Mali Receives Chinese MRAPs

 Military Africa published on 4 August 2025 an article titled "Mali Receives Norinco CS/VP14 MRAPs from China, the Whole Story" by Ekene Lionel.

Mali received 36 Norinco mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles to combat its counter-insurgency threat.  The delivery diversifies its military equipment sourcing and underscores a growing military relationship with Beijing.

Burkina Faso Buys Counter-Insurgency Equipment from China

Defence Blog posted on 8 August 2025 an article titled "China Delivers Artillery and Armor to Burkina Faso" by Dylan Malyasov.

China's Norinco has delivered fire support vehicles, self-propelled gun-mortars, and multiple rocket launch systems to Burkina Faso.  Designed for rapid deployment and fast moving situations, the equipment will be used for counter-insurgency operations. Norinco usually offers competitive pricing and flexible financing.  

Russia Takes Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa

 The Royal United Services Institute published on 9 September 2020 an analysis titled "Russia Takes Its Syrian Model of Counterinsurgency to Africa" by Samuel Ramani, University of Oxford.  

Since Russia embarked on its military intervention in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2015, the Kremlin has advertised its "Syrian model" of counterinsurgency to African countries facing political violence.  The Syrian model emphasizes state-to-state cooperation between Russia and African governments and presents authoritarian stability as the most effective antidote to extremism.  

Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al-Shabaab

The Rand Corporation has just published a study titled "Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al-Shabaab" by Seth G. Jones, Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler.

The study concluded that a tailored engagement strategy--which involved deploying a small number of U.S. special operations forces to conduct targeted strikes, provide intelligence, and build the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations--was key in degrading al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, progress in Somalia is reversible in the absence of continued and consistent pressure and political, economic, and social reforms.

Ethiopia, the Ogaden and Peace

The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 6 August 2013 an analysis titled "Ethiopia: Prospects for Peace in Ogaden."  It reports the peace talks between the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the government of Ethiopia that stalled in October 2012 may restart.  The ICG comments that the Ethiopian government's commitment to the talks is important but undermined by a parallel strategy of piecemeal deals with disgruntled ONLF members.  For its part, the ONLF's leadership lacks a unified vision of the talks' outcome, shifting along a spectrum of options, between reconciliation with the state in return for significant autonomy and outright secession. 

Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia

William Reno, director of the program of African Studies at Northwestern University, questioned the current approach to counterterrorism in Somalia in an article in the 29 April 2013 issue of CTC Sentinel titled "Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia."  The article examines how the shifting loyalties of clan politics challenge the centrality of the institutions of the state as drivers of actors' interests and the real alignments in politics.  He found that in the case of Somalia, there is an enduring resistance to the idea of the state--a fundamental tenet upon which counterinsurgency rests.

Reno noted that pragmatic local leaders constantly play multiple sides, creating an exceptionally difficult social terrain for insurgents and those who oppose them in an effort to rebuild the state.  This approach argues, he says, for an extremely light footprint, focusing on local islands of stability maintained with indigenous forces.

Kenya's Intervention in Somalia

The International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report on 15 February 2012 titled The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia. It points out that the intervention in October 2011 into Somalia's Juba Valley marked a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. Military leaders were apparently convinced it would be a quick campaign, but the Kenyan Defense Forces quickly ran into difficulties in unfamiliar terrain.

The ICG believes the Kenyan government is unlikely to heed any calls for a troop pullout; it has invested too much, and pride is at stake. The ICG urges that Kenya avoid a prolonged occupation of southern Somalia, lest it turn local Somali opinion against the intervention and galvanize an armed resistance that could be co-opted by al-Shabaab.

There is a real prospect, says the ICG, that Kenya will find itself with unpredictable allies, enmeshed in a protracted counter-insurgency campaign against a resilient and experienced enemy. Al-Shabaab is trying to exploit Kenyan-Somali grievances against Nairobi and making pan-Somali appeals, although without much success so far.

The ICG concluded that Kenya's hasty, insufficiently prepared decision to intervene militarily in Somalia will have profound consequences for stability in both countries. Al-Shabaab now clearly intends not only to destabilize the North Eastern Province, but also to undermine Kenya's social harmony. Unless there is a settlement in southern Somalia, Nairobi cannot expect stability in its own border regions; indeed, instability might also reach the center.