Al-Shabaab Strategy following Military Setbacks

The 27 March 2013 edition of the CTC Sentinel has a good update titled "Al-Shabab's Tactical and Media Strategies in the Wake of Its Battlefield Setbacks."  It is written by Christopher Anzalone, a PhD candidate in the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University.

The article assesses the trajectory of al-Shabaab's military and political strategies, explains how defections have weakened the group, and reviews its information and media operations during the past two years following significant territorial losses.

Analysis of Al-Shabaab's Losses in Somalia

The CTC Sentinel at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published an analysis titled "Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab's Losses in Somalia" on 26 September 2012. The authors are Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence at King's College in London, and Hussein Solomon, senior professor at the University of the Free State in South Africa.

They emphasize the success of AMISOM, internal al-Shabaab clan divisions and al-Shabaab's mismanagement of the drought in 2011. At the same time, they warn that al-Shabaab will remain a dangerous organization even as it loses control of more territory.

Click here to read the analysis.

"Somalia: Not Much Changed in 2010"

I'm quoted in Joe DeCapua's VOA News story on Somalia.

I gave the interview on Dec. 21 before there was clarification of the merger of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam.

Hassan Dahir Aweys subsequently stated that he too supports the merger of the two organizations.

This still does not resolve, however, the factional problems within al-Shabaab.

Here's the audio:

Congressional research service report on Somalia

Ted Dagne, who has followed Somalia for many years, is the author of an Oct. 8 Congressional Research Service study titled “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace” (PDF).

It covers earlier history, recent developments, U.S. assistance, al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, the AU peacekeeping mission, Somali piracy and policy options for the United States.

"State-building, Counterterrorism and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia"

In September 2010, Somali specialist Mark Bradbury published a paper titled "State-building, Counterterrorism and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia" at Tufts University's Feinstein International Center.

He argues that Somalia is a location where western military strategies and aid policies developed in Afghanistan and in Iraq are being transferred to Africa. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies combining military force and aid stabilization packages and the use of "for profit" companies to deliver assistance are being deployed in Somalia. This has not proved effective in Afghanistan, where there has been no shortage of funding. He says transferring such approaches to Somalia, which takes no consideration of the context and is backed by fewer resources, seems unlikely to be any more successful.

The biggest challenge to independent humanitarian action in Somalia is, he suggests, the moves towards greater regulation and licensing of humanitarian aid by donor governments. In order to deliver assistance to populations in need in south central Somalia, aid agencies have to negotiate with local authorities, who, in many places, are allied to anti-government forces such as al-Shabaab or Hisbul Islam.

Developments in Somalia

On May 18, the International Crisis Group released a solid analysis of the internal divisions confronting Somalia's Islamist movement titled "Somalia's Divided Islamists."

The report cites the growing internal factionalism within Somalia's Islamist movement that risks plunging the country deeper into violence and with dangerous implications for the wider region. Al-Shabaab's military troubles have been compounded by the steady erosion of its popularity and credibility.

The Crisis Group believes there is a limited opportunity for Somalia's political actors and the international community to take advantage of these divisions and to reach out to the increasing numbers of domestic militants who are disenchanted with the growing influence of foreign jihadis and extremist elements.

Although al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam are far from spent forces, the Crisis Groups says this is the time for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and its international partners to:

• Pay more attention to, and try to counter-act, the increasingly extremist ideological evolution of the Islamist movement;
• Step up the battle for the hearts and minds of the Somali people by emphasizing that the radicalization is largely driven by a unique set of beliefs that are alien to Somalis and an extremist and literal interpretation of holy texts; and by presenting a strategy to de-radicalize Somalia’s youth;
• Place much greater emphasis on reconciliation by exploiting the divisions within Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam and reaching out to less extreme elements in both organizations

Quotes in IPS story on Somalia

I'm quoted in Zach Rosenberg's and Jim Lobe's IPS story "President Calls for More Aid in U.S. Visit." Here are the quotes:

While some observers here and at the U.N. were increasingly concerned as recently as three months ago that the TFG was on the verge of collapse, they are expressing more confidence that Sharif's government can hold on, even if it lacks the power to decisively defeat the insurgent groups. "It's a waiting game now," said David Shinn, a Horn of Africa expert at George Washington University who served as ambassador to Ethiopia from 1996 to 1999. "Today, I think the TFG has a pretty good chance of outwaiting Al-Shabaab." ...Sporadic cruise-missile attacks by U.S. forces against suspected al Qaeda and Al-Shabaab leaders during Ethiopia's two-year occupation of Somalia are believed to have contributed to sympathy for the rebels and growing anti-U.S. sentiment in the country in part due to the fact that civilians were also killed injured. Reaction to the last month's attack, however, appeared to be more muted, according to Shinn. "There doesn't seem to have been much blowback in Somalia, perhaps because (Nabhan) was a Kenyan from Yemen," noted Shinn, who added that the attack's precision eliminated collateral damage.

