The Conversation posted on 20 January 2019 a commentary titled "How Kenya's Security Forces Did Better This Time. But There Still Are Gaps" by Patrick Muthengi Maluki, University of Nairobi.
Kenyan security forces responded more effectively to the 15 January 2019 al-Shabaab terrorist attack on the commercial complex in Nairobi than it did in the case of the al-Shabaab attack on Westgate Mall five years ago. Kenya subsequently installed state of the art surveillance equipment, established the National Counter Terrorism Centre, and created an anti-terrorism police unit. Kenya still needs to do a better job collecting and disseminating intelligence.
Showing posts with label Westgate Mall. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Westgate Mall. Show all posts
Tuesday, January 22, 2019
Friday, September 21, 2018
Comprehensive Update on Al-Shabaab
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 21 September 2018 a comprehensive report titled "Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa."
Five years after an attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall, al-Shabaab appears committed to striking targets targets across East Africa. The ICG concludes that al-Shabaab will likely remain a formidable force inside Somalia and a menace outside it.
Five years after an attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall, al-Shabaab appears committed to striking targets targets across East Africa. The ICG concludes that al-Shabaab will likely remain a formidable force inside Somalia and a menace outside it.
Sunday, May 3, 2015
Kenya's Wrongheaded Approach to Terrorism
Hussein Khalid, executive director of the Kenyan nongovernmental organization Haki Africa, wrote an oped for the Washington Post on 1 May 2015 titled "Kenya's Wrongheaded Approach to Terrorism." He argues that Kenya's counterterrorism tactics are only making the situation in the country worse.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
Barack Obama,
Garissa University,
Haki Africa,
human rights,
John Kerry,
Kenya,
terrorism,
US,
Westgate Mall
Thursday, April 16, 2015
Kenya's Garissa University Tragedy
The Institute for Defense Analyses Africa Watch published on 16 April 2015 a short article titled "Another Kenyan Tragedy--A Pattern Too Familiar" by George W. Ward. It concludes the attack demonstrates both al-Shabaab's resilience and its evolution from a popular resistance movement to a full-blown international terrorist organization. It also points out that al-Shabaab is becoming more deeply rooted in Kenya itself and the Kenyan government's response to the attack is following a policy that only exacerbates the problem.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
Garissa University,
Kenya,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Saturday, April 11, 2015
Education's Role in the Garissa University Terrorist Attack
The GW Hatchett, the student paper at George Washington University, asked me to comment on the al-Shabaab terrorist attack against Garissa University in Kenya. The paper ran my commentary on 9 April 2015 as "Education's Role in the Garissa School Attack."
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
education,
Garissa University,
Kenya,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Thursday, October 23, 2014
Roots of Radicalism in East Africa
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) published on 20 October 2014 a summary titled "The Roots of Radicalism Should Inform Government's Response to Terror" by Anneli Botha, ISS in Pretoria. This cogent analysis based on three separate studies in Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia concludes that what primarily pushed young Kenyans to join al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council were injustices at the hands of Kenyan security forces. Many young Somalis in Kenya joined al-Shabaab in response to a threat to their religious identity while those in Somalia were more influenced by economic issues.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
economy,
Islam,
Kenya,
Mombasa Republican Council,
radicalism,
security,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Uganda,
Westgate Mall
Friday, October 10, 2014
Kenya One Year after Westgate Mall
The Washington-based Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Africa Watch publication published on 6 October 2014 a piece titled "Kenya's Security--Westgate One Year On" by George Ward, editor of Africa Watch. He concluded that al-Shabaab remains a significant threat to Kenya's stability, and the group's potential for violence may even be increasing.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
Islam,
Kenya,
security,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Thursday, September 25, 2014
Kenya and the Challenge of Al-Shabaab
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 25 September 2014 a briefing titled "Kenya: Al-Shabaab--Closer to Home." It reports that al-Shabaab has become more entrenched and active in Kenya following the attack on Westgate Mall a year ago. The country's immediate post-Westgate unity has broken down in the face of increasing attacks. The political elites, security services, and ethnic and faith communities are beset by mutual suspicion and recriminations.
