The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published on 23 September 2026 an analysis titled "The Impacts of the Houthis' Advance Could Extend Well Beyond Saudi Arabia" by Andrew Leber and Lesley Anne Warner.
Connections between the Houthis in Yemen and terrorist organizations in Somalia, renewed conflict and insecurity in the Horn of Africa, and a revival of Somali piracy raise the question whether the worsening situation in the Red Sea region will lead to increased US engagement.
New Lines Magazine published on 16 September 2026 an article titled "Somaliland's Uphill Struggle for Recognition in Washington" by Theophile Simon.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi is on a month-long visit to the United States in an effort to obtain diplomatic recognition by the Trump administration. While his chances of succeeding are not high, he may well obtain some commitments from Washington that will strengthen Somaliland's relations with the United States.
The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in July 2026 a report titled "State of Somalia 2025."
The report reviews the major political, security, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and regional developments that shaped Somalia in 2025. Somalia recorded notable gains in international diplomacy, institutional development, regional integration, and state visibility. It also experienced persistent political polarization, federal-state tensions, humanitarian vulnerability, and unresolved questions surrounding constitutional and electoral processes that continued to challenge state-building efforts.
Somalia demonstrated growing international relevance and achieved several important diplomatic and institutional milestones. Yet progress remained constrained by external interference, including Israel's violation of Somalia's sovereignty through its recognition of Somaliland, alongside political fragmentation, unresolved constitutional questions, persistent insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises.
Business Insider Africa published on 3 July 2026 an article titled "U.S. Military Outlines New Africa Strategy Built on Intelligence, Drones, and Local Forces" by Solomon Ekanem.
Speaking after the 2026 Africa Chiefs of Defense Conference (ACHOD) in Luanda, Angola, from 30 June to 2 July, General Dagvin Anderson, commander of U.S. Africa Command, said the United States is shifting its strategy in Africa to a focus on intelligence sharing, affordable drones, and African led operations instead of relying on large US troop deployments.
For background on ACHOD, see "AFRICOM Hosts Key Defense Conference to Discuss Security Opportunities."
Eurasia Review published on 10 June 2026 an article titled "The Head of US Africa Command Testifies before Congress on American Counter-Terrorism Operations in Africa--Analysis" by Daniel Volman, director of the Africa Security Research Project in Washington.
This is a wide-ranging discussion of US efforts to counter terrorism in Africa. It includes testimony in May before Congress by Dagvin Anderson, Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, and additional comments by other Trump administration officials. The focus is on terrorist threats in Nigeria, the Sahel, and Somalia.
The Washington Examiner published on 20 May 2026 an article titled "US Competing with Russia, China, and Terror Groups for Influence across Africa" by Mike Brest.
Commander of US Africa Command General Dagvin Anderson told the House Armed Services Committee on 19 May that the United States is competing with Russia, China, and terror groups across Africa. This is being done with a 75 percent reduction in the US regional posture over the past decade, a situation which is compounded by additional drawdowns by our allies.
The Institute for Economics and Peace posted on 30 March 2026 its "Global Terrorism Index 2026."
Of the ten countries most impacted by terrorism globally in 2025, six were in Africa: Burkina Faso (2), Niger (3), Nigeria (4), Mali (5), Somalia (7) and Democratic Republic of Congo (8). Nevertheless, deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell in ten countries while rising in just four. Deaths in the Sahel region, however, accounted for more than half of all terrorism-related deaths globally.
Terrorism remains highly concentrated. Just under 70 percent of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries: Pakistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and the DRC. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in 2025, with fatalities rising by 46 percent to 750. Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram were responsible for 80 percent of all terrorism deaths in Nigeria.
The DRC also reported a significant increase in terrorism, reaching its worst ever position on the index. Deaths in the DRC rose by nearly 28 percent to 467, driven by attacks carried out by the IS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces, which targeted civilians, churches, hospitals, and funerals.
Somalia's al-Shabaab, while experiencing a decline in terrorist deaths for the third consecutive year, launched its Shabelle Offensive in early 2025.
Ethiopia Insight published on 24 March 2026 a commentary titled "The Looming War to Eclipse the Horn's Past Conflicts" by Nebiyu Daniel Meshesha, former Ethiopian diplomat.
