Chinese Company Replaces US and Malaysian Companies in Chad's Oil Sector

 The South China Morning Post published on 10 November 2025 an article titled "China Steps in as Chad Bets Oil Future on Beijing after Western Exit" by Jevans Nyabiage.  

The China National Petroleum Company is expanding Chad's oil refining capacity as ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Malaysa's Petronas exit the country, driven by escalating disputes over asset ownership and taxation, compounded by shifts in corporate strategy.

The Digital Silk Road and Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific

 Article 19, a UK-based international organization with 9 regional offices devoted to freedom of expression, posted on 18 April 2024 a report titled "The Digital Silk Road: China and the Rise of Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific."

The report examines China's digital infrastructure and governance influence in Cambodia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand.  While the study does not deal with Africa, it offers lessons for China's digital engagement with the continent.

The report argues that assessing China's partnerships and what they mean for rising repression is vital to understanding China's ambitions to rewire the world and rewrite the rules that govern the digital space.  By expanding its authoritarian model, China aims to ultimately supplant the tenets of internet freedom and rights-based principles of global digital governance.  

Malaysian Oil Company Pulls Out of South Sudan

 S & P Global published on 20 August 2024 an article titled "South Sudan's State-owned Nilepet to Take Over Petronas Oil Fields."

South Sudan's state-owned oil company is set to assume ownership of Malaysian oil company Petronas' assets in the country.  Petronas withdrew from South Sudan earlier this month because of ongoing conflict in neighboring Sudan, an inability to ensure staff safety, and mounting operational costs.  

Africa Is No Longer a Major Source for Chinese Crude Oil Imports

 Worldstopexports.com recently posted an article titled "Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China" by Daniel Workman.

In 2023, 15 crude exporters accounted for 89 percent of China's total crude imports.  The top supplier was Russia ($94 billion or 18.3 percent of China's imports in 2023), followed by Saudi Arabia ($55 billion or 10.7 percent), and Malaysia ($45.5 billion or 8.8 percent).  

The only African country among the top 15 was Angola at number 12 ($18.8 billion or 3.7 percent).  Even the United States surpassed Angola as a supplier of crude to China at number 9 ($22.4 billion or 4.3 percent).  Angolan exports of crude to China in 2023 slipped 18.5 percent compared with 2022.  China imported small amounts of crude from a few other African countries such as Congo Brazzaville.  This is a sharp reversal of the situation earlier this century when briefly almost one-third of China's crude oil imports originated in Africa. 

Although Iran was not included on the list of China's 15 top crude suppliers in 2023, it is estimated to have provided about 10 percent of the country's total imports.  Small independent Chinese refiners known as "teapots" purchased at deep discount about 90 percent of Iran's crude destined for China.  In order to avoid sanctions, this crude was passed off as originating in Malaysia or the UAE.  For an account of Iranian exports to China, see "Exclusive: Iran's Oil Trade with China Stalls as Tehran Demands Higher Prices." 

Comment:  This significant reduction in China's crude oil imports from Africa may tend to diminish Beijing's strategic interest in the continent, although it continues to rely heavily on the importation of certain critical minerals such as cobalt, tantalum, and manganese.  In addition, sourcing crude oil imports is a dynamic process with a history of quick movement in and out of markets.  As the global political and economic situation evolves, Africa may one day return to favor as a major source of crude for China.    

Podcast on Conflict in Sudan

 Malaysia's Because Freedom Matters 89.9 radio station posted on 25 April 2023 a podcast titled "Sudan, On a Brink of Civil War?" with me.

The focus of the discussion was on the reasons behind the violence, the role of natural resources, whether it will result in a humanitarian crisis and civil war, and the implications for international actors.  

China-driven Port Development in Kenya

 The South African Institute of International Affairs published in December 2021 a policy brief titled "China-Driven Port Development: Lessons from Kenya and Malaysia" by Chris Alden, Sergio Chichava, Lu Jiang, Bradley Murg, and Guanie Lim.  

The paper examines the environmental and socio-economic and governance impacts of Chinese-funded and built port projects in Kenya and Malaysia.  Both projects had significant environmental impacts.

Corruption Runs Deep in South Sudan

The Sentry published a detailed report in September 2019 titled "The Taking of South Sudan: The Tycoons, Brokers, and Multinational Corporations Complicit in Hijacking the World's Newest State."

South Sudanese politicians and military officers ravaging the world's newest nation received support from individuals and corporations from across the world who have reaped profits from those dealings. This report examines several illustrative examples of international actors linked to violence and grand corruption in order to demonstrate the extent to which external actors have been complicit in the taking of South Sudan. One of the complicit companies is Dar Petroleum. Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and Malaysian state-owned Petronas hold 41 percent and 40 percent stakes respectively in the consortium.

Debt Diplomacy Is the Wrong Term for China's Loans

The Diplomat posted on 12 March 2019 a commentary titled "China's 'Debt Diplomacy' Is a Misnomer. Call It 'Crony Diplomacy'." by Mark Akpaninyie, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The author says there is little evidence that Beijing coordinates a unified strategy to lure the developing world into unsustainable debt. Instead of a state-led strategy, Chinese firms have exploited poor nations, which are dependent on cheap, and sometimes bad, loans.