9 questions from Life Week (Beijing) on Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, UN, AU, etc.

UPDATE 7/28/09: The Life Week article appears here in Chinese. You can view Google's rough translation of the page here (note that "Dashen" is "Shinn"). I was interviewed on July 18 by Life Week (Beijing). Below is the transcript: Question 1: It seems the situation in Somalia is even more serious than last month. Is that right? Could you please give me some information about the current situation in Somalia? We really do not know much in China. Amb. Shinn: I really do not think the situation has worsened over the past month. The situation in Mogadishu has been difficult for many months. While it has not improved, the relative position of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and those groups (al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam) opposing it are about the same. Image caption: "Government soldiers have been battling al-Shabab for control of the capital, Mogadishu [AFP]." Source: Al-Jazeera. Question 2: Seven people accused of renouncing Islam and spying for the TFG were beheaded in Somalia on July 10. It seems the authority of the Islamist insurgents is growing. What did this terrible event mean? Was it an effort to send a message to the TFG? Amb. Shinn: There is a great deal that we do not yet know about this incident. One al-Shabaab spokesperson has denied responsibility. I am not aware that any group has taken responsibility. According to one report (e.g. here), those who were beheaded were Christians. There are probably not more than a couple thousand Christians in Somalia; they are such a small group that they pose a threat to no one. Somalis have traditionally been highly tolerant of this tiny minority. Whatever group carried out this heinous crime only demonstrated irresponsible cowardice. Question 3: Two French security consultants were kidnapped at gunpoint from a hotel in Mogadishu on July 14, 2009. Who did this? Why? What will the French government do? Amb. Shinn: The two French officials were assigned by the French government to help the TFG establish an intelligence and security service. They were apparently kidnapped by a criminal group that may have turned them over to al-Shabaab and/or Hizbul Islam. The original purpose of the kidnapping seems to have been an effort to obtain ransom money. Now that they may be in the hands of al-Shabaab and/or Hizbul Islam, the incident has become politicized, and one or both of these organizations may try to obtain some political favor from France or the international community. Although France will do everything possible to protect the safety of its nationals, I suspect it is leaving no options off the table in responding to this act. Question 4: I know that the African Union has 4,300 Ugandan and Burundi troops in Mogadishu. Their mandate only allows them to protect the TFG state house, port and airport. They were not permitted to seek out and confront the groups that are trying to overthrow the TFG. But on July 12 there was a direct fight between the AU troops and the insurgents. Why? Facing the increasingly serious situation, will the AU take additional action? Amb. Shinn: The AU troops moved into North Mogadishu to help the TFG remove insurgents who oppose them. For the most part, North Mogadishu is not friendly territory for the insurgents. Although some observers argue that the AU troops exceeded their current mandate to shoot only in self-defense, the AU troops argued that this was self-defense. The AU is urging that the force be given a stronger mandate. In any event, I think from this point forward you will see the AU troops becoming more aggressive vis-à-vis the insurgents. Question 5: What about the Ethiopian troops? We know Ethiopia sent troops to Somalia last month, but it seems they have not acted yet. Amb. Shinn: Ethiopia removed its troops from Mogadishu in January 2009, and they have not returned. I don’t believe they have any intention to return to Mogadishu. On the other hand, Ethiopia has for years sent small numbers of its troops across its lengthy border with Somalia to support friendly Somalis or to chase insurgents that it believed crossed into Ethiopia. You can expect this activity to continue. Question 6: It seems the international community is still keeping aloof from the situation in Somalia and does not intend to take further action. What do you think about it? Why? Amb. Shinn: The international community (United Nations, African Union and Arab League) strongly backs the position of the TFG and opposes al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Although I do not believe the international community is prepared to send troops to Somalia, it is doing more to improve the TFG security forces. The United Nations Development Program is providing training for the police. Djibouti and Kenya have offered training for TFG security forces. France and Italy are helping to train TFG security forces. The U.S. provided about $5 million worth of ammunition and small arms to the AU forces that, in turn, helped to arm TFG forces. The international community should avoid direct involvement in Somalia as this will only alienate more Somalis just as the growing foreign jihadi presence in al-Shabaab is alienating Somalis. Question 7: The UN Security Council warned Eritrea on July 8 that it would consider taking action against anyone who undermined peace in Somalia. The AU said Eritrea had been aiding Islamist insurgents who are fighting Somali government forces, but Eritrea denied it. What did Eritrea do as you know? What will happen next? Will it influence the current situation? Amb. Shinn: I do not have information on Eritrea’s role beyond that which has been provided by the AU and UN, but I have no reason to dispute the UN and AU accounts. If Eritrea continues to support al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, it will come under increasing criticism from the international community, possible including sanctions. Should that happen in the UN Security Council, the position of China and Russia will be critical as both countries have in the past been reluctant to approve sanctions against another country. Question 8: The TFG is supported by the UN and AU, but it seems the insurgents are always stronger. Why? Amb. Shinn: It is difficult to judge the strength of the insurgents. Certainly, the military capacity of the TFG is weak. The insurgents are well financed from overseas and apparently well organized. They are not, however, unified except on one point — to overthrow the TFG. Should they succeed in that effort, I think there will be considerable disagreement among the insurgents as various insurgent factions seek power. It is not that the insurgents are so strong; it is rather that the TFG is so weak. On-going training of the TFG security forces may make a difference in the months ahead. Image: From NYT article mentioned below. Caption: "More than 20 young Somali-Americans, many of them raised in Minneapolis, left the United States to join a militant Islamist group in Somalia." Credit: Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times. Link. Question 9: I heard that some Somali-Americans went back to Somalia and participated with the insurgents. Could you please give me some details? It seems it has evoked a major reaction in U.S. society, right? Why did this happen? Amb. Shinn: The New York Times did an excellent analysis of this issue on July 12, 2009. It identified more than a dozen Somali-Americans from various parts of the United States, but especially from the large group that lives in Minneapolis-St. Paul, who went to Somalia beginning in late 2007 to join al-Shabaab. Some were young Somali-Americans who had engaged in gang activities in the United States while others were upstanding Somalis with a bright future. A few left for Somalia because they were attracted by religious zealotry. Some objected to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. Some sought adventure and some probably had no idea what they were doing. Several died in Somalia, a few returned to the United States and most are probably still in Somalia. There has been considerable attention to the story in the American press. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has spent considerable effort trying to get to the bottom of the case and to prevent any threat to the United States. The vast majority of the Somali-American community are law-abiding citizens or residents. They are very upset at what has happened to a small minority of their children.

