The International Crisis Group posted on 23 April 2025 a commentary titled "The Trump Administration's Renewed Conflict with the Houthis" by Brian Finucane.
The author argues that the objectives of US airstrikes on the Houthis in Yemen and how the airstrikes are intended to achieve these objectives reman murky.
The US Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, hosted on 13 March 2025 a two-hour panel discussion titled "What Is China's Military Strategy--Is It for Global Power Projection?"
The panelists included Dr. Barry M. Stentiford, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies; Lt. Col. Samuel Short, Australian Army, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; and me. Each panelist opened with 10-minute comments. Most of the session was Q & A. The focus was China's security relations with Africa, China-Thailand relations, and military strategy and reform of the PLA.
The US Institute of Peace published on 30 January 2024 a commentary titled "Is China Eyeing a Second Military Base in Africa?" by Alex Vines, Henry Tugendhat, and Armida van Rij.
China opened in 2017 a military base in Djibouti. Rumors persist that it plans to establish another base in Africa. The authors conclude that China is more likely to expand existing civilian port infrastructure and build dual use facilities in African ports where it has already invested than to construct another military base.
Comment: The commentary indicates that Saudi Arabia has a military base in Djibouti. While press reports have suggested for several years that Saudi Arabia plans to locate a military base there, I am not aware of any proof that it has actually done so.
There are multiple reasons why China has not joined the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian that has been established to protect international shipping in the Red Sea from Houthi drone and missile attacks launched from Yemen. The most important reason is probably the fact that the United States organized the task force and potentially may engage in targeting of Houthi or even Iranian military sites. The South China Morning Post published on 27 December 2023 an article titled "Why Hasn't China Joined US-led Naval Force against Houthi Attacks in Red Sea?" by Zhao Ziwen and Jevans Nyabiage, which provides additional rationale for China's decision.
One of the less obvious reasons for not joining the task force likely has to do with China's increasingly complicated relationship with Iran, which backs the Houthis and has become an important source of oil for China; Saudi Arabia, which was until recently at war with the Houthis and is a major supplier of oil to China; the UAE, which was also at war with the Houthis until recently and has become an important Chinese economic and security partner; Yemen's internationally recognized government in the south, with which China has formal relations; and the Houthi regime that controls much of northern Yemen, which China has cultivated. (China's current partner, Russia, also has close military ties with Iran, which further complicates the situation.)
In a major breakthrough for Chinese Middle East diplomacy, Beijing facilitated a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in March 2023. This resulted in the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two and helped to end the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and the Houthis, but did not assure lasting peace in Yemen, another goal of Chinese diplomacy. China once had a strong trade and economic relationship with Yemen, which it would like to restore. It also wants to strengthen its relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE--a challenge for any country's diplomacy, not to mention one with relatively little experience in the region. Mahad Darar, a PhD student at Colorado State University, lays out these challenges in an analysis titled "Can China Broker Peace in Yemen--And Further Beijing's Middle East Strategy in the Process?" in The Conversation dated 5 May 2023.
China's Anton Oilfield Services Group and the Chinese government signed a memorandum of understanding in May 2023 with the Houthis to invest in oil exploration in the country. Although Anton Oilfield Services Group subsequently nullified the agreement, some analysts argue that it demonstrated Beijing implicitly recognizes the Houthi regime as a governing body in Yemen while still publicly maintaining that the Yemeni government in the south is the country's legitimate one. Responsible Statecraft published on 13 July 2023 an article titled "What Is China Doing in Yemen?" by Emily Milliken, an analyst specializing in Yemen, that China has worked hard to maintain cordial relations with all factions in the country. When asked if the Chinese government had any relations with the Houthis, China's charge d'affaires in Yemen, Shao Zheng, said in a 21 June 2023 interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that "China supports the Yemeni legitimate government, and calls on the various Yemeni parties to sit at the negotiating table as soon as possible to launch peace talks." He also noted there are about 30,000 Yemenis living in China, most of whom are merchants.
The Baltimore Post-Examiner published on 26 December 2023 an article titled "China Extends String of Pearls to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean - Part I" by Senge Sering that cites the pro-regime Iran Observer and states that Houthis deliberately avoid targeting Chinese, Russian, and Iranian cargo in the Red Sea. According to the website Marine Traffic, the number of Chinese cargo ships in the Red Sea increased following the Houthi attacks. If these accounts are accurate, it would be an additional reason for China to skip participation in an international naval task force. But the situation is confusing. The giant China COSCO Shipping Corporation reported on 18 December that it had suspended transport through the Red Sea. This would imply that it did not consider the route safe for its ships. It is not clear, however, if COSCO ships are currently using the Red Sea. At the same time, a Houthi missile landed harmlessly but close to a Hong Kong-flagged vessel. This event indicates either the Houthis have not exempted Chinese-affiliated interests from attack, or they have imprecise information on the vessels transiting the Red Sea.
Looking beyond the narrow issue of Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, China's strategy in the region is much broader. The Gulf International Forum published on 19 May 2023 an analysis titled "China's Yemen Diplomacy and a Multipolar Gulf." It concluded that "while Iran, Saudi Arabia, and China have sharply differing foreign policy objectives, their shared end goal is to further the declining influence of the U.S. in the region by establishing a multipolar regional dialogue in which Beijing would play a more prominent role." Joining a U.S.-led naval task force would enhance, not diminish, the position of the United States in the region.
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) posted on 10 October 2023 an hour long podcast titled "Knitting the Pieces of China's Emerging Strategy in Africa."
The podcast pulls together the threads of China's current strategy in Africa and how it relates to great power competition. It includes comments by Nadege Rolland and Rachel Bernstein, both with NBR, Yunnan Chen, Overseas Development Institute, Daria Impiombato, Australian Policy Institute, Mareike Ohlberg, German Marshall Fund, Mandira Bagwandeen, University of Cape Town, and Roukaya Kasenally, University of Mauritius.
The Institute for International Political Studies published on 29 July 2021 a paper titled "China's Blended Approach to Security in Africa" by Paul Nantulya, Africa Center for Strategic Studies.
The author argues that China's military strategy in Africa centers on cultivating personal and professional ties, diffusing norms and models, and forging ideological and political bonds of solidarity.
The German Marshall Fund broadcast on 20 July 2021 a program titled "Chinese Investment in Global Ports and PRC Strategy," an interview of Isaac Kardon, US Naval War College, by Bonnie Glaser.
Chinese companies own or operate 95 port terminals globally, most of them in the Indian Ocean or eastern Mediterranean, for both commercial and strategic reasons. Of the 95 ports, 32 have hosted a port call by a PLA Navy vessel. China's motivation is access to markets and potentially PLAN access that may lead to dual access. China may not want to create a string of military bases as it has done in Djibouti. Rather, China seems to be creating a network of "strategic strong points" where it has more access and influence to protect Chinese interests.