Wednesday, September 3, 2014
US Attack on Al-Shabaab Leader
Foreign Policy published on 2 September 2014 an article titled "Pentagon Says It Hit Its Target, but Did It Kill Al-Shabab's Leader?" by Gordon Lubold and Kate Brannen. This is a good summary about what is known as of this date on the U.S. effort to kill al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane.
The Washington Post published on 2 September 2014 another good account of this attack in an article titled "U.S. Drone Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Shabab Leader" by Craig Whitlock.
The Washington Post published on 2 September 2014 another good account of this attack in an article titled "U.S. Drone Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Shabab Leader" by Craig Whitlock.
Labels:
Ahmed Abdi Godane,
al-Shabaab,
AMISOM,
drones,
Somalia,
US,
Westgate Mall
Monday, September 1, 2014
Kenya, Corruption, and Counterterrorism
Good Governance Africa published on 1 September 2014 an article titled "Blowing the Whistle" by Jessica Hatcher. It is based on a discussion with John Githongo, Kenya's former anti-corruption czar who has established a non-governmental organization that advocates for good governance in Kenya. Githongo argues that Kenya's inability to protect itself from terrorism is directly related to corruption.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
corruption,
counterterrorism,
John Githongo,
Kenya,
Somalia,
tourism,
Westgate Mall
Monday, July 14, 2014
Kenya: Aftermath of the Westgate Mall Attack
The Foreign Service Journal published by the American Foreign Service Association carried an article in its July/August 2014 edition titled "Westgate: The Other Nairobi and the Future of Kenya" by Joash Omondi, a journalism student at the United States International University in Nairobi.
The author argues that nothing seems to have changed in Kenya since the terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi last year. One is left with the sense that there is nothing to stop the next attack. Kenya continues to endure all the old problems that plagued it before the terrorist attack. Terrorism is not the biggest problem facing Kenya. The bigger problem is the complacency of a system that is now failing to combat terrorism. What is needed is a mobilization of the "Kenyan Spirit."
The author argues that nothing seems to have changed in Kenya since the terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi last year. One is left with the sense that there is nothing to stop the next attack. Kenya continues to endure all the old problems that plagued it before the terrorist attack. Terrorism is not the biggest problem facing Kenya. The bigger problem is the complacency of a system that is now failing to combat terrorism. What is needed is a mobilization of the "Kenyan Spirit."
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
extremism,
Kenya,
Operation Linda Nchi,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Monday, July 7, 2014
The War against Al-Shabaab
International Affairs published in July 2014 an article titled "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War against Al-Shabaab" by Paul D. Williams, George Washington University.
Williams concludes that the Somali government must now deliver on its promises to provide the residents of settlements recovered from al-Shabaab with basic services, administration, and protection. For its part, al-Shabaab is entering the beginning of its political end game. With power now consolidated in its extremist fringe, its continued terror tactics are unlikely to win it more supporters within Somalia.
Williams concludes that the Somali government must now deliver on its promises to provide the residents of settlements recovered from al-Shabaab with basic services, administration, and protection. For its part, al-Shabaab is entering the beginning of its political end game. With power now consolidated in its extremist fringe, its continued terror tactics are unlikely to win it more supporters within Somalia.
Labels:
Ahmed Godane,
Al-Hijra,
al-Qaeda,
al-Shabaab,
AMISOM,
Amniyat,
ASWJ,
Kenya,
refugees,
SNA,
Somalia,
UNSOM,
Westgate Mall
Tuesday, June 3, 2014
Al-Hijra: Al-Shabaab's Affiliate in Kenya
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point publishes the CTC Sentinel, which ran a brief analysis on 29 May 2014 titled "Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab's Affiliate in Kenya" by Nairobi-based journalist Frederick Nzes.
