Time published on 16 January 2025 a commentary titled "Locals in Sudan Are Saving Lives that International Aid Agencies Can't Reach" by Karl Vick.
Sudan faces the world's largest humanitarian crisis, and the government has ceased to function. A grass roots campaign has created more than 600 pop-up community centers known as Emergency Response Rooms (EERs) to do what would normally be expected of a government.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury posted on 16 January 2025 a press release titled "Treasury Sanctions Leader of Sudanese Armed Forces and Weapons Supplier."
The US placed sanctions on Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the Defense Industries System, a procurement arm of the SAF. The sanctions resulted from "egregious war tactics" that constituted war crimes.
The New York Times published on 16 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Military Has Used Chemical Weapons Twice, U.S. Officials Say" by Declan Walsh and Julian E. Barnes.
Although not mentioned in the Treasury Department announcement, this report quotes US officials as stating that the SAF also used chemical weapons in Sudan.
The International Crisis Group posted on 16 January 2025 a 40-minute podcast titled "What to Expect from the New AU Mission in Somalia" with Paul Williams, George Washington University, and Omar Mahmood.
This is a discussion of the newly authorized five-year African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). It is arguably the most complex international peace mission in the world today. This is the third African Union peace mission in Somalia. AUSSOM is smaller in size compared to previous missions, but its purpose has not changed significantly from earlier missions. Williams discusses the challenges the Somali National Army faces working with AU peace forces.
The Council on Foreign Relations held on 16 January 2025 an hour-long podcast titled "Genocide in Sudan: A Conversation with U.S. Special Envoy Tom Perriello on the Ongoing War" hosted by Reuben Brigety.
This is a wide-ranging, thoughtful conversation with U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello based on his one-year role in this position just days before he finishes his service. He also brings into the discussion previous experience in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The Associated Press published on 15 January 2025 an article titled "India's Navy Launches Submarine, Warships to Guard against China's Presence in Indian Ocean" by Rafiq Maqbool and Ashok Sharma.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi commissioned this week at a Mumbai shipyard an India-made submarine, destroyer, and frigate in response to China's major naval buildup and growing effort to extend power into the Indian Ocean.
Aljazeera published on 14 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan Faces Possible Darfur Division as War Progresses, Say Analysts" by Mat Nashed.
Darfur, a region in western Sudan nearly the size of France, may become a separate entity under the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. If this happens, it could lead to additional geographical divisions in Sudan and the eventual collapse of the state.
Seatrade Maritime News published on 14 January 2025 an article titled "Over One Month since Last Confirmed Red Sea Attack on Shipping" by Gary Howard.
The last confirmed Houthi attack on Red Sea shipping took place on 10 December. This has been the quietest period for Houthi attacks since they began in late 2023. The likely explanation is the reduced availability of suitable targets and the military intervention by the United States and United Kingdom.
The Maritime Executive published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "China Wins Release of Fishing Boat Held off Somalia."
A Chinese fishing boat and its crew seized off Somalia by pirates in November has been released. The pirates demanded $10 million ransom for its release; China offered $1 million. It is unclear if China ultimately paid a ransom.
The Voice of America published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "Sahel Vacuum Provides Opportunity for China, Analysts Say" by Kate Bartlett.
As Western, especially French and American, influence decreases in Africa's Sahel region, China may be in a position to take advantage although, so far, Russia has been more aggressive. China is in a strong position to increase arms sales and military and police training but remains uninterested in kinetic military engagement.
The Hill published on 13 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's Descent into Chaos Demands Urgent Global Action" by Imran Khalid.
The situation in Sudan is dire as the world continues to focus on crises such as Gaza and Ukraine. Sudan's path to stability hinges on its people, the engagement of regional powers, and the international community to craft a political solution that ends the chaos.
The conservative American Enterprise Institute published on 6 January 2025 a commentary titled "Eritrea Is the North Korea of Africa: America Must Act" by Michael Rubin.
The author argues that while U.S. forces have no business in Eritrea nor would their deployment be wise, "the United States should openly support regime change." He adds that incoming President Donald Trump should empower his National Security Council and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs "to help Eritreans rid the world of one of its worst regimes."
Comment: While Eritrea is poorly governed and no friend of the United States, U.S. government supported regime change is not the answer. This is a task for Eritreans themselves. Any concerted effort by the United States to change the government in Eritrea will almost certainly end badly and even be resented by many Africans who also have a negative opinion of the regime.
The Sudan Tribune published on 11 January 2025 an article titled "Sudan's RSF Leader Admits Defeat in Al Jazirah State, Vows to Fight On."
The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) recaptured Wad Madani, a strategic crossroads 170 kilometers southeast of Khartoum, from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This was a major victory for the SAF just as it was for the RSF more than a year ago when it captured the town from the SAF. The RSF claimed the SAF victory was due to the use of Iranian drones, Eritrean forces, and Ethiopian Tigray militia fighters.
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies published in January 2025 an analysis titled "Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of Its African and Middle Eastern Clients?" by Antonio Giustozzi, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David Lewis.
This Whitehall Report looks at the Wagner Group from the perspective of its clients in four case studies: Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique, and Syria. In terms of support services such as training, advising and maintenance, Wagner's performance was rather undistinguished in the view of its clients. After the mutiny in 2023, most of Wagner's support services contracts were taken over without much trouble by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
With regard to Wagner's provision of ready-to-deploy combat units, as of 2024 it remained one of few entities willing to offer this service, as well as the most willing to deploy in very challenging environments. Attempts by the Russian Ministry of Defense to replace Wagner in such tasks following the mutiny were met with stubborn resistance by the Malian and CAR governments. The Syrian government, by contrast, was happy to see Wagner leave in 2023. In Mozambique, it was Wagner's leader Yevgeny Prigozhin who decided to bail out.
