US AFRICOM Commander Says No Plans for Base in Somaliland

 Somalia Today published an article dated 1 August 2026 titled "AFRICOM Chief Rules Out US Military Base in Somaliland" by Mohamed Bashir.

General Dagvin Anderson, head of the US Africa Command, said in an interview published by the US embassy in Mogadishu on 31 July that "there are no plans to build a base in Somaliland."  He added that "US policy is and remains the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.  That has not changed."

The United States has maintained contact with Somaliland officials and supported development and security programs in the region without recognizing it as a separate state.  

UK Sanctions Illicit Gold Networks Fueling Sudan's War

 The UK government published on 16 July 2026 a press release titled "UK Sanctions Illicit Gold Networks Fueling Sudan's War Amid Crisis around El Obeid."

The UK government announced sanctions targeting the conflict gold trade in Sudan, procurement networks, and financial facilitators that are fueling the civil war in Sudan.  The sanctions focus primarily on the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces and UAE-based companies, but they include the Sudan Armed Forces and one Hong Kong-based company.  

Egypt Provides Drone Base against Sudan's Rapid Support Forces

 Modern Diplomacy published on 5 August 2026 a commentary titled "Cairo's Shadow War in Sudan: Drones, Borders and a Fading Army Ally" by Carla Davies.

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been engaged in conflict with the Sudan Armed Forces for more than three years.  Drones launched from inside Egypt have targeted the RSF inside Sudan for at least six months.  Egypt's strong support for the Sudan Armed Forces is linked in part to a coordinated Egypt-Sudan effort to counter Ethiopia's position on Nile water issues.

China's AI Systems Making Rapid Gains in Africa

 The New York Times published on 5 August 2026 an article titled "China's A.I. Is Surging Across Africa.  That Should Worry Silicon Valley" by Paul Mozur, Adam Satariano, and Aaron Krolik.

China's AI is surging in Africa where buyers look for the best possible system at the lowest possible cost.  The Chinese systems are publicly available to download and modify without payment or approval.  Xi Jinping is using AI as a form of Chinese soft power.

 

China and South Africa to Share Nuclear Waste Experiences

 SABC News posted on 4 August 2026 an article titled "SA Moves to Complete R2 Billion Radioactive Waste Management Facility."

South Africa's National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute signed a memorandum of understanding with the China National Nuclear Corporation to work together and share experiences.  

China's Reaction to Morocco's Ceuta Crisis

 The ChinaMed Project published on 5 August 2026 an analysis titled "Chinese Officials, Experts and Media Discuss the Ceuta Crisis" by Leonardo Bruni.

On 31 July, some 60,000 people crossed from Morocco into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast.  This analysis discusses how Chinese officials and media have framed the Ceuta crisis, and if Chinese analysts see it as evidence that internal European Union divisions could weaken the bloc's ability to respond to external threats, such as China's assertive trade policies.

By avoiding discussing responsibility or causes of the migrant surge, Beijing showed its interest in maintaining good relations with both Spain and Morocco.  The weakness of European solidarity was, however, a recurring theme.

US-China Competition for Ethiopia's New International Airport

 Business Insider Africa published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "Ethiopia's $12.5 Billion Airport Has Become the Latest Investment Battleground between the U.S. and China in Africa" by Solomon Ekanem.

The United States is seeking a role for its private sector companies in the development of Ethiopia's new $12.5 billion Bishoftu Airport as it challenges China's commanding position of building infrastructure projects in Africa by its state-owned companies.

The United States sees this as an opening for its construction and engineering companies and an opportunity to sell more Boeing aircraft to Ethiopian Airlines.  In addition, the Bishoftu Airport is a gateway to influence Africa's fast-growing aviation, logistics, and technology sectors.

How Many Deaths Is Demise of USAID Causing?

 The Economist published on 30 July 2026 an article titled "How Many People Are Dying as a Result of USAID's Demise?"

Elon Musk, who is responsible for dismantling the US Agency for International Development (USAID), insists it has not cost any human lives.  The influential publication, Lancet, estimates that by 2030, 14 million people will die as a result of USAID's demise.