The article profiles al-Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center. Al-Hijra is a covert group of primarily Kenyan Somali and non-Somali Muslim followers of al-Shabaab in East Africa. The group may have been strengthened recently by fighters returning from Somalia and local recruits from East Africa.
The article profiles al-Hijra, formerly known as the Muslim Youth Center. Al-Hijra is a covert group of primarily Kenyan Somali and non-Somali Muslim followers of al-Shabaab in East Africa. The group may have been strengthened recently by fighters returning from Somalia and local recruits from East Africa.
Labels:
Al-Hijra,
al-Shabaab,
Kenya,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Saturday, April 19, 2014
Kenya's Roundup of Somalis Likely to Backfire
The International Crisis Group (ICG) published on 16 April 2014 a commentary titled "Losing Hearts and Minds in Kenya" by Cedric Barnes, ICG Horn of Africa project director. Barnes concludes that Kenya's roundup of Somalis looks like collective punishment of a minority group that will only marginalize and radicalize Somalis.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
Eastleigh,
Kenya,
migrants,
refugees,
Somalia,
Westgate Mall
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Kenya's Muslims--In the Eye of the Storm
The Washington-based Institute for Defense Analysis Africa Watch published on 3 April 2014 a brief analysis titled "Kenya's Muslims--In the Eye of the Storm" by George F. Ward. He argued that Kenya's announced policy restricting Somali refugees to Camps is both unworkable and a potential fuel for inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence. He also commented on the recent killing in Mombasa of the leader of the Musa Mosque.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
Dadaab,
Islam,
Kenya,
Mombasa,
Musa Mosque,
refugees,
Somalia,
Westgate Mall
Wednesday, March 26, 2014
Somalia's Al-Shabaab and Social Media
Jane's Intelligence Review published in March 2014 a good analysis titled "Hashtag Shabaab: Islamists Develop Sophisticated Online Strategy" by Richard Evans, director in the Intelligence, Security and Risk division of IHS Aerospace, Defence, and Security Consulting.
The author concluded that al-Shabaab and its supporters have developed a broad and sophisticated online communication strategy using multiple social media platforms to reach a global audience.
Al-Shabaab has exploited social media to engage with its supporters, adversaries, and the mainstream media, and has successfully shaped the news agenda through micro-blogging platforms such as Twitter.
However, al-Shabaab faces significant challenges in using social media to directly influence people to support its agenda or attract new recruits.
The full article is only available by subscription or access though a library.
The author concluded that al-Shabaab and its supporters have developed a broad and sophisticated online communication strategy using multiple social media platforms to reach a global audience.
Al-Shabaab has exploited social media to engage with its supporters, adversaries, and the mainstream media, and has successfully shaped the news agenda through micro-blogging platforms such as Twitter.
However, al-Shabaab faces significant challenges in using social media to directly influence people to support its agenda or attract new recruits.
The full article is only available by subscription or access though a library.
Labels:
al-Shabaab,
AMISOM,
Kenya,
social media,
Somalia,
twitter,
Westgate Mall
Monday, February 24, 2014
Two Articles about Al-Shabaab
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point published in February 2014 a special issue of CTC Sentinel that includes two articles on al-Shabaab.
The first article is titled "Al-Shabaab's Capabilities Post-Westgate" by Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson College. He concludes that al-Shabaab today is both weaker and more dangerous and unconstrained than in the past. In the short term, this is bad news for Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali government and people, and international actors operating in Somalia. In the longer term, however, al-Shabaab's downward trajectory since 2009 shows few signs of reversal, at least inside Somalia. Additional losses of top leaders could lead to a quick unraveling of the group, at which point the chief security threat will be the residual Amniyat network, which will retain the capacity for extortion and political violence.
The second article is titled "An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabaab's Internal Divisions" by Stig Jarle Hansen, associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. He concludes that al-Shabaab will likely continue to attack countries that have deployed forces in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's biggest danger to the West is most likely through potential logistics support for other al-Qaeda units, its indoctrination of Somalis into al-Qaeda's ideology, and its growing reach in African countries.
