia, and the Congo. When asked what was left out of the speech, I suggested that I missed more emphasis on private American investment in Africa, as this could provide the most positive impact on improving African economies.

"Obama in Africa: Can US rival China's new clout?"

I am quoted in Drew Hinshaw's article in today's Christian Science Monitor on President Obama's trip to Africa. Here are the relevant passages:

For many African governments, China's state-operated Exim Bank, now the world's third largest credit agency, has become a compelling alternative to the World Bank, one that doesn't dwell on humanitarian concerns. ...Exim Bank's loans typically come with gentle 1 to 2 percent interest rates and only one major catch: that the governments contract China's state-owned companies to complete the project. This works well for reform-reluctant leaders, and for China's government, which in many cases directly pays state-owned contractors from state-owned banks, bypassing the host nation altogether. A token amount of the loan reaches the local workforce, or is used to purchase local materials. "But the rest of it will be money that goes from one Chinese bank to another," says former US Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn. "And this has been the pattern across Africa. How can a Western company compete with it?"

And here:

But beyond oil, analysts say American companies are shirking opportunities in Africa. "Except for oil, where investment money goes in no matter what, there hasn't been much Western investment in Africa in recent years," said Mr. Shinn, the ambassador. "This is an area where the United States really needs to make a push, particularly as we start coming out of the economic funk we're in."

The entire article can be accessed here. Photo: July 8. "A street vendor sits in his kiosk selling memoribilia depicting President Obama in Accra, Ghana's capital city. The visit will be Obama's first to sub-Saharan Africa since becoming president in January. Luc Gnago-Re." Source: Washington Post.

President Obama's visit to Ghana

I just spoke with Hearst Television Inc. about President Obama's visit to Ghana, and made the following points: I believe the President will use the visit to Ghana to underscore that country's successful elections over the past 15 years and to make his first major remarks on U.S. policy towards Africa. I believe some of the major themes in his remarks will be strengthening democratic institutions on the continent, helping African countries to prevent and mitigate conflict, encouraging sound economic policies and sustainable growth, and working with Africa to diminish the negative issues such as food insecurity, climate change, health pandemics, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and maritime insecurity. The Obama administration seems to be very interested in improving African agriculture. At some point, the administration's signature program for the continent may be assistance for creating a green revolution.

Interview with Alhurra TV

Alhurra Arabic-language TV asked for my views today on President Obama's upcoming visit to Ghana. I noted that this was actually the President's second visit to Africa as he earlier visited Cairo. He chose Ghana because of the good record it has established in promoting democracy -- four peaceful changes of government in the last 15 years with the opposition winning on two occasions. I suggested that the administration is well engaged on the most pressing crises on the continent. Obama's special envoy for Sudan, Scott Gration, has been active in dealing with problems surrounding both the north-south peace agreement and Darfur. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson has been active concerning a new U.S. policy towards Somalia, and it is my understanding that there will be a new special envoy for the Great Lakes region of Central Africa as there was in the Clinton administration.

9 questions from Life Week (China)