The Economist explains that the drop in US health funding has been less cataclysmic than originally predicted and that early estimates of deaths drew on trends that may no longer be valid.  While the early estimates of deaths are too high, Musk's notion of zero deaths is plainly wrong. Lives have been lost.

Kenyan Bank Launches Renminbi Currency Payments with China

 Serrari posted on 4 August 2026 an article titled "Stanbic Bank Kenya Launches RMB Payments Through CIPS" by Montel Kamau.

Stanbic Bank Kenya has introduced direct Renminbi payment processing through China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS).  Businesses importing goods or services from China can now settle eligible transactions without routing every payment through longer conventional correspondent-banking chains.  

Comment:  This is one more indication of China's currency making inroads in the banking system of the Global South.  

How China and the US Pursue African Critical Minerals

 China-Africa Security Radar published on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Fragmented Leverage: Why African States Call for Collective Bargaining but Prefer Bilateralism in Critical Minerals Negotiations" by Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah.

The author explains how China and the United States seek advantage with African countries in bilateral negotiations in their quest for critical minerals.  China exploits bilateral negotiations through processing dominance and bundled infrastructure-mineral deals.  The United States pursues selective frameworks and corridor diplomacy.  

Ethiopians Flee Western Tigray into Sudan

 Radio France Internationale posted on 3 August 2026 an article titled "Hundreds Flee Ethiopia to War-torn Sudan Following New Fighting in Tigray."

Hundreds of Ethiopians fled to Sudan following the outbreak of conflict on 1 August between federal government troops and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in western Tigray region.  They joined thousands of Ethiopian refugees inside Sudan from the 2020-2022 war between the Ethiopian army and the TPLF.

Zambia Ends Raw Copper Exports to China and Elsewhere

 Business Insider Africa published on 27 July 2026 an article titled "Africa's Second-largest Copper Producer Curbs Raw Copper Exports and Makes Demands of Chinese Firms" by Awogbemila Temitope.

The Zambian government has restricted unrefined copper exports to force foreign mining and industrial companies to build local processing plants.  Chinese companies invest heavily in Zambia's mining sector and will be the most impacted by this policy change.

Is China Importing Illicit Uranium from the DRC?

 Netherlands-based Lighthouse Reports published on 30 July 2026 a report titled "Congo's Hidden Uranium Exports."

China imports 95 percent of the cobalt exported by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Uranium is present in significant quantities in DRC cobalt.  Chinese companies mine the ore, which is then refined in China.  

China has added significantly to its nuclear weapons stockpile in recent years.  Lighthouse Reports argues that China's increase in weapons far exceeds the uranium it mines domestically or that which it receives on the basis of reported imports.  It concludes that much of the uranium for nuclear weapons is imported surreptitiously from the DRC.

Red Sea Security and US Policy

 The Congressional Research Service published on 21 July 2026 a brief titled "Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy" by Christopher M. Blanchard.

In March 2025, the Trump administration designated the Iranian-backed Houthis a Foreign Terrorist Organization.  On March 15, 2025, U.S. forces began a military campaign against the Houthis which the administration said was intended to compel them to end attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.  The United States and the Houthis agreed to a truce in May 2025, which continues to hold.  

State of Somalia in 2025

 The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies published in July 2026 a report titled "State of Somalia 2025."

The report reviews the major political, security, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, and regional developments that shaped Somalia in 2025.  Somalia recorded notable gains in international diplomacy, institutional development, regional integration, and state visibility.  It also experienced persistent political polarization, federal-state tensions, humanitarian vulnerability, and unresolved questions surrounding constitutional and electoral processes that continued to challenge state-building efforts.

Somalia demonstrated growing international relevance and achieved several important diplomatic and institutional milestones.  Yet progress remained constrained by external interference, including Israel's violation of Somalia's sovereignty through its recognition of Somaliland, alongside political fragmentation, unresolved constitutional questions, persistent insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises.

Background of Houthis' Red Sea Blockade

 Pakistan's South Asian Chronicle published on 1 August 2026 an article titled "Houthi Red Sea Crisis."

This is a nice summary of the background of the Houthi blockade of the Red Sea and relations with Saudi Arabia.  

Why Is the State Department Slashing Visa Processing Across Africa?