9 questions from Life Week (China)

I was interviewed about Somalia by Life Week. You can access the original article in Chinese here, or an English version (via Google Translate) here. Below, I have also included the text of the Q&A, which occurred on June 26. Life Week: The Somali government has declared a state of emergency. How serious is this situation? Amb. Shinn: The situation if very serious. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, which is recognized by the United Nations, African Union, and Arab League, is being threatened by an extremist organization, al-Shabaab and an allied group known as Hizbul Islam. Al-Shabaab has stated publicly that it has links with al-Qaeda. It has strong external support, including a growing number of foreign jihadis from the Middle East, South Asia, and northeastern Africa. Al-Shabaab and probably Hizbul Islam also receive financing and weapons from outside Somalia. The two groups have seized by force significant parts of Mogadishu, the capital city, and southern and central Somalia. Life Week: The Speaker of Somalia’s Parliament said they were under attack by foreign terrorists. Is it true that some foreign fighters participated in the fight? Why do they do so? Amb. Shinn: Most of the fighters for al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam are Somalis. They have joined these groups for different reasons. Some believe in the extreme version of Sharia advocated by these organizations while others simply want to seize power. Some have come from the Somali diaspora in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. Some of the fighters are not Somali and have joined the battle in order to impose their extreme interpretation of Sharia on the Somalis. Virtually all Somalis are Muslim; they have traditionally practiced a moderate version of Islam. Life Week: Some people said the foreign fighters and the al-Shabaab have a very close relationship with al-Qaeda. Is that true? Why does al-Qaeda support anti-government forces in Somalia? Amb. Shinn: Many of the foreign fighters almost certainly have links with al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some of them probably do not have ties with these groups but have been attracted by the radical ideology of al-Shabaab. A few of al-Shabaab’s Somali leaders also have past associations with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. I suspect that most of the Somali rank and file members of al-Shabaab do not have ties with al-Qaeda. Life Week: Some Somali analysts say the conflict between the TFG and al-Shabaab will drag on for months fueled by outside support for both sides. Besides al-Qaeda, what support do both sides receive from the outside? Amb. Shinn: Those Somali analysts are probably correct; the conflict will drag on for months fueled by outside support. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam also receive support from the government of Eritrea, some Somalis in the diaspora, and private non-Somalis in the Middle East and South Asia. The TFG receives humanitarian and moral support from most of the international community, including the United States. Several European countries have provided training to TFG security forces. The U.S. State Department confirmed on June 25 that it has delivered a shipment of arms to the TFG. Somalis in the diaspora also support the TFG. Life Week: Somalia has become an international conflict. How does the unsettled situation in Somalia affect neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia? Why is Ethiopia so concerned? Amb. Shinn: Somalia shares a lengthy border with both Kenya and Ethiopia. The persons living in those neighboring parts of Kenya and Ethiopia are Somalis. There is a long history whereby past Somali governments have wanted to incorporate those territories into Somalia. This has led to conflict. In the late 1970s, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and occupied most of the Somali-inhabited territory for a number of months. The TFG has disavowed any desire to take control of these territories, but al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have not. In fact, a few of their leaders have explicitly raised the possibility of occupying these territories. The borders are very porous; it is not difficult to cross them and carry out attacks on the other side. Kenya is the location of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees who have fled Somalia because of the unrest there. This puts an additional burden on the government of Kenya, which recently sent additional forces to its border with Somalia. The neighboring countries do have legitimate security concerns, but it is important that they not take actions that will worsen the situation. Life Week: Somalia’s Parliament pleaded Saturday for its neighbors and the international community