I was interviewed about Somalia by Life Week. You can access the original article in Chinese here, or an English version (via Google Translate) here. Below, I have also included the text of the Q&A, which occurred on June 26. Life Week: The Somali government has declared a state of emergency. How serious is this situation? Amb. Shinn: The situation if very serious. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which is recognized by the United Nations, African Union, and Arab League, is being threatened by an extremist organization, al-Shabaab and an allied group known as Hizbul Islam. Al-Shabaab has stated publicly that it has links with al-Qaeda. It has strong external support, including a growing number of foreign jihadis from the Middle East, South Asia, and northeastern Africa. Al-Shabaab and probably Hizbul Islam also receive financing and weapons from outside Somalia. The two groups have seized by force significant parts of Mogadishu, the capital city, and southern and central Somalia. Life Week: The Speaker of Somalia’s Parliament said they were under attack by foreign terrorists. Is it true that some foreign fighters participated in the fight? Why do they do so? Amb. Shinn: Most of the fighters for al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam are Somalis. They have joined these groups for different reasons. Some believe in the extreme version of Sharia advocated by these organizations while others simply want to seize power. Some have come from the Somali diaspora in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. Some of the fighters are not Somali and have joined the battle in order to impose their extreme interpretation of Sharia on the Somalis. Virtually all Somalis are Muslim; they have traditionally practiced a moderate version of Islam. Life Week: Some people said the foreign fighters and the al-Shabaab have a very close relationship with al-Qaeda. Is that true? Why does al-Qaeda support anti-government forces in Somalia? Amb. Shinn: Many of the foreign fighters almost certainly have links with al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some of them probably do not have ties with these groups but have been attracted by the radical ideology of al-Shabaab. A few of al-Shabaab’s Somali leaders also have past associations with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. I suspect that most of the Somali rank and file members of al-Shabaab do not have ties with al-Qaeda. Life Week: Some Somali analysts say the conflict between the TFG and al-Shabaab will drag on for months fueled by outside support for both sides. Besides al-Qaeda, what support do both sides receive from the outside? Amb. Shinn: Those Somali analysts are probably correct; the conflict will drag on for months fueled by outside support. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam also receive support from the government of Eritrea, some Somalis in the diaspora, and private non-Somalis in the Middle East and South Asia. The TFG receives humanitarian and moral support from most of the international community, including the United States. Several European countries have provided training to TFG security forces. The U.S. State Department confirmed on June 25 that it has delivered a shipment of arms to the TFG. Somalis in the diaspora also support the TFG. Life Week: Somalia has become an international conflict. How does the unsettled situation in Somalia affect neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia? Why is Ethiopia so concerned? Amb. Shinn: Somalia shares a lengthy border with both Kenya and Ethiopia. The persons living in those neighboring parts of Kenya and Ethiopia are Somalis. There is a long history whereby past Somali governments have wanted to incorporate those territories into Somalia. This has led to conflict. In the late 1970s, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and occupied most of the Somali-inhabited territory for a number of months. The TFG has disavowed any desire to take control of these territories, but al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have not. In fact, a few of their leaders have explicitly raised the possibility of occupying these territories. The borders are very porous; it is not difficult to cross them and carry out attacks on the other side. Kenya is the location of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who have fled Somalia because of the unrest there. This puts an additional burden on the government of Kenya, which recently sent additional forces to its border with Somalia. The neighboring countries do have legitimate security concerns, but it is important that they not take actions that will worsen the situation. Life Week: Somalia’s Parliament pleaded Saturday for its neighbors and the international community to send in troops. Will the neighboring countries and the international community take such action? Amb. Shinn: This is a highly controversial issue. First, the African Union has 4,300 Ugandan and Burundi troops in Mogadishu. Their mandate only allows them to protect the TFG’s state house, the port, and airport. They are not permitted to seek out and confront the groups that are trying to overthrow the TFG. Second, the United Nations sponsored a major military intervention in Somalia from 1993 until 1995. It was not a good experience. It did not end Somalia’s failed state, and it alienated a lot of Somalis in the process. Third, Somalis do not like the idea of foreign troops in the country, including the foreign jihadis that support al-Shabaab. The international community would risk alienating Somalis again if it sent troops in support of the TFG. The sending of foreign troops would not, in my view, help the TFG over the long term. At best, it would postpone tough decisions that the TFG must make now. I doubt that the international community will send forces to Somalia. Although the African Union may increase the number of troops it has in Somalia, it will make little military difference so long as the AU mandate is one of static defense. Life Week: Will the U.S. attitude influence the situation? Amb. Shinn: The attitude of all permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States and China, in addition to the European Union, African Union, and Arab League will influence the situation in Somalia. It is in the interest of all these governments and organizations to encourage stability in Somalia and to help create a government that has the widespread support of Somalis. Life Week: Why are the anti-TFG groups such as al-Shabaab unwilling to negotiate with the government? What is their claim? Amb. Shinn: Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam want power and will do anything they can to achieve their goal including suicide bombings and political assassinations. They have no interest in power sharing. They claim they are trying to force foreign elements out of Somalia while relying increasingly on foreign jihadi fighters for their own support. Life Week: Why has Somalia been unable to achieve political stability since 1991? Amb. Shinn: This question is more appropriately directed to a student writing a dissertation for a doctoral degree. The answer is long and complex. For fear of oversimplifying, it is important to recall that the last national government in Somalia, the one led by Siad Barre, failed completely in 1991. Northwest Somalia declared its independence as Somaliland in 1991 and has actually put in place surprisingly democratic government. The rest of Somalia broke up into fiefdoms led by local administrations such as Puntland or warlords in Mogadishu and parts of southern and central Somalia. The right combination of circumstances and Somali leadership has not yet come together to convince the vast majority of Somalis that they should support that leadership. Somalia also became a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Finally, extremists from outside Somalia decided to take advantage of the failed Somali state for their own purposes. This is an oversimplification but probably as much as your readers want to know.