China, Loans, Debts and Africa

Quartz Africa posted on 28 December 2018 an article titled "From Asia to Africa, China's 'Debt-trap Diplomacy' Was under Siege in 2018" by Kari Lindberg and Tripti Lahiri.

The article summarizes during 2018 the concerns, many of them from the United States, of China's lending policies for infrastructure in Asia and Africa.

Egypt Welcomes Chinese Investment

Reuters published on 13 October 2018 an article titled "Egypt Minister Sees No Threats Attached to China Investment" by Fransiska Nangoy and Ed Davies.

Egypt and China have signed deals worth $18 billion as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Egypt's Minister of Investment and International Cooperation sees only a "win-win" result.

South Sudan Increases Security in Oil Fields

Bloomberg published on 8 February 2017 an article titled "South Sudan beefs Up Security at Oil Fields" by Okech Francis. The article details efforts by South Sudan to increase oil production and, hence, revive the economy.

Somalia: Good News on Piracy

The New York Times published on 17 September 2016 an article titled "Southeast Asia Replaces Africa as the World's Hotbed of Piracy" by Joe Cochrane.

The article reports that in 2015 there were 178 pirate attacks in Southeast Asia and NONE in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea Region near Somalia. When it comes to good news, it is not often that we can celebrate Somalia. This is a case where major progress has been made.

East Asian Networks Smuggle African Ivory

The BBC published on 7 July 2016 a story titled "East Asian Networks 'Smuggle Ivory across Africa'" by Navin Singh Khadka. Drawing on a lengthy report by the NGO Traffic, the article emphases the role of East Asian gangs in the killing of about 30,000 African elephants annually for their ivory.

Growth in Africa-Malaysia Ties

The Diplomat published on 30 May 2016 an analysis titled "Malaysia - Africa's Silent Partner" by Tim Steinecke, a consultant on Asia-Africa relations. The author highlights the increasing engagement of Malaysia in Africa, especially its diversified investment.

Africa's Changing Partnerships over the Next Decade

The Institute for Defense Analyses, National Intelligence University, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence hosted a conference at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on 7 June 2016 titled "The United States and Africa: Looking toward the Next Decade." I gave a presentation on "Africa's Changing Partnerships over the Next Decade." It focused on Africa's present and future trade, aid, investment, and security relationships with partner countries.

Asian Investment and Africa's Textile Industry

The Center for Global Policy at Carnegie-Tsinghua published on 5 August 2014 a study titled "The Impact of Asian Investment on Africa's Textile Industries" by Tang Xiaoyang, resident scholar at Carnegie-Tsinghua.  The author argues that as African countries seek to industrialize and build indigenous cotton-textile-apparel value chains, the interactions between Asian, primarily Chinese, investors and African companies become more complex.  Asian investors present both a challenge to an opportunity for local industries.

South Africa and the BRICS

William Gumede, a South African journalist, wrote a provocative analysis on 10 April 2013 for Pambazuka News titled "The BRICS and South Africa." 

He commented correctly that every BRICS member is in the organization for its own economic, trade and geopolitical interests.  There are serious questions as to how South Africa can take advantage of its membership. Gumede argues that South Africa's best strategy is not to rely overly on its BRICS partnership, but to strengthen its relations with other emerging markets such as South Korea, Malaysia and Turkey as well as the western industrial powers. 

The analysis does not address the issue whether South Africa's membership is of any value to other nations in Africa or is only designed to benefit Pretoria.  

Foreign Direct Investment in Africa

The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) published on 25 March 2013 a 10-page summary titled "The Rise of BRICS FDI and Africa."  It has attracted some attention because it states that both Malaysia and South Africa as of the end of 2011 had more cumulative FDI stock in Africa than did China.  In fact, France headed the list with about $58 billion of cumulative FDI stock in Africa, followed by the United States with about $57 billion and the United Kingdom with about $48 billion.

Malaysian Houses of Parliament. Flickr/Wojtek Gurak

There was a sharp drop to Malaysia with about $19 billion in FDI stock, followed by South Africa with $18 billion, China with $16 billion, and India with $14 billion.  South Africa was the leading recipient of Chinese FDI followed by Sudan, Nigeria, Zambia, and Algeria.  Indian FDI in Africa was concentrated in Mauritius in order to take advantage of the latter country's offshore financial facilities and favorable tax conditions.  As a result, the final destinations of India's investments in Africa often went elsewhere.  Some of the FDI coming from other countries also went to Mauritius with the same result.  The relatively large FDI figure for Malaysia is, however, still surprising.

As I have commented before on this blog, the official FDI figure for China in Africa significantly understates the actual amount for a variety of reasons.  It only represents FDI that it is officially reported to the government of China.  Some private Chinese investors do not report FDI flows.  China's official numbers miss FDI that passes through Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands and goes to many countries, including some in Africa.  Chinese FDI statistics do not include investment in the financial sector.  For example, China's $5.5 billion purchase of 20 percent of Standard Bank of South Africa is presumably not reflected in the cumulative figures for FDI to Africa.  China has also made several large investments in companies located in countries outside Africa that have significant holdings in Africa.  These investments would not appear in the cumulative figure for Africa.

This is a murky area.  Nevertheless, I believe it is correct to conclude that as of the end of 2011 China had more cumulative FDI in Africa than either South Africa or Malaysia  but not more than the UK, US, or France.