The first article is titled "Al-Shabaab's Capabilities Post-Westgate" by Ken Menkhaus, professor of political science at Davidson College. He concludes that al-Shabaab today is both weaker and more dangerous and unconstrained than in the past. In the short term, this is bad news for Kenya, Ethiopia, the Somali government and people, and international actors operating in Somalia. In the longer term, however, al-Shabaab's downward trajectory since 2009 shows few signs of reversal, at least inside Somalia. Additional losses of top leaders could lead to a quick unraveling of the group, at which point the chief security threat will be the residual Amniyat network, which will retain the capacity for extortion and political violence.
The second article is titled "An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabaab's Internal Divisions" by Stig Jarle Hansen, associate professor at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. He concludes that al-Shabaab will likely continue to attack countries that have deployed forces in Somalia. Al-Shabaab's biggest danger to the West is most likely through potential logistics support for other al-Qaeda units, its indoctrination of Somalis into al-Qaeda's ideology, and its growing reach in African countries.
Labels:
Ahmed Godane,
al-Higra,
al-Qaeda,
al-Shabaab,
AMISOM,
Amniyat,
Ethiopia,
Kenya,
Muktar Robow,
Puntland,
Ras Kamboni militia,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
Friday, February 21, 2014
The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab
The Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington published in February 2014 an analysis titled "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?" by Matt Bryden, director of Sahan Research, a think tank located in Nairobi, Kenya.
In this excellent study, Bryden notes that al-Shabaab's leadership was once relatively heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow. There were differences within al-Shabaab over the value of a relationship with al-Qaeda, the wisdom of attacks on civilians, and the role of foreign fighters in the organization. Following a purge of the nationalists, what now remains of al-Shabaab is the more extremist fringe: an al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the "takfiri" ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and recommitment to the cause of international jihad and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate.
In this excellent study, Bryden notes that al-Shabaab's leadership was once relatively heterogeneous, including nationalist and politically pragmatic figures such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and Muktar Robow. There were differences within al-Shabaab over the value of a relationship with al-Qaeda, the wisdom of attacks on civilians, and the role of foreign fighters in the organization. Following a purge of the nationalists, what now remains of al-Shabaab is the more extremist fringe: an al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the "takfiri" ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and recommitment to the cause of international jihad and the restoration of an Islamic caliphate.
Monday, November 18, 2013
China Confronts Terrorism in Africa
China-US Focus published on 18 November 2013 a brief commentary I wrote titled "China Confronts Terrorism in Africa." It assesses China's current approach to dealing with the challenge of terrorism in Africa.
Thursday, November 7, 2013
Al-Shabaab's Relative Strength Is the Real Threat
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Pretoria published on 4 November 2013 a commentary titled "Al-Shabaab's Relative Strength Is the Real Threat" by Andrews Atta-Asamoah, senior researcher at ISS.
The author concluded that "Al-Shabaab may be weak in comparison with the capacity it had in the past, but it is not weak in relation to the frail Somali government and the huge internal vulnerabilities of countries like Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda."
While I agree with the above assessment, I think Atta-Asamoah is wildly optimistic about the utility of opening a dialogue with the "nationalist elements" of al-Shabaab. By his own account, al-Shabaab has been captured by the extremist elements of the organization led by Ahmed Godane. Al-Shabaab is not interested in dialogue and there is no one to dialogue with in any event.
The author concluded that "Al-Shabaab may be weak in comparison with the capacity it had in the past, but it is not weak in relation to the frail Somali government and the huge internal vulnerabilities of countries like Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda."
While I agree with the above assessment, I think Atta-Asamoah is wildly optimistic about the utility of opening a dialogue with the "nationalist elements" of al-Shabaab. By his own account, al-Shabaab has been captured by the extremist elements of the organization led by Ahmed Godane. Al-Shabaab is not interested in dialogue and there is no one to dialogue with in any event.
Labels:
Ahmed Godane,
al-Shabaab,
AMISOM,
amneyats,
Kenya,
Somalia,
terrorism,
Westgate Mall
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