Follow up on June 11 post

It is now clear that my June 9 meeting with Salahdin Abdurahman Maow and Abdiwali Hussein Gas stirred up a lot of controversy among Ogadenis around the world. Isn't that one of the goals of a blog? In any event, I appreciate your different points of view. It is now obvious, however, that there are AT LEAST two ONLF factions even if some of you are not prepared to acknowledge that fact. Let me be clear on one other point. I meet with persons having widely divergent views in order to gain a better understanding of the issue, not because I necessarily support any particular group.

In depth interview on Somali piracy with Chronogram Magazine

I was extensively interviewed by Lorna Tychostup for her piece "Fishermen & the Failed State" in the Hudson Valley-based Chronogram Magazine. Here is one of the 17 questions she asked:

What restraints, historically, have been seen as working against curbing the activities of pirates? Why wasn’t piracy addressed sooner? Looking at figures from the International Maritime Organization, in 2006 there were 10 recorded pirate attacks off Somalia. In 2007 there were 31, in 2008 there were 111, and as of mid-June 2009, there have been 114. Ten attacks are not going to attract attention. When you get 111 attacks, people start paying a lot of attention. Capturing a Ukrainian vessel full of tanks, ammunition, and small arms destined for southern Sudan attracts enormous attention. A super tanker loaded with oil for the US results in even more interest. When an American freighter with an American crew and captain on board are kidnapped, you really rock the meter. The only thing that gets international attention is when international interests become adversely impacted. So long as it’s just a horrible situation on the ground in Somalia, there is little interest.

Al-Shabaab's threats: primarily designed to attract international media attention

Radio France Internationale asked me to comment today on the threat by Somalia's al-Shabaab organization to attack Ethiopia and Ethiopia's response that it does not fear such an attack. I noted that there is a history from the mid-1990s of several terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia by a Somali organization known as al-Ittihad al-Islami. One such attack in 1996 nearly killed the then Ethiopian minister of communications, an Ethiopian from Somali region. Although al-Ittihad ceased to exist several years ago, some of its members almost certainly joined al-Shabaab. Consequently, there is the possibility that al-Shabaab could at some point carry out one or more terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia. On the other hand, al-Shabaab is not a serious threat to the security of Ethiopia or Kenya, another country that it recently threatened to attack. Al-Shabaab makes such threats primarily to attract international media attention. Image: The radical Islamist al-Shabab are accused of links to al-Qaeda. Source: BBC.

New Heritage Foundation study on piracy

I call to your attention another useful report that deals with Somali piracy titled "Maritime Security: Fighting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond," published by the Heritage Foundation on June 24, 2009. You can access the report (in PDF format) here. It is unfortunate that this otherwise excellent study released in mid-2009 only has statistical data through 2007. I also found a couple of the recommendations a little strange. For example, the report calls for "expanding the Navy's stated goal of raising its number of ships from 277 to 313 (the majority of the additional 36 should be nuclear powered, including additional nuclear-powered submarines) and focusing Navy operations more on sea control and assured access, less on maritime engagement and security missions." I am not sure I see much of a connection between reducing piracy and adding more nuclear-powered submarines to the U.S. fleet. On the other hand, shifting the U.S. military contribution from the Navy to the Coast Guard and expanding the Coast Guard, as the report recommends, makes a lot of sense. The report correctly urges that the international community focus on helping Somalis to reestablish governance. On the other hand, the recommendation that the United States should support a "grassroots model" of governance in Somalia is a little too facile. The report is on target when it urges the United States to support the UN Security Council in demanding international respect for Somalia's Exclusive Economic Zone and related conventions that bar the dumping of toxic wastes.

Presidential term limits for African countries

A reporter with america.gov asked me several months ago to comment on a story he was doing about elections in Africa. He used most of my remarks in his story. The staff at america.gov liked both the article and my contribution and asked that I do a stand alone piece of my choosing about democracy for the america.gov blog. Term limits have long bothered me, as they are too often observed in the breach. Either a country's constitution does not contain term limits or the leader, upon reaching the end of his/her prescribed time in office, asks that the constitution be changed to permit another term. Although clearly not limited to Africa (witness the most recent effort in Honduras), it has been a particular problem there. To read my blog post, titled "Presidential Term Limits for African Countries," click here.