The Council on Foreign Relations posted on 13 April 2018 a commentary titled "China's Strategy in Djibouti: Mixing Commercial and Military Interests" by Monica Wang, an intern at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The author concludes that the mixing of commercial and military interests that made Djibouti a possibility has become the model that China will replicate again in the Indian Ocean region, and soon.
Showing posts with label Bab-el-Mandeb. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bab-el-Mandeb. Show all posts
Monday, April 16, 2018
Saturday, December 9, 2017
From the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden
I contributed a chapter titled "From the Suez Canal to the Gulf of Aden" in a new book titled Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific: Heritage and Contemporary Challenges edited by Howard M. Hensel and Amit Gupta (Routledge, 2018).
While the book explores maritime security issues throughout the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, my chapter focuses only on the maritime and coastal space from the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal, through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba, Bab el-Mandeb, and into the Gulf of Aden.
While the book explores maritime security issues throughout the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, my chapter focuses only on the maritime and coastal space from the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal, through the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba, Bab el-Mandeb, and into the Gulf of Aden.
Labels:
Bab-el-Mandeb,
Djibouti,
Egypt,
Eritrea,
Ethiopia,
Gulf of Aden,
Israel,
Jordan,
maritime security,
Red Sea,
Saudi Arabia,
shipping,
Somalia,
Somaliland,
Sudan,
Suez Canal,
Yemen
Friday, February 26, 2016
China's Motives in Combatting Piracy in the Gulf of Aden
The Diplomat published on 25 February 2016 an analysis titled "Chinese Anti-Piracy and the Global Maritime Commons" by Matthew G. Minot-Scheuermann, a non-resident fellow with CSIS Pacific Forum's Young Leaders Program.
The author argues that China's naval presence and activities off the Horn of Africa are defined by three factors: independent command and control of its engagement, unilateral action, and an unwillingness to meaningfully integrate into other anti-piracy coalitions operating in the area. He adds that China is operating in its own interest.
The author argues that China's naval presence and activities off the Horn of Africa are defined by three factors: independent command and control of its engagement, unilateral action, and an unwillingness to meaningfully integrate into other anti-piracy coalitions operating in the area. He adds that China is operating in its own interest.
Labels:
Bab-el-Mandeb,
China,
EU,
Gulf of Aden,
Horn of Africa,
NATO,
piracy,
PLAN,
US
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