Overall, while Wagner was fairly successful in providing ready-to-deploy small armies in challenging environments, it was clearly exposed to the risk of ending up seriously embattled.
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies published on 7 January 2025 a commentary titled "What to Expect from Africa-China Relations in 2025" by Paul Nantulya.
China will continue to promote its governance model in Africa, enlist support to reshape global norms, secure the supply of critical minerals, strengthen party-to-party ties, and increase military outreach. The major items on the agenda of African countries are market access, balanced trade with China, and adding value to exports.
The China Global South Project published on 9 January 2025 a commentary titled "From 1991 to Today: The Significance of the Chinese Foreign Minister's Annual Africa Tour" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.
Every year since 1991, China's foreign minister has made his first overseas visit to Africa. On his current visit, Wang Yi is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. Each year much ink is spilled by China-Africa analysts trying to explain why the foreign minister visits the particular countries on the itinerary. The author rightly points out that these trips may simply be about normal, run-of-the-mill diplomacy and have no deeply strategic geopolitical or economically motivated explanation.
Deutsche Welle published on 8 January 2025 an article titled "Chinese FM's Africa Tour Is More than Symbolic" by Cai Nebe.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is making the 35th first overseas visit of the year to an African country. On this occasion, he is visiting Namibia, Republic of Congo, Chad, and Nigeria. This tradition has served China's African policy well over the years, especially when it is compared to the practices of Western governments.
Foreign Policy published on 6 January 2025 an article titled "The Houthis Are Undeterred" by Beth Sanner and Jennifer Kavanagh.
The US is burning through billions of dollars' worth of production of scarce munitions to combat the continuing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping using cheap drones and missiles. Washington may be spending as much as $570 million per month on a mission that has had limited success.
The Hill published on 7 January 2025 an article titled "US Determines Sudan Paramilitary Committed Genocide, Sanctions Leader" by Laura Kelly.
In a last-minute policy decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and allied militias committed genocide in Sudan. Blinken added this decision neither supports nor favors the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Both the RSF and SAF bear responsibility for the violence and suffering in Sudan.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued on 7 January 2025 a notice that it had sanctioned Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), the leader of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) for undermining the goal of a democratic transition in Sudan. It also sanctioned seven UAE-based companies for assisting the RSF in obtaining military equipment and generating finances to continue to fuel the conflict in Sudan.
The Atlantic Council posted on 2 January 2025 an analysis titled "Russia Is Making a Fragile Pivot from Syria to Libya. The West Should Beware Falling into a New Trap" by Emadeddin Badi.
As Russian forces are being pushed out of Syria, Moscow is relocating troops and hardware in eastern Libya, controlled by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army. Libya should not be seen as a fallback but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow's strategic hold in the region and to project power beyond it, especially in Africa. The West should avoid chasing a fleeting alliance with Haftar and focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.
The Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies published on 2 January 2025 an article titled "China Arming Houthi Rebels in Yemen in Exchange for Unimpeded Red Sea Passage."
US intelligence sources reportedly revealed that the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen are using Chinese-made weapons for their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in exchange for allowing Chinese vessels to pass freely.
The US Naval Institute News published on 2 January 2025 an article titled "Top Stories 2024: The Battle Between the Houthis and Commercial Shipping" by Heather Mongilio.
This is a review of Houthi attacks during 2024 on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and efforts by the United States and United Kingdom to bring them to an end.
Foreign Policy published on 31 December 2024 an analysis titled "The Illusion of Russian Security in Africa Has Been Shattered" by Samuel Ramani, CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk.
Due to Russia's setback in Syria, African autocracies are second-guessing Moscow's ability to serve as their last line of defense in a moment of crisis. In any event, Russia's track record for providing security in Africa has been underwhelming.
Libya and Sudan are highly problematic as replacement locations for Russian air and naval bases in Syria should they be asked to leave.
The China International Development Cooperation Agency published on 17 December 2024 an article titled "3rd China-Indian Ocean Forum on Development Cooperation Held in Kunming."
Wang Yong, vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, said at the opening ceremony of the China-Indian Ocean Forum that "the construction of a maritime community with a shared future is evolving from a Chinese initiative into a shared international goal."
India's Observer Research Foundation published on 30 December 2024 a commentary titled "Competitive Regionalism in the Indian Ocean" by Sayantan Haldar.
The Indian Ocean is witnessing competition for primacy between China and India. In 1997, India created the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) for Regional Cooperation. China has dialogue partner status. Since 2021, China has been convening the China-Indian Ocean Forum. India is not a member.
IORA is an intergovernmental forum that seeks to operate through diplomatic dialogue on issues of maritime security. The China-Indian Ocean Forum reinforces a client-patron dynamic between China and Indian Ocean littoral states, whereas IORA is a democratic forum fostering dialogue on issues of common interest.
The U.S. Naval Institute published in December 2024 an analysis titled "The U.S. Navy Must Preserve and Use the Lessons Learned from Red Sea Combat" by John Minor.
A U.S. Navy chief petty officer comments on lessons learned from Houthi attacks on American naval vessels in the Red Sea, especially the psychological implications and impact on the mental health of sailors.