to send in troops. Will the neighboring countries and the international community take such action? Amb. Shinn: This is a highly controversial issue. First, the African Union has 4,300 Ugandan and Burundi troops in Mogadishu. Their mandate only allows them to protect the TFG’s state house, the port, and airport. They are not permitted to seek out and confront the groups that are trying to overthrow the TFG. Second, the United Nations sponsored a major military intervention in Somalia from 1993 until 1995. It was not a good experience. It did not end Somalia’s failed state, and it alienated a lot of Somalis in the process. Third, Somalis do not like the idea of foreign troops in the country, including the foreign jihadis that support al-Shabaab. The international community would risk alienating Somalis again if it sent troops in support of the TFG. The sending of foreign troops would not, in my view, help the TFG over the long term. At best, it would postpone tough decisions that the TFG must make now. I doubt that the international community will send forces to Somalia. Although the African Union may increase the number of troops it has in Somalia, it will make little military difference so long as the AU mandate is one of static defense. Life Week: Will the U.S. attitude influence the situation? Amb. Shinn: The attitude of all permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States and China, in addition to the European Union, African Union, and Arab League will influence the situation in Somalia. It is in the interest of all these governments and organizations to encourage stability in Somalia and to help create a government that has the widespread support of Somalis. Life Week: Why are the anti-TFG groups such as al-Shabaab unwilling to negotiate with the government? What is their claim? Amb. Shinn: Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam want power and will do anything they can to achieve their goal including suicide bombings and political assassinations. They have no interest in power sharing. They claim they are trying to force foreign elements out of Somalia while relying increasingly on foreign jihadi fighters for their own support. Life Week: Why has Somalia been unable to achieve political stability since 1991? Amb. Shinn: This question is more appropriately directed to a student writing a dissertation for a doctoral degree. The answer is long and complex. For fear of oversimplifying, it is important to recall that the last national government in Somalia, the one led by Siad Barre, failed completely in 1991. Northwest Somalia declared its independence as Somaliland in 1991 and has actually put in place surprisingly democratic government. The rest of Somalia broke up into fiefdoms led by local administrations such as Puntland or warlords in Mogadishu and parts of southern and central Somalia. The right combination of circumstances and Somali leadership has not yet come together to convince the vast majority of Somalis that they should support that leadership. Somalia also became a proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Finally, extremists from outside Somalia decided to take advantage of the failed Somali state for their own purposes. This is an oversimplification but probably as much as your readers want to know.

Al Jazeera interview on Somalia

Al Jazeera Arabic-language TV asked me to comment on the confirmation from the State Department earlier in the day that the United States is providing weapons to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Under the circumstances, I thought this was the right response and added that several European countries are training TFG security forces. This too is appropriate. I do not agree with those who are calling for the sending of international forces to Somalia to prop up the TFG. The Somali government has to stand on its own feet. It is true that the groups opposing the TFG -- al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam -- are receiving funding and weapons from foreign sources and being aided by several hundred foreign jihadis. The international community should also do what it can to end the supply of foreign money, arms, and jihadis reaching these organizations. When Al Jazeera suggested that U.S. support for the TFG will result in a negative response from the Muslim world, I thought that would not be the case except for organization like al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. The United Nations, African Union, and Arab League have all called for international support of the TFG. Earlier this week, the secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference even called on the international community to intervene immediately to support the TFG. The U.S. action is in keeping with the views of the world's major Islamic organizations.