 The State Department published on 15 July 2026 an announcement titled "Realignment of U.S. Visa Services in Africa to Regional Hubs."

Effective August 1, the Department of State ended routine visa services at the following 25 US embassies and consulates in Sub-Saharan Africa: Antananarivo (Madagascar), Abuja (Nigeria), Asmara (Eritrea), Bamako (Mali), Banjul (The Gambia), Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Bujumbura (Burundi), Conakry (Guinea), Cotonou (Benin), Durban (South Africa), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Gaborone (Botswana), Harare (Zimbabwe), Juba (South Sudan), Libreville (Gabon), Lilongwe (Malawi), Lusaka (Zambia), Maputo (Mozambique), Maseru (Lesotho), Mbabane (Eswatini), N'Djamena (Chad), Niamey (Niger), Nouakchott (Mauritania), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Windhoek (Namibia). 

Instead, persons seeking visas to visit the United States in the countries cited above will have to travel to a regional visa hub in one of the following 20 cities: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), Accra (Ghana), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Cape Town (South Africa), Dakar (Senegal), Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania), Djibouti (Djibouti), Johannesburg (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), Kigali (Rwanda), Kinshasa (DRC), Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), Luanda (Angola), Malabo (Equatorial Guinea), Monrovia (Liberia), Nairobi (Kenya), Port Louis (Mauritius), Praia (Cape Verde), and Yaoundé (Cameroon).

The Department of State said it is realigning visa operations in Sub-Saharan Africa as "part of a long-standing Department practice that strengthens national security by promoting more uniform screening, vetting, and adjudication standards, as well as improves efficiency."  

Comment:  The national security explanation is not convincing.  For example, a consular officer located in Lusaka can adjudicate a visa application just as uniformly and accurately as one at a visa hub in Johannesburg.  In fact, a consular officer located in the country of application has a better understanding of the applicant's background than a consular officer in another country.  Nor is the realignment likely to save much money.  US embassies and consulates are still expected to provide routine passport and protection services for American citizens.  The consular sections in most embassies and consulates in Africa are small with one individual often handling both visa services and assistance to American citizens.  

What the realignment will do is make it more difficult for many Africans to visit relatives in the United States, study at American universities, and travel for tourism and business.  The geography of the realignment means, for example, that the entire Sahel region and all of southern Africa except South Africa and Angola will no longer have local non-immigrant and immigrant visa services provided by US embassies and consulates.  This raises the question.  Is the real reason for this realignment to make it more difficult for Sub-Saharan Africans to come to the United States?  Whatever the rationale, the State Department has just handed another victory to China and Russia.  

 

Sudan's Rapid Support Forces Still Holds Sudanese Journalists

 The Committee to Protect Journalists posted on 30 July 2026 a press release titled "CPJ Calls for Release of Ailing Sudanese Journalists Held by RSF, Protection of Darfur 24 Reporters."

The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces kidnapped three Nyala radio station journalists in February and threatened Darfur 24 reporters.  The Committee to Protect Journalists called for the release of the journalists and condemnation of the threats against Darfur 24 reporters.

Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?

 The China Global South Project published on 31 July 2026 an analysis titled "Are Chinese and Turkish Drones Fueling Conflicts in Africa?" by Christian Geraud Neema Byamungu.  

China and Türkiye are Africa's primary supplier of drones, which increasingly are used in conflict situations.  Türkiye sells them directly to African militaries engaged in conflict, including in Libya, Sudan, DRC, and Rwanda.  China sells them directly to both conflicting parties in the DRC and Rwanda but those used by Marshall Haftar's army in Libya and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in Sudan were transferred by the UAE.

The author concluded that while these drone sales do not start wars, both China and Türkiye insert themselves into pre-existing conflicts fueled by political rivalries, regional tensions, and economic interests.

Ethiopia's Economic Outlook

 Nanyang Technological University published on 6 July 2026 an article titled "Assessing Ethiopia's Economic Reform and Outlook" by Rafiq Raji.  

Ethiopia's economic growth since 2022 has averaged about 8.5 percent and is projected to maintain that rate at least until 2030, assuming there are no catastrophic events such as a war in Tigray region or with Eritrea.  Inflation is trending down and Ethiopia has restructured its significant level of debt.  The country's exports are doing well.