The author argues that earlier dynamics in the Horn of Africa that once fractured states and redrew borders now risk drawing Ethiopia into a similar spiral, with potentially profound consequences for the region. The Horn of Africa may once again find itself trapped in a cycle of conflict.
The Wall Street Journal published on 28 July 2024 an article titled "Dozens of Russian Mercenaries Killed in Attack in Mali" by Benoit Faucon, Bojan Pancevski, and Michael M. Phillips.
Although the numbers are in dispute, dozens of Russian mercenaries with the Wagner Group were killed by Tuareg rebels in Mali and others were captured. This is seen as a major setback for Moscow's policy in the Sahel region of Africa.
The Hill published on 1 May 2024 an article titled "US Losing Ground to Russia in Geopolitical Battle Over Africa" by Brad Dress.
As French and American forces are asked to leave countries in the Sahel region of Africa, they are being replaced by small numbers of Russian troops from the newly formed Africa Corps.
Comment: While this situation does decrease the influence of France and the United States in the Sahel region, it puts a responsibility on Russia that it almost certainly will not be able to meet. Russia will now be expected to counter the growing threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Sahel, a challenge that it is not prepared to deal with, especially as it remains bogged down in a war with Ukraine.
Politico published on 22 April 2024 an article titled "US vs. Russia: Why the Biden Strategy in Africa May Be Failing" by Erin Banco and Lara Seligman.
The article discusses the recent US policy setbacks in Africa's Sahel region, especially in Niger and most recently in Chad. It notes correctly that Russia has taken advantage of diminished Western influence in the region and suggests it may be time for a US policy change.
Comment: It is important not to lose sight of the fact that Africa constitutes 54 countries with just over a half dozen constituting the Sahel region. There is a long history in the Sahel region of the ebb and flow of military takeovers, elected governments, and then repeat. The US not only prefers elected governments but faces legal restrictions when the military illegally replaces one. Many other African governments are equally concerned about these illegal changes of power.
While a government like Russia's can take advantage of these developments, the US can only seek to minimize the damage to the relationship, which it has been trying to do in Niger without much success so far. It is appropriate to maintain a relationship with these military regimes, however limited it may be. But it is more important to play the long game. Eventually, these regimes will be replaced, possibly by another military coup or even an election demanded by the people.
In the meantime, Russia may have saddled itself with the responsibility of protecting regimes that, over time, become increasingly less popular and require more and more resources. There is also the larger threat to these Sahelian governments from ISIS-affiliated jihadi organizations that are trying to eliminate them. Is Russia prepared to prevent this from happening across the Sahel? Highly doubtful.
The Foreign Policy Research Institute published on 5 April 2024 an analysis titled "Niger's Pivot to Moscow: What's Next for US Engagement in Africa?" by Raphael Parens, Christopher Faulkner, and Marcel Plichta.
Niger's military regime has asked US forces to leave the country while pivoting toward Russia. The United States is trying to salvage some influence and presence in the country as Russia works to remove it entirely. Should Russia's Africa Corps move into Niger, it will likely be used to keep the regime in power rather than confront the country's serious ISIS terrorist threat.
The Hill published on 2 April 2024 a commentary titled "The United States Needs to Get Troops Out of Niger" by William Walldorf, Wake Forest University.
The Niger military government asked the United States to remove its troops from the country while Washington negotiates with the regime to keep a contingent in place. The author suggests this is a bad idea and makes the arguments for pulling all the troops out as requested by Niger.
Comment: The author makes a strong case, but it would be helpful to see the arguments on the other side of this issue.
Foreign Policy published on 4 March 2021 a commentary titled "Great-Power Competition Is Coming to Africa" by Marcus Hicks, retired Air Force major general, Kyle Atwell, active duty US Army officer, and Dan Collini, active duty US Army officer.
The authors argue that great-power competition will increase the need for the United States to battle terrorists and safeguard democracy, trade, and free enterprise in Africa--but to do so with particular attention to limiting the malign influence of Russia and China. To do so, they say the United States needs to pursue a strategy in Africa tailored to specific regions, not individual countries.