Interview with VOA on TFG

In an interview yesterday with the Voice of America Somali service, I was asked to comment on the request by the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for international troops. I responded that I did not believe this is the solution. If foreign forces prop up the TFG, it will only postpone the inevitable and alienate even more Somalis as they do not favor the presence of foreign troops. On the other hand, there are some steps the international community can take. It can step up the training and equipping of Somalis who have aligned with the TFG against the extremist al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam organizations. This is a problem that only Somalis can solve, not outsiders. The international community should make a greater effort to prevent foreign jihadis and military equipment destined for al-Shabaab from entering Somalia. Because of porous borders, this is difficult. It is not clear, however, that much of an effort has been made so far. The interviewer suggested that these steps would take time and the TFG might fall before it has any impact. I acknowledged this is a risk. On the other hand, dramatic change generally does not occur that quickly in Somalia. In addition, I believe most Somalis oppose what al-Shabaab stands for and the role of foreign jihadis. The organization also has its own internal divisions.

Interview with Ethiopian Reporter

I was interviewed by Namrud Berhane of the Ethiopian Reporter for the article "What without Aweys in Somalia?" Here is one of the questions:

Question: The issue of piracy is one major problem that has become daunting not only to Somalia but the international community as a whole. Do you think current efforts of battling it on sea will help the situation at all, when stability on the land still seems to evade the country? My response: I have been arguing for months that the highest priority is to resolve the situation in Somalia on the ground, not the high seas. Although the large international naval presence has diminished the number of successful pirate attacks, it can never totally eliminate them. This will only happen when there is a national government in Somalia that is in control of the country, is widely accepted by the Somali people and has a viable coast guard in place. At the same time, the international community must do its part now to help prevent illegal foreign fishing off Somali shores and take steps to help end any dumping of toxic waste that may still happen from time to time.

Neo-Islamists must first be confronted on religious and jurisprudential, rather than military, grounds

Although I have been immersed in recent weeks doing research for an upcoming book on China-Africa relations, I try to keep up on developments in the Horn of Africa. I ran across a perceptive piece on Somalia by Abukar Arman, who lives in Ohio and writes on Somalia, the Middle East, and Islam. His short analysis appeared in a Foreign Policy Association document dated 4 June 2009 titled “Somalia’s Neo-Islamists.” The principal organizations that constitute the “Neo-Islamist” movement in Somalia are al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Abukar Arman’s analysis is worth reading in it entirety, but I was impressed by one particular conclusion. “The Neo-Islamists and the religious leaders that shape their obtuse frame of mind must be challenged religiously and jurisprudentially but not militarily," he wrote. "It is the only way to prevent perpetual sectarian strife in Somalia — a challenge that this predominantly Muslim nation has never faced.” While I don’t think that moderate Somalis should allow the Neo-Islamists to seize power militarily unopposed, I believe Abukar Arman is correct that they should be confronted first and foremost on religious and jurisprudential grounds. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam and their foreign funding and foreign jihadi fighters might be able to defeat moderate Somalis on the battle field, but they will not in my view defeat them on the basis of their interpretation of Islam and implementation of their version of Shariah. Image: Abukar Arman. Source: Somaliland Times.

Interview with Jamaican radio about Pres. Obama's foreign policy priorities, Somalia

I did an interview today on Somalia with the Breakfast Club program in Jamaica (93 FM). When asked why President Obama is not personally engaged in the Somali issue, I noted that he has higher foreign policy priorities such as the Middle East, Iran, and North Korea. He can not be expected to be the action officer on every foreign policy challenge that confronts the United States. The U.S. foreign policy mechanism has a lot of depth. In the case of Somalia, it probably only rarely gets the attention of Secretary of State Clinton. On the other hand, an experienced expert on Africa, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, almost certainly spends a lot of time on the issue. We also discussed the threat to the Transitional Federal Government from spoiler groups such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. I emphasized that al-Shabaab is making progress because of increasing foreign financing and the recruitment of foreign fighters. While this may aid al-Shabaab over the short-term, most Somalis resent foreign involvement in their country as they demonstrated during the Ethiopian intervention. The willingness by al-Shabaab to recruit foreigners will eventually come back to haunt them. I will link the interview if and when 93 FM posts it.